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Abstract 
The topics of business model innovation (BMI) and organizational design have potentially 
important links. And yet, there has been little cross-fertilization of ideas between the two fields. The 
purpose of this thesis is to fill that gap by proposing and developing an organizational view of BMI 
that focuses on the missing links between business model innovation and organizational design 
theory. Guided by the research question—what is the role of organizational design in the process of 
business model innovation?—the thesis not only investigates how BMI activity unfolds, but also 
looks at the different roles of the firm’s organizational design and where the activity takes place. 
Moreover, this research provides ample detail on how organizational complementarities emerge or 
vanish as a result of the fit or misfit between business model elements and design choices. To drive 
home these important points, I rely on insights from a multiple-case study of three pharmaceutical 
companies: Novo Nordisk, UCB and LEO Pharma.    
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Resumé 
Emnerne for forretningsmodelinnovation (FMI) og organisationsdesign har potentielt vigtige 
forbindelser. Og dog har der kun været lidt krydsbefrugtning af ideer mellem de to felter. Formålet 
med denne afhandling er at udfylde dette hul ved at foreslå og udvikle et organisatorisk syn på FMI, 
der fokuserer på de manglende forbindelser mellem forretningsmodelinnovation og teori om 
organisationsdesign. Styret af forskningsspørgsmålet—hvilken rolle har organisationsdesign i 
processen med innovation af forretningsmodel?—denne afhandling undersøger ikke kun, hvordan 
FMI-aktiviteter udfolder sig, men ser også på de forskellige roller for virksomhedens 
organisationsdesign og hvor aktiviteten finder sted. Desuden giver den rigelige detaljer om, hvordan 
organisatoriske komplementariteter fremkommer eller forsvinder som følge af sammenhæng eller 
mangel på sammenhæng mellem forretningsmodelelementer og designvalg. Til belysning af disse 
vigtige punkter, anvender jeg indsigter fra en multipel case-undersøgelse af tre farmaceutiske 
virksomheder: Novo Nordisk, UCB og LEO Pharma.        
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The Need for an Organizational Design View of Business Model 
Innovation 
This thesis seeks to understand business model innovation (BMI) through the lens of organizational 
design theory. BMI can be defined as the reconfiguration of a firm’s core business model elements 
and/or architecture by weaving these elements together into a system that will enable the firm to 
create and deliver value to its target segment(s) (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Santos, Spector, and Van der 
Heyden, 2009). Notions such as “configuration,” “system,” “model,” and “architecture” are at the 
core of the BMI construct (Foss and Saebi, 2015). However, I would argue that scholars can benefit 
from additionally incorporating constructs related to organizational design, such as information 
processing (e.g., Simon, 1945; Thompson, 1967), contingency and fit (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967), organizational structure (e.g., Child, 1972), complementarities (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990) and interdependence (Aiken and Hage, 1968), into the BMI concept. This is because the 
designable parts of an organization serve as levers that managers can pull to reorient the strategic 
direction of the organization by, for example, defining new work roles and responsibilities, 
changing communication flows and channels, or introducing new rules and targets, or other 
elements of planning. Since the ability to change an incumbent business model (BM) usually 
involve changes along these dimensions, the firm’s organizational design is likely to influence the 
quality, type, extent and degree of BMI that it achieves. In other words, the literature on BMI and 
the theory of organizational design should be considered in tandem. And yet, in spite of the 
apparent linkages between these two bodies of literature, such a connection has not received 
sufficient scholarly attention. This gap provides the basic motivation for this thesis.  
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How, then, might BMI and organizational design be related? Do managers need to redesign 
their organizations in order to drive and implement BMI? Or, does BMI lead to new organizational 
designs? And if organizational design plays a role in the process of BMI, what is that role, exactly? 
Where in the organization does BMI take place? How does organizational design influence which 
part of the BM gets innovated, and by whom? How does organizational design affect the 
characteristics and quality of BMI outcomes? 
These questions are important to address because their answers can help elucidate the holistic 
nature of BMI. In contrast to more partial theoretical explanations such as the value chain (1985), 
the resource-based view (e.g., Barney, 1991), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) and 
strategic network theory (Jarillo, 1995), the BMI construct not only explains the what (e.g., the 
fundamental value proposition(s) by which the firm can satisfy specific customer segments) and the 
how (e.g., the structure and processes required to realize the relevant value proposition at a profit), 
but also ensures integration between the two. The way in which this is achieved “can be highly 
firm-specific and may thus serve to differentiate the firm in the marketplace” (Foss and Saebi, 
2015: 2).  
An example. Through BMI, Southwest Airlines has managed to sustain company growth for 
three decades. Not surprisingly, several competitors (e.g., JetBlue, RyanAir, United Express) have 
attempted to copy Southwest’s BM in whole or in part, but “none of these firms has achieved the 
level of success as Southwest, especially in head-to-head competition with the firm” (Morris, 
Schindehutte, and Allen, 2005: 732). Due to the firm specificity and underlying complexity that 
such innovations involve (Foss and Saebi, 2015), competitors have a hard time replicating them 
within their own organizational context, as opposed to, for example, copying a new product or a 
single process. This is the reason why the BMI phenomenon has attracted major scholarly interest 
in recent years. But it is also due to the holistic nature of BMI that the literature currently lacks the 
theoretical underpinnings and cumulative empirical base to fully explain the concept. For instance, 
Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2013: 480) note that BMI is “a slippery construct to study.” 
Relatedly, Foss and Saebi (2017: 203) argue that the “literature does not possess clearly articulated 
research models that lay out the basic causal web-connecting antecedents, moderating, mediating 
variables with the key constructs and consequences.” 
The Need for an Organizational Design View of Business Model Innovation 
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However, by adopting an organizational design view, we might be able to provide the much 
needed theoretical basis to explain BMI. Taking the example of Southwest Airlines again, the firm’s 
business model changes related to short haul, high frequency, point-to-point service; careful 
selection of airports; flights into uncongested airports; use of Boeing 737 aircraft; and 
differentiation are achieved by emphasizing on-time arrival, low fares, and a good passenger 
experience (Morris et al., 2005). To achieve this, top management made a number of organizational 
design choices (for a more detailed description see Gittell, 2003). First, they assigned significant 
decision-making authority to the frontline supervisors, enabling those supervisors to rapidly resolve 
day-to-day issues. Second, rather than hiring high performers or superstars, they made a deliberate 
effort to recruit people who excelled at working in teams. Third, so-called “boundary spanners” 
were brought in to improve coordination and knowledge sharing, as well as to build relationships 
across boundaries and provide flexibility. Fourth, new team-based performance measures were 
implemented to avoid “pointing the finger and blaming other departments” (Gittell, 2003: 5), and to 
improve learning. Finally, management introduced highly flexible job descriptions. Although “at 
Southwest everyone’s job description [was] clear and specific, […] there [was] an added 
requirement that each employee [was] expected to do whatever [was] needed to enhance the overall 
operation—even if that [meant] helping out with a different type of job as required (Gittell, 2003: 
5). This reduced the status barriers between various job positions and helped foster stronger co-
worker relationships (Gittell, 2003). As this example illustrates, a firm’s organizational design does 
play a significant role in coordinating BMI activities and supporting integration between the what 
and the how. Equally important, however, is the fact that organizational design belongs to a much 
more established field of research with relatively robust theoretical underpinnings and research 
foundations. As such, the field of organizational design offers a highly useful starting point upon 
which to ground research on BMI. 
Practical applications of joining BMI and organizational design theory, yet with little 
contact made so far. An organizational design understanding can be highly valuable to practitioners 
and managers, because it could spell the difference between a successful and unsuccessful 
implementation of BMI. For example, such knowledge can help managers choose appropriate 
organizational design mechanisms for specific types of BMI, and understand how these 
mechanisms may act during different stages of the BMI process. In other words, an organizational 
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design view can help managers make more informed decisions about BMI. Moreover, BMI is often 
formulated and described in rather abstract terms. For example, Easyjet’s owner Stelios Haji-
Ioannou conceptualized the firm’s business model (BM) as a fixed capacity, high fixed-cost service, 
with price-elastic demand (Doz and Kosonen, 2010). Similarly, Foss and Saebi (2015: 1) state that 
“business models are sometimes characterized as mental constructs—presumably mainly residing in 
the upper managerial echelons of a company.” This level of abstraction has made increasingly 
difficult for managers to determine which action to take. However, by specifying new work tasks, 
responsibilities, budget allocations, rules and targets, BMI is made more concrete and attainable at 
the lower organizational levels. This is particularly important given the holistic and systemic 
features of such innovations—BMI does not, after all, solely occur in the upper echelons of 
organizations. Furthermore, as both organizational design theory and BMI deal with strategy 
implementation, innovation, and complementarities, one would expect an extensive cross-
fertilization between the two fields, simply because so many interesting and practical research 
possibilities emerge when we think of BMI in terms of concrete organizational design choices. And 
yet, aside from a few recent studies (e.g., Foss and Saebi, 2015; Foss and Saebi, 2017), there has 
been relatively little contact between the two fields. Although organizational design scholars have 
dedicated considerable attention to different innovation types (such as product, process, and 
organizational innovation) and dimensions (such as incremental, radical, modular and architectural 
innovations), they have ignored BMI. Research on BMI is still in its infancy and thus has not yet 
been fully integrated into the more established theories of strategic management. As a consequence, 
no serious theory or framework of the organizational design of BMI exists to guide academics and 
practitioners toward an enriched understanding of the kind of problems that intimately link the two 
phenomena. 
What can each field learn from the other? A robust of theory BMI should attempt to specify 
the dimensions of the phenomenon, the (contextual) conditions under which it is more or less likely 
to occur, the manner in which it is manifest, and other related factors (e.g., strategy, structure and 
environment). In the contemporary BMI literature, BMI is usually conceptualized as an 
organizational change process that places heavy demands on top management’s ability to lead 
change (e.g., Achtenhagen, Melin, and Naldi, 2013; Stieglitz and Foss, 2015) and develop new 
capabilities (e.g., Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Leih, Linden, and Teece, 2015) and learning processes 
The Need for an Organizational Design View of Business Model Innovation 
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(e.g., Chanal and Caron-Fasan, 2010; McGrath, 2010; Cavalcante, 2014) in order to create and 
capture more value (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu, 2013; Berglund and Sandström, 2013). 
However, as alluded to above, BMI is about much more than that. It is about designing a new 
architecture that specifies the functional relationships among the various BM elements and 
underlying organizational activities (Santos et al., 2009; Foss and Saebi, 2017) so as to promote a 
value-enhancing effect across a system of interdependent activities (i.e. complementarities).  
A holistic view of BMI thus requires an understanding of the organizational design aspects of 
the BMI function. Similarly, I believe that organizational design theory can be improved by 
seriously considering the systemic characteristics of BMI. The concept of complementarity has 
become a bedrock proposition in the literature on organizational design, yet relatively little is 
known about the conditions under which complementarities takes place, or about the characteristics 
of the elements or factors among which complementarities exists (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; 
Porter and Siggelkow, 2008; Ennen and Richter, 2009). While organizational design only deals with 
the designable elements of an organization, the BMI construct builds upon and extends central ideas 
from business strategy and its associated theoretical traditions (such as competitive strategy, value 
chain, the resource-based view, and network theory). Such a holistic approach may be better able to 
capture the systemic nature of the interrelationships between heterogeneous elements (e.g., strategy, 
BM, organizational structure, environment, etc.) that are likely to influence complementarities, 
rather than merely looking at the designable parts of organizations. In sum, the BMI literature and 
the theory of organizational design have much to gain from cross-fertilization. However, they must 
first be brought together. In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly map out the current research 
landscape in the BMI and organizational design fields, and further address the need for integration 
efforts between the two disciplines.  
Research on BMI 
During the last decade and a half, the BM construct has attracted substantial attention from both 
management scholars and practitioners (see Zott, Amit, and Massa (2011) for a comprehensive 
review of the literature). A BM outlines “the manner by which the enterprise delivers value to 
customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those payments to profit” (Teece, 2010: 
172). In its orientation, it draws on and extends insights from the established corpus of strategic 
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management, including Porter’s value chain, the resource-based view, and the transaction cost 
approach. It is presumably this ability to integrate diverse concepts and theories that has given rise 
to the construct’s growing popularity and adoption. BM, then, is a holistic construct that not only 
defines “the structure of the interlocking activities associated with key strategic choices,” but also 
the way in which the value chain is set up in order to “[realize] the relevant value proposition, and 
the mechanisms of value capture that the firm deploys, including its competitive strategy” (Foss and 
Saebi, 2015: 1).       
Research on the BM construct has served a host of different purposes, providing, for example, 
(1) a classification scheme of firms (e.g., Timmer, 1998; Rappa; 2000; Amit and Zott, 2001; 
Osterwalder, Pigneur, and Tucci, 2005); (2) antecedents of heterogeneity in firm performance (e.g., 
Zott and Amit 2010; Weill, Malone, D’Urso, Herman, and Woerner, 2005); (3) a new vehicle and 
source of innovation (e.g., Teece, 2010; Markides, 2006), and (4) a way to integrate different 
theories (cf. George and Bock, 2011).   
More recently, the notion of business model innovation has come into prominence as drivers 
such as globalization, deregulation and technological change have profoundly altered the 
environment of several industries and rendered more traditional types of innovation (e.g., product 
and process) less effective. Many scholars seem to agree on the strategic importance of BMI as a 
key driver of firm performance (cf. Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010; Ho, Fang, and Hsieh, 2011; 
Zott and Amit, 2007) as well as a vehicle for organizational change and renewal (Demil and 
Lecocq, 2010; Ireland, Hitt, Camp, and Sexton, 2001; Johnson, Christensen, and Kagermann, 2008; 
Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodríguez, and Velamuri, 2010). BMI can also be used to cope with contingencies, 
both external (such as new entrants and changing regulations) and internal (such as organizational 
or managerial factors) (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2013), and it “complements the 
traditional subjects of process, product, and organizational innovation” (Zott et al., 2011: 1032). 
Scholars seem to agree that the most successful firms under new circumstances seem to be the ones 
that can take advantage of structural changes to innovate incumbent BMs in order to compete 
‘differently.’ An illustrative example is IBM, which successfully transformed its incumbent BM 
from mainly product-based to service-based in order to better meet customers’ IT needs. In 2006, 
the majority of the company’s $90-billion revenue was generated by its IBM Global Services arm, a 
business that had not been in existence fifteen years prior (Chesbrough, 2007). The importance of 
The Need for an Organizational Design View of Business Model Innovation 
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BMI is also being recognized by other business executives. By interviewing 765 corporate and 
public leaders worldwide, consultants from IBM Global Business Services found that firms that 
were financial outperformers put twice as much focus on BMI as underperformers (Pohle and 
Chapman, 2006). 
In spite of these efforts and increasing recognition, the BMI literature remains 
underdeveloped, both theoretically and empirically, “perhaps reflecting that the BMI literature is 
more recent than the BM literature” (Foss and Saebi, 2017: 201). As a consequence, the field of 
research is currently disorganized and largely a descriptive rather than a normative discipline. This 
is particularly evident in the heterogeneity with which scholars attempt to define and conceptualize 
the construct. For example, some scholars take a process view of BMI by associating it with 
experimentation, learning and transformation (e.g., Aspara, Lamberg, and Laukia, 2011; McGrath, 
2010; Cavalcante, 2014), while others attempt to classify it according to its innovative outcomes 
(e.g., Velamuri, Anant, and Kumar, 2015; Sabatier, Mangematin, and Rousselle, 2010).  
On the definitional issue, it has been argued that BMI occurs when a firm changes at least one 
of its core BM elements (e.g., Abdelkafi, Makhotin, and Posselt, 2013; Amit and Zott, 2012), or 
introduces a fundamentally different BM (e.g., Markides, 2006; Khanagha, Volberda, and Oshri, 
2014). This lack of agreement and specificity in defining BMI reflects a deep conceptual ambiguity 
about the meaning, scope and relevance of the BMI construct. In a recent, and, to my knowledge, 
the first, systematic review of the BMI literature, Foss and Saebi (2017) raise similar concerns. 
They find that: (1) the different research streams regarding BMI have largely developed in parallel, 
with little cross-fertilization; (2) the literature in general faces problems with respect to construct 
clarity; (3) the basic causal web linking antecedent, moderating, and mediating variables is ill-
understood; and (4) such characteristics of the field have resulted in little cumulative theorizing, and 
a lack of a sustained data collection analysis.     
As mentioned earlier, organizational design theory may provide a theoretically and 
empirically grounded initial reference from which more robust theorization about the causes, 
processes, and consequences of BMI can emerge. While the contemporary BMI literature has given 
some attention to the roles of corporate strategy, cognition, learning, experimentation, resources, 
capabilities and leadership, surprisingly little is known about the role of organizational design in the 
process of BMI. That is, although BMI frequently involves reconfiguring core elements and/or the 
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architecture/structure of the BM, the extent to which organizational design variables need to be 
changed to accommodate BMI and the extent to which the implementation of BMI requires a new 
organizational design configuration are issues that have scarcely been touched upon (Foss and 
Saebi, 2017).   
Organizational design theory 
Organizational design is a well-established and influential theory within strategic management 
research. In particular, much attention has been devoted to the redesign of the firm’s internal 
organization via modification of structures, control mechanisms, information-processing 
mechanisms, decision-making systems, and reward and incentive systems; this has accompanied the 
emergence of entirely new organization types specialized to compete in dynamic, information-rich 
environments (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Schoonhoven and Jelinek, 1990; Damanpour, 1991; Nohria 
and Eccles, 1992; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995; O’Reilly and Tushman, 1996; Ilinitch, 
D’Aveni, and Lewin, 1996; Damanpour and Gopalakrishnan, 1998; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; 
Zenger, 2002; Foss, 2003). More specifically, in the strategic management literature, the 
organizational design view of the firm has been associated with improved strategy implementation 
(e.g., Noble, 1999; Govindarajan, 1988), coordination (e.g., Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Tushman 
and Nadler, 1978), firm performance (e.g., Armour and Teece, 1978; Dalton, Todor, and Spendolini, 
1980), and innovation (e.g., Daft, 1978).  
The reason driving management scholars’ attraction to organizational design probably lies in 
the construct’s contingency approach. Essentially, contingency theory is based on the assumptions 
that “there is no one best way to organize, [and] any way of organizing is not equally effect” 
(Galbraith, 1973: 2), and that the best way to organize depends on the characteristics of the 
environment in which the organization is embedded (Scott, 1998). The argument that there is no one 
best way is supported by the work of several scholars who came to the following similar 
conclusions: that different environments place differing requirements on organizations (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967); that mechanistic structures are more appropriate for stable industries, while 
organic structures are more suitable for industries undergoing change (Burns and Stalker, 1961); 
that bureaucracies, in particular, are not unitary, and take various forms depending on the setting 
(Pugh, Hickson, and Hinnings, 1969); and that intervention strategies vary to the extent that such 
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strategies need to be aligned with organizational change issues (Harrison, 1973). Thus, according to 
Scott (1998: 96), “contingency theory is guided by the general orienting hypothesis that 
organizations whose internal features best match the demands of their environments will achieve 
the best adaptation.”  
In other words, the formal parts of an organization can be designed to better “fit” one another 
in such a way that not only enable the firm to deal with different environmental contingencies, but 
allow the firm to realize complementarities. In its most general form, the notion of complementarity 
denotes a synergistic interaction of the design elements of a system, where doing more of one thing 
increases the returns from doing more of another (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). As such, it would 
seem that realizing complementarities should be a key objective of the strategic organization 
designer; however, it should be noted that complementarities can also entail negative consequences. 
For example, complementarities in tightly coupled systems may raise barriers to organizational 
change, as change in one element both requires and impacts change in many or all other elements of 
that system (Gates, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1996; Matsuyama, 1995). In addition, complementarities 
may be complex, with multiple local equilibrium points that are by no means apparent to the 
decision maker, and that can only be approximated through more-or-less deliberate search processes 
(Foss and Stieglitz, 2015; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Stieglitz and Heine, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the complexity emerging from such complementarities makes them more difficult for 
would-be imitators to copy than stand-alone practices (Barney, 1991; Porter and Rivkin, 1998).   
Another reason for popularity of organizational design theory is that design choices can be 
readily implemented, in contrast to softer and more informal dimensions such as organizational 
culture and identity. While it can take several years to change an organization’s culture or identify, 
top management can, within a relatively short period of time, restructure the entire organization. 
Thus, the designable elements of an organization “represent some of the most powerful strategic 
levers available to the top management of the modern corporation” (Gulati, Puranam, and Tushman, 
2009: 575). Moreover, the firm’s organizational design can serve to improve its durability, 
reliability and legitimacy. First, compared to other social structures, organizations can be designed 
in such a way as to persist over time by routinely and continuously supporting various efforts across 
a set of specified activities (Hannan and Carroll, 1995). During times of strategic and/or 
environmental change, such durability can offer stability to organizational members and allow for 
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change to better manifest. Second, organizational design provides reliability in the sense that 
structures, rules and routines can be designed to continuously perform the same activities. This 
enables managers to more easily analyze how well the company is performing, and where 
efficiency and effectiveness gains can be achieved. Third, legitimacy is achieved by implementing 
rules, job descriptions, functions, etc., that provide both guidelines and justifications to the external 
environment for decisions and activities (Hannan and Carroll, 1995; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
In short, the field of organizational design is a vibrant area of research that has been used to 
address a number of important strategic management questions. Due to its long tradition, it has a 
solid theoretical foundation and a robust empirical literature. In this thesis, I define organizational 
design as involving “decisions about the configuration of the formal organizational arrangements, 
including the formal structures, processes, and systems that make up an organization” (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1997: 48). In important respects, as I argue below, incorporating organizational design 
can further the BMI literature in a fundamental way, because organizational design theory addresses 
important issues regarding conceptualization, coordination, implementation, systemic systems, 
complementarities, and organizational change, which have been largely overlooked in BMI 
research.    
The potential for cross-fertilization  
The research literatures on BMI and organizational design theory can, I believe, be fruitfully 
combined to form a much needed theory or research model of BMI and advance our understanding 
of organizational complementarities. The questions that emerge from the union of these two fields 
are likely to draw attention to the locus of BMI. While a clear definition of BMI remains elusive, 
there is some agreement in the literature that BMI attempts to answer three questions: What is the 
value offering (i.e., the core elements that constitute the BM)?; Who is the target market segment?; 
and (with emphasis), How is the offering developed and delivered to the customer? (i.e., How do 
the elements work together?) (cf. Santos, Spector, and Van der Heyden, 2015). The last question 
includes the issue of how experimentation with and exploitation of BMI is organized, planned, 
evaluated, and implemented within the firm. Despite the importance of this final point, scholars 
have mainly been preoccupied with answering the what and who questions. As such, little work has 
been done to move the field closer to understanding how and where BMI activity takes place. This 
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has been a concern for Zott and Amit (2013: 407), who note in their recent review that the extant 
literature has not been able to answer with precision the following:  
Why and how do business models come into being? Do they emerge as part of evolutionary 
dynamics, or are they purposefully designed by entrepreneurial actors? And what are the 
implications of these various processes for the resulting business model design? What is the 
role of the environment and social processes in shaping business models? How much 
variation is there among business models, and what types and extent of variation really 
matters (e.g. for value creation or for value capture by the focal firm)?  
There are a few notable exceptions that specifically deal with the how by, for example, emphasizing 
the importance of an organizational dimension of BMI, including the role of the firm’s formal and 
informal (social) structures (see, e.g., Santos et al., 2009; Foss and Saebi, 2015; Foss and Saebi, 
2017).  
Advancing the literature on BMI. Along similar lines, I argue that organizational design 
theory is particularly well suited to understanding not only where BMI emerges, but also how it can 
be implemented, managed and even exploited. For example, high-powered incentives and decision 
rights can be delegated to cross-functional work teams, thereby creating a context in which new BM 
ideas can flourish. When an appropriate idea has been identified, BM experiment(s) can be set up 
within a new sub-unit or function that has its own dedicated resources and staff to demonstrate 
proof of concept. If the experimentation phase is successful, the proposed BM changes can be rolled 
out to other parts of the organization through formalized rules and procedures, which can then be 
used to refine and modify the new BM in order to fully exploit the opportunities presented by the 
changes. As noted previously, the interplay between underlying design choices and the core 
elements of the BM creates a complex system whose parts “interact in a nonsimple way” (Simon, 
1962: 468). As a result, while competitors might be able to identify the reasons why a particular 
company possesses a competitive advantage, they have a harder time decomposing the complex 
system that constitutes the basis for this advantage. Moreover, in contrast to new strategies, product 
pipelines, and merger and acquisition activities that in many cases are publicly available (e.g., in 
annual reports), some elements of design (such as specific organizational tasks, rules, targets and 
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reward systems) are usually only visible to, and understood by, the people who carry them out on a 
daily basis (i.e., the members of the organization). 
However, a firm’s organizational design may also raise barriers to BMI. As explained by 
Sosna et al. (2010: 384), “while great and winning business models often appear to have gone 
straight from drawing board into implementation leading the firm to glory and success, in reality 
new business models rarely work the first time around, since decision makers face difficulties at 
both exploratory and implementation stages.” In the exploratory stage, due to the durable, reliable 
and legitimate nature of organizational design, it might be difficult to convince top management to 
authorize the allocation of resources toward implementing a new BM characterized by high degree 
of uncertainty and unpredictability. This is especially true for organizations that have been 
influenced by particular sub-units over longer periods of time (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Mintzberg, 
1983). During the implementation stage, due to the systemic nature of BMI, organizational 
realignment is required, including the need for decision makers to mobilize scarce resources, 
develop new capabilities and adjust organizational structures and processes to promote, learning, 
change and adaptation (cf. Zott et al., 2011). In other words, disregarding the systemic properties of 
BMI can lead to substantial coordination costs. As noted by Zenger (2002, cited in Foss 2003: 337), 
“changing one element in an isolated way is likely to set in motion (possibly unforeseen) processes 
of change in other elements because the system will grope toward an equilibrium where all 
elements have changed.” 
Advancing organizational design theory. An improved understanding of the BMI construct 
can also advance the theory of organizational design. Ever since the seminal work of Burns and 
Stalker (1961), organizational design scholars have mainly distinguished between mechanistic and 
organic forms of organizational design. However, cataclysmic changes (such as the proliferation of 
Internet and communication technologies, globalization and hyper-competition) occurring in the 
environment of organizations call for new forms of design. For example, scholars have begun to 
express avid interest in the project-based organization (Hobday, 2000; Sydow, Lindkvist, and 
DeFillippi, 2004), internal hybrids (Zenger, 2002; Foss, 2003), the virtual enterprise (Mowshowitz, 
1997; Afsarmanesh and Camarinha-Matos, 2005), the modular organization (Sanchez and Mahoney, 
1996; Schilling, 2000; Hoetker, 2006), the boundaryless organization (Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick, and 
Kerr, 2002), the ambidextrous organizations (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004), and so on. Despite 
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these efforts, however, there is still a lack of knowledge about why and, particularly, how new 
organizational design forms come into being (cf. Romanelli, 1991; Lewin, Volberda, 1999). A better 
understanding of the dimensions of BMI may aid in this regard. Specifically, BMI varies with 
respect to the type, extent and degree of change. While some instances “may involve relatively 
minor connected changes, [others] may be massive corporate-wide processes that involve basically 
all employees and all processes and activities” (Stieglitz and Foss, 2015: 104). Such heterogeneity 
is likely to be reflected in the firm’s choice of organizational design. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, I argue that the holistic nature of BMI is particularly well-suited to developing an 
understanding of not only how organizational complementarities are obtained, but also the 
challenges and difficulties that result from such a complementary logic. 
Research aim and design 
The overall research question guiding this thesis is What is the role of organizational design 
in the process of BMI? In particular, this thesis aims to further our knowledge about BMI and 
organizational design in two ways. First, I aim to demonstrate to scholars in both fields, although 
mainly to BMI scholars, the potential for gains from cross-fertilization (Chapters 2 and 3). In this 
regard, I introduce a new process framework that encompasses the stages through which BMI 
comes about and discuss the multiple roles of organizational design in this framework (Chapter 9). 
Second, similarly to Siggelkow (2001, 2002), this thesis adds to existing research on 
complementarities by providing ample detail on how organization-specific factors (such as industry, 
strategy, structure and BM) relate to one another and thus influence how firms go about changing, 
implementing and/or preserving various elements of their BMs. To drive home these insights, I 
adopt an inductive, multiple-case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989) (Chapter 5), in which I examine 
three select players in the pharmaceutical industry—namely, Novo Nordisk, LEO Pharma and UCB 
Pharma (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). While these firms differ markedly across a number of basic 
dimensions (such as disease target, firm size, and firm age), they all face the challenge of 
redesigning their organization to accompany an on-going process of BMI, as necessitated by 
environmental change (Chapter 4). These characteristics enable me to identify “uniqueness and 
important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged 
out of heterogeneity” (Patton, 2002: 235). In this way, more substantiated theory development is 
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possible because propositions are derived from and rooted in more varied empirical evidence, thus 
allowing the development of a robust integrative theory on the role of organizational design in 
process of BMI. 
The remainder of the thesis. The thesis is organized as a monograph with ten interdependent 
chapters. It has considerable length and scope, which will allow me to communicate a novel 
understanding, as well as intricate details and nuances, of the BMI phenomenon. In particular, each 
chapter gradually builds upon the preceding one to uncover a more granular and complete 
understanding of the process of innovating a firm’s incumbent BM. In the next chapters, I will 
elaborate on some of the ideas introduced in this chapter. More specifically, I present the current 
research landscape regarding BMI and show how it ties into central ideas and key constructs from 
the contemporary theory of organizational design. Next, I discuss the choice of research methods 
for this thesis and empirical context. I then move on to the three cases (Novo Nordisk, UCB and 
LEO Pharma), which explore different aspects of changes in the firms’ organizational designs and 
BMs. The remaining chapters deal with cross-case findings, and the thesis concludes with a 
discussion of the relevant contributions, limitations and future research opportunities.               
   
  
 
2  
 BMI: Literature Review and Critical Knowledge Gaps 
During the last decade and a half, the BM construct has attracted substantial attention from both 
management scholars and practitioners (Zott et al., 2011). A BM outlines “the manner by which the 
enterprise delivers value to customers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those 
payments to profit” (Teece, 2010: 172). Most notably, the BM builds upon and extends central ideas 
from business strategy and its associated traditions (such as value chain analysis, the resource-based 
view, strategic networks and transaction cost economics).  
The growing popularity of the BM construct may be ascribed to the its holistic and systemic 
properties, namely, a BM is not just what firms do (e.g., the bundle of products and services they 
offer to satisfy specific market segments), but also how they do it (e.g., how they link factor and 
product markets to produce and deliver that bundle at a profit) (cf. Santos et al., 2009).           
In particular, a BM is comprised of a set of interlocking activities, governed by organizational 
units that implement those activities both within and outside the focal firm; it is designed to create 
and deliver value through the production and delivery of its value proposition to a specific market 
segment (Santos et al., 2009; Teece, 2010). Due to the complex interactions between BM activities 
and organizational units, competitors find it difficult to discover and replicate those activities within 
their own organizational context. This helps differentiate the firm’s offering and ultimately leads to 
a competitive advantage.        
More recently, the notion of BMI has come into prominence, as drivers such as globalization, 
deregulation and technological change (to mention only a few) have profoundly altered the 
environment in several industries, rendering traditional types of innovation (e.g., product and 
process innovation) less effective. Scholars and practitioners agree that the most successful firms 
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under these new circumstances seem to be those that have taken advantage of such structural 
changes to innovate their incumbent BMs to gain a competitive advantage. IBM’s previously 
mentioned transformation from a product-based to service-based focus, and the resulting revenues, 
is a clear example (Chesbrough, 2007).  
BMI can be defined as the reconfiguration of the activities and organizational units of a firm, 
to create a new BM that is new to the marketplace in which the firm competes. For example the 
example of IBM, the company needed to develop and implement new activities and organizational 
units to accommodate the increasing service content of its BM. All of these changes together may 
add up to a massive organizational change process that places a heavy burden on the organization. It 
is rare that a new BM goes straight from the drawing board to full-scale implementation. Thus, BMI 
is difficult, inducing potentially substantial changes and interfering with the existing ways of doing 
things. At the same time, this complexity is coupled with the underlying specificity of the firm such 
that innovating a BM is likely to result in a more sustainable advantage (compared to, e.g., product 
innovation). This is being recognized by executives. Interviews with 765 corporate and public 
leaders worldwide conducted by consultants from IBM Global Business Services revealed that 
firms that are financial outperformers put twice as much focus on BMI as underperformers (Pohle 
and Chapman, 2006).  
This review aims to synthesize the contemporary literature on BMI, identify key research 
streams, and carefully document potential knowledge gaps. The review is structured as follows:  It 
starts with a summary of the BM construct, including the key conceptualizations, assumptions, 
issues, and controversies, followed by a review of the BMI literature, and ends with a discussion of 
the critical knowledge gaps.  
What is a BM? 
While BMs, as defined above, have been fundamental to business since pre-classical times (Teece, 
2010), it was the advent of the Internet, the development of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), and the subsequent emergence of web-based companies in the mid-1990s that 
prompted interest in the term. Since then, it has been widely adopted by scholars and practitioners 
alike, as evidenced by the growing number of publications that address the construct, including 
articles, books, and book chapters in the business press and academic journals.    
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Ghaziani and Ventresca (2005) performed a frame analysis1 of the term “business model” by 
searching for use of the term in general management articles from 1975 to 2000. Searching the 
ABI/INFORM database provided 1,729 publications that contained the BM term. In that sample, 
only 166 were published in the period between 1975 and 1994, whereas the rest (1,563) belonged to 
the period between 1995 and 2000, indicating a substantial increase in the incidence of the term. 
Amit et al. (2011) found a similar pattern in a keyword-based search of the term business model but 
noted that academic research on BMs seems to trail behind practice. 
During the last decade, the BM term has become important in practitioner discourse, 
appearing frequently in newspapers and magazines, in annual reports, in negotiations between 
venture capitalists and startup companies, etc. The concept’s growing popularity lies in its strong 
communicative capacity. Foss and Saebi (2015:6) argue that “entrepreneurs stand a better chance of 
getting funding from […] financiers when they can make convincing claims that they are not just 
pitching a value proposition, but a value proposition that is supported by value chain activities, an 
identification of distinct segments […] and […] that all this is replicable.” With the emergence of 
web-based companies in the early 2000s, the need to demonstrate value was at its highest, largely 
because such companies could not be valued on the basis of past performance since there were no 
precedents. Therefore, investors speculated about the future value of these innovative BMs 
(Thornton and Marche, 2003). Pets.com, for example, received investments amounting to USD 300 
million in less than two years. However, despite massive spending on marketing that generated 
huge brand awareness, it failed because few were willing to order pet-related products online. This 
is just one among many examples of a web-based company’s BM being used to garner stratospheric 
valuations (Garfield, 2011). There were also some successful web-based startups at that time, such 
as Amazon (which initially reached book buyers through the Internet instead of physical stores) and 
eBay (which moved garage sales and neighborhood auctions into the electronic age).  
Many scholars believe that awareness of the BM concept and its widespread use since the 
mid-1990s can be partly ascribed to the advent of the Internet as well as ICT (e.g., Amit and Zott, 
2001), the growing importance of emerging markets, increased focus on social and sustainability 
issues (Prahalad and Hart, 2002; Seelos and Mair, 2007; Thompson and MacMillan, 2010), and an 
                                                 
1 A frame analysis can be defined as “the study of the frames, or fundamental schemes of interpretation, by which 
people in social situations make coherent sense of what is occurring in those situations” (Chambliss, 2005: 289).  
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increasing number of industries and organizations reliant on post-industrial technologies (Perkmann 
and Spicer, 2010). Specifically, the Internet and ICT dramatically changed the way companies do 
business in a number of industries, and so the BM concept quickly spread to the analysis of more 
traditional brick-and-mortar companies. Firms from industries such as air travel and music are some 
of the most used BM cases. 
Why BMs matter 
The BM is a new unit of analysis, and thus may be useful for generating new insights into strategic 
management. As argued elsewhere (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2013; Foss and Saebi, 2015), the inherently 
systemic nature of BMs has much to offer management theory—most notably, a focus on the need 
for alignment of, and consistency between, strategic choices pertaining to the value proposition and 
mechanisms of value creation and appropriation. Similarly, Magretta (2002: 6) argues that 
“business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together.” The ways in 
which firms fit those pieces together often require highly firm-specific systems, processes, 
capabilities and assets. Thus, due to the level of firm-specificity and underlying complexity that a 
BM encompasses, advantages emerging from such differentiation may be difficult for competitors 
to eliminate (e.g., by replication).     
BMs are usually illustrated using graphical representations, which help convey an 
understanding that is much simpler than the real-life situation but still resembles it in many 
respects. Essentially, a BM is about telling a good story about how a particular company works 
(Magretta, 2002). A “model” is also something that can be examined, measured, discovered, and 
emulated (Foss and Saebi, 2015). For instance, firms can better assess the value of a given strategy 
(e.g., How does our value proposition stack up against the competition?) and what it takes to 
implement it (e.g., Which interlocking activities and organizational units are essential to realize a 
given value proposition at a profit?). Intuitively, it also seems easier to change a model as opposed 
to an organization. A BM is malleable and therefore subject to experimentation, as its value 
proposition and associated mechanisms of value creation and appropriation may change in response 
to contingencies. 
The holistic nature of the BM construct has also been useful in academic circles to: (1) 
classify firms according to their BMs (e.g., Timmers, 1998; Rappa, 2000; Amit and Zott, 2001; 
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Osterwalder et al., 2005); (2) explain variation in firm performance (e.g., Zott and Amit, 2010; 
Weill et al., 2005); and (3) identify new types of innovation (e.g., Teece, 2010; Markides, 2006). 
More recently, scholars have been delving into the relationship between BMs and the ecosystem or 
industry architecture (see, e.g., Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Jacobides, Knudsen, and Augier, 2006), 
for instance, by looking at the competition among different BMs.      
Theoretical ambiguity 
Despite its widespread use in both academic research and practice, the notion of a “BM” remains 
highly ambiguous. Zott et al. (2011: 4) note in an extensive overview of the literature (Table 2.1): 
“At a general level, the business model has been referred to as a statement (Stewart and Zhao, 
2000), a description (Applegate, 2000; Weill and Vitale, 2001), a representation (Morris, et al., 
2005; Shafer, Smith and Linder, 2005), an architecture (Dubosson-Torbay, Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2002; Timmers, 1998), a conceptual tool or model (George and Bock, 2009; Osterwalder, 
2004; Osterwalder et al., 2005), a structural template (Amit and Zott, 2001), a method (Afuah and 
Tucci, 2001), a framework (Afuah, 2004), a pattern (Brousseau and Penard, 2007), and a set (Seelos 
and Mair, 2007). Surprisingly, however, the business model is often studied without an explicit 
definition of the concept.” They found more than one third (37%) of the reviewed publications did 
not define the concept, instead taking its meaning more or less at face value. Less than half (44%) 
explicitly defined or conceptualized the BM, for example, by highlighting its main components. 
The remaining publications (19%) referred to the work of other scholars in defining the concept. In 
a more recent review, DaSilva and Trkman (2014) point to similar issues, and raise the concern that 
the lack of a clear distinction between the BM and other theories of management (e.g., the resource-
based view, transaction cost economics and business strategy) may turn the term into simply 
another management fad.   
 
Table 2.1 Selected BM definitions 
 
Author(s) 
 
Definition 
 
Papers citing the definition 
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Timmers, 1998 The business model is “an architecture of the 
product, service and information flows, including a 
description of the various business actors and their 
roles; a description of the potential benefits for the 
various business actors; a description of the sources 
of revenues” (p. 2). 
Hedman and Kalling, 2003 
 
Amit and Zott, 2001; Zott 
and Amit, 2010 
 
The business model depicts “the content, structure 
and governance of transactions designed so as to 
create value through the exploitation of business 
opportunities” (2001: 511). Based on the fact that 
transactions connect activities, the authors further 
developed this definition to conceptualize a firm’s 
business model as “a system of interdependent 
activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its 
boundaries” (2010: 216). 
 
Hedman and Kalling, 2003; 
Morris et al., 2005; Zott 
and Amit, 2007, 2008; 
Bock, Opsahl, and George, 
2010 
 
Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002 
 
The business model is “the heuristic logic that 
connects technical potential with the realization of 
economic value” (p. 529). 
 
Chesbrough, Ahern, Finn, 
and Guerraz, 2006; 
Chesbrough, 2007a, 2007b; 
Teece, 2007, 2010 
 
Magretta, 2002 
 
Business models are “stories that explain how 
enterprises work. A good business model answers 
Peter Drucker’s old age questions: Who is the 
customer? And what does the customer value? It 
also answers the fundamental questions every 
manager must ask: How do we make money in this 
business? What is the underlying economic logic 
that explains how we can deliver value to customers 
at an appropriate cost?” (p. 4). 
 
Seddon, Lewis, Freeman, 
and Shanks, 2004; Ojala 
and Tyrväinene, 2006; 
Demil and Lecocq, 2010 
 
Morris et al., 2005 
 
A business model is a “concise representation of 
how an interrelated set of decision variables in the 
areas of venture strategy, architecture, and 
economics are addressed to create sustainable 
competitive advantage in defined markets” (p. 727). 
It has six fundamental components: the value 
proposition, the customer, internal 
processes/competencies, external positioning, the 
economic model, and personal/investor factors. 
 
Calia, Guerrini, and Moura, 
2007 
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Johnson et al., 2008 Business models “consist of four interlocking 
elements that, taken together, create and deliver 
value” (p. 52). These are the customer value 
proposition, the profit formula, key resources, and 
key processes. 
Johnson and Suskewicz, 
2009 
Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart, 2010 
“A business model is … a reflection of the firm’s 
realized strategy” (p. 195). 
Hurt, 2008; Baden-Fuller 
and Morgan, 2010 
 
Teece, 2010 
 
“A business model articulates the logic, the data 
and other evidence that support a value proposition 
for the customer, and a viable structure of revenues 
and costs for the enterprise in delivering that value” 
(p. 179). 
 
Gambardella and 
McGahan, 2010 
Source: Adopted from Zott et al. (2011).  
 
George and Bock (2011: 83) note that BM conceptualizations “vary widely, incorporating 
organizational narrative (Magretta, 2002), processes that convert innovation into value (Chesbrough 
and Rosenbloom, 2002), recipes for firm activities that incorporate organizational design and 
strategy (Slywotzky and Wise, 2003), ‘flows’ of information and resources (Timmers, 1998), and 
designed structures such as the firm’s set of boundary-spanning transactions (Amit and Zott, 
2001).” 
This lack of definitional and construct clarity gives rise to numerous interpretations of the 
core construct, ultimately leading to fragmentation rather than convergence in perspectives and thus 
retarding cumulative research efforts on BMs. Furthermore, proponents of the BM construct often 
fail to define the essence of the construct in such a way that differentiates it from other strategic 
management constructs (such as strategy and the value chain). This is problematic, as it leads to the 
proliferation of different terms and labels for the same phenomena, i.e., putting “old wine in new 
bottle” (Suddaby, 2010). 
Given this heterogeneity in terms of definition and conceptualization, it is not surprising that 
there is no agreed-upon framework that captures the essence of a BM. For example, Alt and 
Zimmermann (2001) include elements such as a mission, processes, legal issues and technology in 
their framework. Weill and Vitale (2001) in their framework highlight the importance of strategic 
objectives, a value proposition, critical success factors, core competencies, customer segments, 
channels and IT infrastructure. Afuah and Tucci (2003) propose a BM framework that encompasses 
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customer value, scope, pricing, revenue sources, connected activities, implementation, capabilities 
and sustainability. Therefore, there is an immediate need for a clearer conceptualization and unified 
definition of a BM in order to coordinate research efforts and move the field forward. 
The constituent parts of a BM 
Despite the considerable differences in the definition and conceptualization of a BM, a consistent 
pattern in the meaning is becoming apparent in the literature on BMs. Scholars seem to converge on 
the basic idea that a BM comprises four key elements or components: value creation, value 
appropriation, value chain organization and the value network. Typically, these are bundles of 
activities that can be paired under the headings of the company’s overall value proposition (What?), 
the customer segments targeted with the value proposition (Who?), the company’s way of 
delivering value (How much?), the value chain configuration required to create and deliver the 
offering, the complementary resources needed to maintain a key position in this chain, and the 
processes and internal organization of the firm that create and reinforce linkages among the other 
components in the model (How?). 
BMI: definitions, conceptualizations, and emerging research streams 
As mentioned above, the extant literature on BMs is characterized by disagreement and confusion, 
which makes conceptualizing BMs into a common theoretical framework challenging (Zott et al., 
2011). Consequently, there is no solid foundation for the study of BMI (Spieth, Schneckenberg, and 
Ricart, 2014). Perhaps this is also a reason for the relatively small amount of published articles on 
BMI in peer-reviewed management journals (such as Journal of Strategic Management, and 
Academy of Management Review). As argued by Foss and Saebi (2017: 201), although BM and 
BMI are obviously intrinsically related, “BMI introduces the additional dimension of innovation 
and [thereby] raises a number of crucial theoretical and empirical questions: What are the drivers, 
facilitators, and hindrances of the innovation of a BM? Under which circumstances can BMI give 
rise to sustained competitive advantage? Does BMI exclusively originate in the upper echelons, or 
may it originate in levels of the organization?” Due to the lack of theoretical grounding and 
inconsistency regarding the BM construct itself, and given the newness of BMI research, such 
fundamental questions remain unanswered. However, recent efforts by scholars such as Schneider 
BMI: Literature Review and Critical Knowledge Gaps 
23 
 
and Spieth (2013), and particularly Foss and Saebi (2017), have been made to map the current 
research landscape and make note of potential research gaps that need to be filled in order to move 
the field forward. Along similar lines, this review approaches the extant literature with the aim of 
improving our understanding of BMI, and especially the research question formulated in Chapter 1. 
I organize the extant literature on BMI according to the following themes (Table 2.2): (1) 
understanding and defining BMI; (2) classification of BMI; (3) drivers and barriers to BMI; and (4) 
a process view of BMI. Some themes have been identified by prior reviews (for a similar 
application, see Schneider and Spieth, 2013; Foss and Saebi, 2017), while others, such as (2) and 
(4), have not been covered by prior reviews. With this review, I hope to take a further step in the 
investigation of BMI, without claiming an exhaustive review of the literature. 
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Table 2.2 Themes of BMI research 
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Understanding and defining BMI 
Many scholars have attempted to improve our understanding of BMI from a conceptual perspective, 
by (1) highlighting the role of BMI, (2) defining the phenomenon, and (3) addressing key conceptual 
problems (e.g., Santos et al., 2009; Teece, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2012). To deal with the growing 
challenges arising as a result of globalization, deregulation and technological change, companies are 
increasingly relying on BMI as an alternative or complement to product or process innovation. For 
example, Amit and Zott (2012:41) argue that  
innovations to improve processes and products, […] [and] are often expensive and time-
consuming, requiring considerable upfront investment in everything from research and 
development to specialized resources, new plants and equipment, and even entire new 
business units. Yet future returns on these investments are always uncertain. Hesitant to 
make such big bets, more companies now are turning toward BMI as an alternative or 
complement to product or process innovation.  
Relatedly, others argue that innovative technologies or ideas alone have no economic value, but that 
rather it is through the design of complementary BMs that managers are able to unlock the value 
from those investments and market them (Massa and Tucci, 2013). In general, scholars seem to 
agree on the strategic importance of BMI as a key driver of firm performance (cf. Chesbrough 
2010; Teece, 2010; Ho et al., 2011; Zott and Amit, 2007) as well as a vehicle for organizational 
change and renewal (Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Hitt, Ireland, Camp, and Sexton, 2001; Johnson et 
al., 2008; Sosna et al., 2010). It can also be used to cope with external contingencies (such as new 
entrants and changing regulations) and internal ones (such as organizational or managerial factors) 
(e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2013; Hartmann et al., 2013). 
The BMI field is still in its infancy. Thus, scholars are still trying to make sense of BMI (i.e., 
What is it? How does it work? What are its limitations and boundary conditions?). The lack of a 
common understanding of BMI has resulted in several definitions (see Table 2.3), the most general 
of which defines BMI as “new ways to create and capture value” or the “core elements of a firm 
and its business logic.” By contrast, few authors have explicitly defined or conceptualized BMI by, 
for example, specifying its main elements and processes (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2012; Santos et al., 
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2009; Sorescu et al., 2011). Moreover, existing definitions differ significantly, although they are 
often conflated in the sense they refer to a single phenomenon.  
 
Table 2.3 Selected BMI definitions 
 
Author(s) 
 
Definition 
 
Main elements and 
processes 
 
Abdelkafi et al. (2013: 
13) 
“A business model innovation happens when the 
company modifies or improves at least one of the 
value dimensions.”  
Specified according to 
BMs, but not BMI 
 
 
Amit and Zott (2012: 
44) 
 
Business model innovation occurs when one or more 
of the following elements are changed: (1) content; 
(2) structure; and (3) governance.  
 
 
 Adding new activities 
 Linking activities in 
new ways 
 Governing activities in 
new ways 
 
Berglund and Sandström 
(2013: 276) 
“A BMI can thus be thought of as the introduction of 
a new business model aimed to create commercial 
value.” 
Specified according to 
BMs, but not BMI 
 
Casadesus-Masanell and 
Zhu (2013: 464) 
 
“At root, business model innovation refers to the 
search for new logics of the firm and new ways to 
create and capture value for its stakeholders; it 
focuses primarily on finding new ways to generate 
revenues and define value propositions for customers, 
suppliers, and partners.” 
 
Specified according to 
BMs, but not BMI 
 
Khanagha et al. (2014: 
324) 
 
“Business model innovation activities can range from 
incremental changes in individual components of 
business models, extension of existing business 
model, introduction of parallel business models, right 
through to disruption of the business model, which 
may potentially entail replacing the existing model 
with a fundamentally different one.” 
 
 Strategic intent 
 Structural form 
 Key roles 
 Targeted outcomes 
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Kim and Min (2015: 36) 
 
“An incumbent firm may commit to original business 
model innovation by creating a new business model 
derived from its own technological breakthrough or 
endogenous reconfiguration of ways of doing 
business. Imitative BMI is an incumbent’s addition of 
new business model already invented by other firms.” 
 
 Managerial choices 
 Asset configuration 
 Organizational 
configuration 
 
Markides (2006: 20) 
 
“Business model innovation is the discovery of a 
fundamentally different business model in an existing 
business.” 
 
Specified according to 
BMs, but not BMI 
 
 
Mitchell and Coles 
(2003: 17) 
 
“By business model innovation, we mean business 
model replacements that provide product or service 
offerings to customers and end users that were not 
previously available.” 
 
Specified according to 
BMs, but not BMI 
 
Santos et al. (2009: 14) 
 
“Business model innovation is a reconfiguration of 
activities in the existing business model of a firm that 
is new to the product service market in which the 
firm competes.” 
 
 Reactivating 
 Repartitioning 
 Relinking 
 Relocating 
 
Yunus et al. (2010: 312) “Business model innovation is about generating new 
sources of profit by finding novel value 
proposition/value constellation combinations.” 
Specified according to 
BMs, but not BMI 
 
Because of the variations in definition, numerous interpretations of the core construct exist. 
Although scholars agree that BMI can be described as a process of change, there is less agreement 
on the magnitude of change. While some argue that BMI involves change of one or more elements 
of the BM, others associate it with “evolution,” “adaptation,” transformation,” or “disruption of the 
business model, which may potentially entail replacing the existing model with a fundamentally 
different one” (Khanagha et al., 2014: 324). This general lack of definitional and construct clarity is 
problematic because it leads to confusion and divergence regarding the meaning of BMI. This may 
in turn significantly slow down research progress on BMI.  
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Classifications of BMI 
The BMI construct has also been subject to various forms of classification. Typically, studies 
investigate BMI within a specific context, such as healthcare (Velamuri et al., 2015; Sabatier et al., 
2010), newspapers (Santos et al., 2009; Holm et al., 2013), insurance (Desyllas and Sako, 2013), 
banking (Yunus et al., 2010), aviation (Schneider and Spieth, 2013; Pereira and Caetano, 2015), or 
entrepreneurship (Trimi and Berbegal-Mirabent, 2012). One group of scholars classifies BMI 
according to specific strategic purposes. For example, studies have examined BMs for general 
purpose technologies (Gambardella and McGahan, 2010), BMs for low-income markets (Anderson 
and Kupp, 2008; Sánchez and Ricart, 2010; Yunus et al., 2010), BMs for sustainable innovation 
(Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, 2013; Richter, 2013), service-based BMs (Kindström and 
Kowalkowski, 2015), and more recently, BMs for open innovation (Saebi and Foss, 2015). In a 
similar vein, scholars have identified a set of so-called “iconic business models” belonging to 
particular companies. Following Sabatier et al. (2010), an “iconic business model” is labeled with 
the name of the instigator company; it is also widely recognized and well established as an example 
of a particular way of creating and capturing value. For example, companies such as Amazon, 3M, 
Dell, Google, and more recently, Nestlé’s Nespresso, have BMs that have become iconic (Sabatier 
et al., 2010; Matzler, Bailom, Von Den Eichen, and Kohler, 2013). Another group of scholars 
distinguishes between different types of BM change. For instance, Cavalcante et al. (2011) propose 
a change typology, in which they distinguish between BM creation, extension, revision, and 
termination. Similarly, Santos et al. (2009: 15) provide a typology for BMI, in which they specify 
four types of change: (1) “reactivating,” that is, altering the set of elemental activities that the firm 
offers to its customers (e.g., offering a hot meal on flights); (2) “repartitioning,” that is, altering the 
boundaries of the firm by moving activities and the organizational units that perform those activities 
(e.g., outsourcing); (3) “relocating,” that is, altering the (physical, cultural and institutional) location 
of units currently performing activities (e.g., offshoring); and (4) “relinking,” that is, altering the 
linkages between organizational units that perform the activities (e.g., when an arms-length 
relationship with a supplier becomes an alliance). In general, this stream of research does not set 
forth criteria for what constitutes a BMI, and is often not clear about the unit of analysis. Moreover, 
it is difficult to understand the underlying differences between various types of BMI, since scholars 
do not always state the basic assumptions behind them.  For example, what is the difference 
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between a sustainable BM and a service-based BM? And how is BMI different from BM change, or 
is it the same feature under different names? This lack of clarity is problematic because the strength 
of classifications or typologies lies in their ability to “describe the causal relationships of 
contextual, structural, and strategic factors, thus offering configurations that can be used to predict 
variance in an outcome of interest” (Fiss, 2011: 393).          
Drivers and Barriers to BMI 
Scholars have also examined the internal and external drivers of, and barriers to, BMI. With regard 
to external drivers, a considerable number of articles describe BMI as resulting from environmental 
changes, such as globalization and technological developments (De Reuver, Bouwman, and 
MacInnes, 2009; Lee, Olson, and Trimi, 2012; Miller et al., 2014; Sabatier, Craig-Kennard, and 
Mangematin, 2012; Wirtz, Schilke, and Ullrich, 2010). For example, most scholars point out that 
BMI is necessary to cope with “strategic discontinuities and disruptions, convergence and intense 
global competition” (Doz and Kosonen, 2010: 370), increasing competitive pressure or a shifting 
base of competition (Johnson et al., 2008), or “new communication technologies, shorter product 
life cycles, global markets and tougher competition” (Osterwalder, 2004: 11).  
Scholars have also highlighted a number of internal strategic drivers underlying firms’ BMI 
decisions, including structure, culture, processes, capabilities and leadership. A study of 107 
multinational firms by Bock et al. (2012) revealed a number of interesting results. First, the authors 
found that a creative culture is associated with strategic flexibility, and is thus an important driver of 
BMI. Second, the reliance on external partners apparently decreases the probability achieving 
strategic flexibility. Third, delegation increases the probability that firms will achieve strategic 
flexibility. Fourth, the greater the BMI effort, the more reconfiguration seems to stifle strategic 
flexibility, and thus BMI. Similarly, Doz and Kosonen (2010) refer to strategic agility as an 
important driver of BMI. They identify three meta-capabilities as being essential to strategic agility: 
strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource fluidity. Sorescu et al. (2011) further describe 
interdependencies among BM elements and a customer-centric orientation as critical drivers of 
BMI. For example, “a sustained focus on improving the customer experience may prompt [firms] to 
identify innovative ways to best align their ‘backstage’ (back-office), ‘frontstage’ (physical 
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environment, service employees, service delivery processes), [and] ‘auditorium” (fellow 
customers)’” (Sorescu et al., 2011: 12). 
Fewer scholars have investigated potential barriers to BMI. In a theoretical paper, Chesbrough 
(2010) sheds light on the barriers to BMI identified in earlier studies by Amit and Zott (2001), 
Christensen and Raynor (2003), Christensen (1997), and Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002). He 
identifies two type of barriers—obstruction and confusion—and suggests that organizational 
leadership, as well as experimentation and effectuation, can be used to overcome these barriers. In a 
multiple case study of the role of strategic agility during BMI, Doz and Kosonen (2010) explain that 
inertia can arise from various sources in defense of the status quo, thus presenting a key challenge 
throughout the transformation of a BM. 
Although this body of research addresses a number of different drivers and antecedents of 
BMI, it does so mainly in conceptual or theoretical terms rather than through empirical claims. A 
notable exception is a study by Lee, Shin, and Park (2012). Based on a survey of 400 Korean 
SMEs, the authors found that globalization has forced SMEs to engage in BMI.        
A process view of BMI 
A number of scholars recognize BMI as a complex organizational change process, influenced by a 
variety of interrelated factors, such as leadership, capabilities, and learning mechanisms. At least 
four strands of this literature can be distinguished. The first strand describes and emphasizes critical 
stages of the BMI process. In a conceptual paper, De Reuver et al. (2013) coin the term “business 
model roadmapping” as an approach for defining the transition stages between an existing and 
newly designed BM. In particular, they identify four basic sequential steps: (1) identify desired 
changes in the BM; (2) analyze the impact of the desired BM changes on other BM domains; (3) 
translate BM changes into specific activities; and (4) back-casting of ideal transition path. The 
roadmap helps managers understand how operational actions and BM changes are interrelated. 
Similarly, Frankenberger, Weiblen, Csik, and Gassmann (2013) developed the so-called “4I-
framework,” which organizes the BMI process and sheds light on specific challenges that managers 
face during the initiation, ideation, integration, and implementation stages of BMI. From a slightly 
different perspective, Girotra and Netessine (2014: 98) describe the BMI process as “a set of key 
decisions that collectively determine how a business earns its revenues, incurs its costs, and 
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manages its risks. [The authors] view innovations to the model as changes to those decisions: what 
your offering will be, when decisions are made, who makes them, and why.” 
The second strand of literature on the process view of BMI focuses on critical organizational 
capabilities and processes needed to support the ongoing change process. In contrast to the first 
strand, this one views BMI as a non-linear process, rather than proposing a sequential ordering of 
actions. Demil and Lecocq (2010: 234) argue that BMI is driven by the  
interactions between and within the core model components. Interactions between 
components will follow choices to develop a new value proposition, to create new 
combinations of resources or to make changes in the organizational system, and the impacts 
such adaptations will have on the other components and their subsidiary elements.  
In other words, the process of BMI does not necessarily have to start at A and end at Z. This is 
further emphasized with the observation that BMI is both a planned and an emergent process. In a 
large case study of nine companies from different industries, Achtenhagen et al. (2013) illustrate the 
importance of strategizing actions (e.g., strategy development and policies and measures) and 
critical capabilities (e.g., recognizing business opportunities, leadership styles and characteristics of 
corporate culture) when conducting BMI, and suggest that not only are the two interlinked, but they 
are complementarities. In a longitudinal study of the Naturhouse case, Sosna et al. (2010) found that 
the ability to learn from unsuccessful experiments and the resilience to continue experimentation 
represent crucial individual and organizational capabilities for BMI.      
The third strand of process-view BMI research highlights the importance of experimentation 
and learning in the BMI process. Yunus et al. (2010) argue that strategic experimentation is central 
to the process of BMI because it allows decision makers to deal with uncertainty in a controlled 
manner. More specifically, “launching a series of small experiments helps minimize risk and 
maximize the firm’s rate of learning, making it possible to identify a [BM’s] potential for success 
most efficiently” (Yunus et al., 2010: 315). Similarly, others have characterized BMI as an 
evolutionary process (Dunford, Palmer, and Benveniste, 2010), as ongoing processes of 
experimenting and learning (Chanal and Caron-Fasan, 2010; McGrath, 2010; Cavalcante, 2014) 
incorporating double-loop learning (Moingeon and Lahmann-Ortega, 2010), and as a discovery-
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driven, trial-and-error-based process, instead of an analytical one (McGrath, 2010; Smith, Binns, 
and Tushman, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). 
The fourth strand offers a range of practitioner-oriented tools for managing the BMI process. 
For example, through an experiment, Eppler et al. (2012) showed that artifacts (such as a BM 
template, physical objects with sketching or PowerPoint) can have a significant influence in shaping 
team interactions and subsequently BM idea generation. Evans and Johnson (2013) propose the so-
called “innovation readiness levels” (IRLs) framework to help managers asses “the organization’s 
state of readiness to implement a specific BM and [as] a measure of the amount of stress an idea is 
likely to create for the organization” (Evans and Johnson, 2013: 52). 
The common theme across these strands is that they view BMI as a dynamic process that can 
be shaped by both internal and external factors and their interactions. The studies are mainly 
anecdotal and exploratory in nature, with the primary aim of achieving a first understanding of the 
BMI phenomenon. This is shown by the extensive use of qualitative methods (e.g., single/multiple 
case study studies) rather than the testing of tightly specified hypotheses. 
Critical Knowledge Gaps in the BMI Research  
In the previous sections, I reviewed the extant literature on BMs and BMI. In the following, I 
highlight some of the more interesting knowledge gaps pertaining to BMI. Based on the review, I 
identify three critical gaps: (1) the nature of BMI; (2) BMI capabilities; and (3) the neglect of 
organizational elements in BMI research and theory.   
The Nature of BMI 
The extant literature on BMI has not sufficiently addressed five main issues. First, despite a flood of 
attention in the academic and practitioner communities, BMI remains a “slippery construct to 
study” (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu, 2013). As Table 2.3 shows, there is little consistency with 
regard to the terminology and definitions used for BMI. In particular, the unit of analysis is often 
not clearly defined and explained; rather, it is often phrased in ambiguous terms such as “generating 
new sources of profit by finding novel value proposition” or a “novel approach to commercializing 
its underlying assets.” In other words, an operational definition of BMI has yet to be developed. 
This lack of clarity stems from discrepancies in the conceptual framework of the BM construct 
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itself, which resides at the intersection of economics and business strategy without possessing a 
robust theoretical foundation in either field (Teece, 2010). According to Andersen and Kragh 
(2010), unspecified theoretical expectations or a lack of theoretical knowledge can lead scholars to 
replicate pre-existing findings, thus adding little to existing theoretical knowledge, or to produce 
massive amounts of data without any clarity with respect to how the data can lead to new insights. 
The second issue is the question of what is being innovated. Some scholars limit BMI to an 
isolated change to a specific element of the BM, while others call for changes to the entire BM 
architecture rather than individual elements (cf. Foss and Saebi, 2017). In the first case, the nature 
of BMI is characterized as changes made to the “value proposition,” the “value chain,” the “value 
network,” or the “revenue/cost model” (see, e.g., Giesen, Berman, Bell, and Blitz, 2007; Schneider 
and Spieth, 2014). Thus, as Abdelkafi et al. (2013: 13) argue, “a BMI happens when the company 
modifies or improves at least one of the value dimensions.” By contrast, in the second case, BMI 
takes the form of innovations across multiple BM elements. For example, Santos et al. (2009) state 
that BMI happens when a firm takes steps to reconfigure its set of elementary activities by 
“reactivating,” “repartitioning,” “relocating,” or “relinking.” Similarly, Richter (2013: 458) defines 
BMI “as the development of new organizational forms for the creation, delivery, and capture of 
value.” In other words, emphasis is placed on the underlying mechanisms that link together the set 
of elementary activities into a coherent BM architecture (cf. Foss and Saebi, 2017; Zott and Amit, 
2010). Although these contributions briefly touch on the role of organizational units, they are not 
particularly forthcoming about how such an architecture is formed.    
The third issue regards whether BMI is something that is new to the world, to an industry, or 
simply to the firm that is implementing it (cf. Schumpeter, 1911; Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbeck, 
1973; Damanpour, 1991; Nohria and Gulati, 1996), or as Johannessen, Olsen, and Lumpkin (2001: 
22) put it, “the degree or extent of newness that constitutes an innovation” (for an application of this 
question in the BMI literature, see Zott and Amit, 2007). 
The fourth issue regards whether innovations are “systemic” or “autonomous” (Chesbrough 
and Teece, 1996; Teece, 1996). Proponents of the systemic view argue that BMI benefits can mainly 
be obtained if a change to the firm’s core BM elements is accompanied by related or 
complementary changes to the adjacent elements and/or architecture. For example, Zott and Amit 
(2012: 48) claim that BMI “encourages systemic and holistic thinking when considering innovation, 
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instead of isolated, individual choices.” Similarly, Stieglitz and Foss (2015) argue that the main 
contribution of the BMI literature to macro-management theory is derived from the construct’s 
inherently systemic character. Conversely, other scholars submit that BMI can be pursued 
independently, without prompting or inadvertently eliciting spontaneous changes to other parts of 
the incumbent BM, while still providing significant benefits. Such views emphasize the need for 
separation (usually in the form of spin-offs or new, autonomous units) between the “old” and “new” 
BM activities (see, e.g., cf. Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Markides and Charitou, 2004; 
Markides, 2013). The rationale for this approach is quite obvious. As noted by Markides (2004: 23),  
the existing organization and its managers will often find that the new business model is 
growing at their expense. They will therefore have incentives to constrain it or even kill it. 
Therefore, by keeping the two business models separate, you prevent the company’s existing 
processes and culture from suffocating the new business model.  
In a related fashion, drawing on the seminal work of Simon (1962) and Henderson and Clark 
(1990), Foss and Saebi (2017: 216) reason that “innovating a BM where the value creation, 
delivery, and appropriating mechanism are tightly interdependent implies architectural change; 
conversely, a more loosely coupled BM will entail less architectural change but potentially much 
modular change.” In other words, innovations can either be linked into an integrated whole or 
partitioned into modules. 
The four issues presented above give rise to a central question, namely, what the locus of BMI 
is. Is it something that takes place within the organization, and if so, where (e.g., in the upper or 
lower echelons, the R&D or marketing organization) and when? Or does it emerge from the firm’s 
external value network of inter-organizational relationships (e.g., via co-creation with customers or 
resource integration with key suppliers)? Or is it contingent on the type of BMI or industry in which 
it takes place? Or is it a combination of all these things? The answers to such questions are 
important because they not only can help researchers set appropriate boundary conditions and 
differentiate the phenomenon from other similar or related concepts, but they can also help 
managers pinpoint where BMI activities should take place. Unfortunately, surprisingly little 
research has actually attempted to identify where BMI activity resides.              
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The BMI literature has yet to resolve the above-stated issues. Although most scholars agree 
that BMI constitutes new ways of doing business, there is less agreement on what constitutes 
newness. Some suggest that in order to distinguish itself as an innovation, a new BM should either 
fulfill unmet customer needs or attract new customers (Markides, 2006), while others claim that 
innovation status can only be achieved by creating entirely new stages within the value chain 
(Schweizer, 2005), without necessarily changing the product or service itself (Velamuri et al., 
2015). And then there are those who argue that the innovation must be new to the industry (Santos 
et al., 2009). Relatedly, scholars have assessed BMI in terms of the dimensions of radicality and 
incrementality based on the extent to which the change departs from existing practices within the 
firm or industry (Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Enkel and Mezger, 2013; Brink 
and Holmén, 2009). Yet these contributions provide little guidance to the questions “What is new?” 
and “How new?” With regard to the extent of innovation, some argue that it is only necessary to 
change a single element in the BM to realize BMI (e.g., Amit and Zott 2012; Bock et al., 2012; 
Santos et al., 2009; Schneider and Spieth, 2013). Others allow for “one or more” elements to be 
changed (e.g., Frankenberger et al., 2013; Sorescu et al., 2011). And then there are those who 
require “simultaneous” changes to a major number of elements (Mitchell and Coles, 2003), or an 
entirely new bundle including all constituent elements of the BM (e.g., Velamuri, Bansemir, Neyer, 
and Möslein, 2013; Yunus et al., 2010). This lack of agreement about the nature of BMI makes it 
difficult to arrive at an operational definition of BMI.   
The ambiguity with regard to the nature of BMI may be due to the conceptual discrepancies 
among scholars in different silos (and within the same silo). Cavalcante et al. (2011), for example, 
attempt to reconcile BM change with different degrees of innovation by distinguishing between BM 
creation, extension, revision, and termination, while Ho et al. (2011) argue that the difference 
between incremental and radical BMI relates both to the number of changes made to BM 
components, and to the degree of innovation. That is, when both are high, BMI is said to be radical, 
and when both are low, BMI is considered incremental. These conceptualizations seem to reconcile 
highly incremental and radical changes under the same BMI heading, and involve both multiple and 
individual changes of the BM’s constituent elements. This poses a problem of synthesis for BMI 
theory because there exists a large middle ground in which one of the two criteria can be high and 
the other low. Imagine the following scenarios: (1) the degree of innovation is high, but only a 
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single component is changed; or (2) the degree of innovation is low, but the entire component 
architecture is changed. Therefore, the questions of whether scenario 1 and 2, or both, qualify as 
BMI remain unaddressed or inadequately specified, contributing to the growing ambiguity in the 
literature.  
BMI as an outcome-oriented activity. A large group of scholars do not seem to avoid 
tautology or circularity in the sense that they include outcome variables as part of their definition of 
BMI. For example, BMI has been defined by its ability to find “new ways to create and capture 
value for its stakeholders” (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu, 2013: 464), by its ability “to create 
commercial value” (Berglund and Sandström, 2013: 276), “as a novel way of how to create and 
capture value (Frankenberger et al., 2013: 250), or as “the discovery of a fundamentally different 
business model (Markides, 2006: 2). In contrast, the adjacent innovation literature generally does 
not claim that value creation and commercial success are necessary conditions for innovation. 
Furthermore, incorporating outcome variables into definitions is not advisable for proper theory 
building, as it results in empty definitions (Suddaby, 2010). 
BMI Capabilities  
The BMI literature generally recognizes that organizational capabilities are instrumental to support 
the ongoing BMI change process. For example, Demil and Lecqoc (2010) emphasize the 
importance of developing “dynamic consistency,” which they refer to as the capability to build and 
sustain firm performance while changing the BM. Gambardella and McGahan (2010) point to the 
importance of “commercialization capabilities,” including an orientation toward marketing, and 
installing and selling integrated solutions based on broader customer insights. Along similar lines, 
Kranz, Hanelt, and Kolbe (2016) argue for the role of “balanced capabilities” to avoid 
misalignments with respect to the necessary timing and scope of BM change. Achtenhagen et al. 
(2013) identify the need for “critical capabilities,” such as experimentation, a balanced utilization of 
resources, and coherence between leadership, organizational culture and employee commitment, in 
value creation processes. However, the extant literature does not shed much light on how such 
capabilities can be materialized. A notable exception is found in Doz and Kosonen (2010), who 
emphasize the importance of achieving “strategic agility” to prompt BM renewal; the authors also 
show how strategic agility can be achieved through the development of three-meta capabilities: 
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strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource fluidity. The scant research on capabilities is 
surprising, given that they may explain performance heterogeneities in BMI, since such capabilities 
affect the causal mechanisms (i.e., value creation and value appropriation) through which 
organizational, environmental, and BM-specific attributes lead to superior or inferior performance. 
Moreover,  firms may need specific resources that cannot be acquired in strategic factor markets, 
and which therefore need to be developed internally through an often lengthy and complex process 
(Dierickx and Cool 1989; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). For these reasons, the question of 
whether firms can develop or reconfigure new capabilities for BMI becomes a fundamental 
strategic issue. Another important issue is due to the fact that managers must usually decide which 
capabilities to invest in given limited resources and managerial attention. As noted by Winter (2003: 
993), “deciding whether some [capability] is needed is only a small part of the total problem of 
making profitable capability investments; the larger part is deciding which among the many 
promising but uncertain investments should be undertaken—recognizing there are likely to be 
trade-offs or other interactions among them.” Accordingly, more research is needed to clarify how 
firms create and prioritize capabilities for BMI.  
The Neglect of Organization in BMI 
Although notions such as design, systems, structure, architecture, configuration, and organizational 
elements dot the BMI literature, only a few contributions have attempted to clarify the role of 
organization in bringing about BMI. Bucherer, Eisert, and Gassmann (2012), for example, highlight 
the importance of “organizational anchoring,” that is, where BMI is located at the organizational 
level, and which roles and responsibilities are relevant. In their multiple-case study, the authors 
found that companies rarely have a dedicated organizational unit for BMI. Rather, BMI is often a 
shared responsibility between existing units such as marketing, business development and portfolio 
management. Yet, these units are supportive rather than responsible for the BMI. In contrast, most 
companies have a dedicated organizational structure for and ownership of product innovations (e.g., 
separate R&D units), whereas an equivalent structure for BMI is rare. In addition, the authors found 
that BMI often faces significant resistance, revealing the need for resources and power to be shifted 
within the organization. Khanagha et al. (2014) explore the interdependence among strategy 
formulation, structuring, and BMI processes, and provide more clarity on the role of different 
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structural forms in enabling the organization to facilitate BM transformation. In a related vein, 
Demil and Lecocq (2010) draw on the distinction between loose and tightly-coupled organizational 
systems in facilitating BMI. In particular, the authors argue that tightly-coupled systems result in 
more positive feedback between the BM’s core components, while loose coupling applies when 
managers do not yet completely understand the relationships between the BM’s core components. 
Moreover, the authors conceptualize organizational structure as a part of BMI. While Schneider and 
Spieth (2014) similarly highlight the role of organization by exploring the impact of BMI on 
different dimensions of strategic flexibility (i.e., resource flexibility, coordination flexibility, and 
variety of managerial capabilities), it is not conceptualized as part of BMI. Bock et al. (2012) look 
at the effects of culture and structure on strategic flexibility in BMI and how BMI efforts moderate 
those relationships. Moreover, Santos et al. (2009) highlight the different roles that corporate-level 
strategy plays in managing BMI. More recently, ambidextrous organizational designs have been 
suggested to address the issue of managing conflicting BMs simultaneously (Markides, 2013). Yet, 
most of this work has focused primarily on the organization as a facilitator of BMI, and perhaps 
more worryingly, has not built on the rich body of work on organizational theory. Not surprisingly, 
it remains unclear which role(s) the organization plays in bringing about BMI. Is it an antecedent, 
moderator, mediator, or all at the same time? Or should it be considered a part of BMI? In other 
words, ambiguity remains about the causal link(s) between the organizational context and BMI. 
One of the problems might be that firms emphasize strategic fit in discussions prior to conducting 
BMI, while neglecting considerations of organizational fit. 
A notable exception is found in Foss and Saebi (2015), who, to my knowledge, were the first 
ones to address the importance of and lack of attention toward the organizational dimension of 
BMI. Their book contains both theoretical and empirical contributions that specifically “deal with 
the designable parts of organizations, that is, the boundaries and internal structuring of 
organizations” (Foss and Saebi, 2015: 8). Nevertheless, in a recent review of the BMI literature, the 
authors argue that more work is still needed before we can fully understand the organizational 
design aspects of BMI (Foss and Saebi, 2017).    
BMI: Literature Review and Critical Knowledge Gaps 
39 
 
Summary 
Developments in the BMI literature over the last fifteen years and diverse observations by 
senior scholars have consistently indicated that the literature exhibits a number of inconsistencies, 
competing conceptualizations and definitions with regard to the BMI construct, as well as persisting 
knowledge gaps. First, no agreed-upon framework or even conceptualization of BMI has emerged, 
and little research has been done to systematically identify the antecedents, moderators, mediators, 
and consequences of BMI. Thus, there is an immediate need for theoretical and conceptual 
clarification to pave the way for more in-depth research on BMI. In addition, the lack of clarity and 
consistency has made it increasingly difficult to offer practical guidance to managers and 
executives. Second, too little attention has been devoted to the development of capabilities for BMI 
purposes. Although the BMI literature highlights a range of different capabilities, empirical 
evidence demonstrating how such capabilities can materialize (or disappear) is rather scant. I 
therefore believe that more research is required to clarify how firms can develop and dynamically 
adapt capabilities for BMI purposes. Third, the role of the organization is still poorly understood in 
the BMI literature, despite its obvious importance in fostering change that may enable the 
organization to facilitate BMI. The limited research focusing specifically on the organization has 
not systematically described the process by which an organization is changed or reconfigured to 
allow for BMI, nor has it clearly identified whether the organization is a part of the BMI construct 
or whether it serves as an antecedent, moderator, mediator, or all at the same time. 
Although these represent large gaps in our knowledge about BMI, it is perhaps not surprising, 
given that the research on BMI has yet to fully mature. According to Foss and Saebi (2017), it is to 
be expected that certain characteristics of an emerging research field will remain —because the 
field has yet to develop into a crystallized “hard core” of key theoretical constructs and assumptions 
regarding a new, puzzling phenomenon (Lakatos, 1970). 
In the following chapter, I will demonstrate how both BMI scholars and organizational design 
scholars stand to gain from a productive exchange of ideas between the fields. I first introduce 
relevant literature on organizational design. I then discuss its application to BMI in order to provide 
a more solid theoretical and empirical base from which future BMI research can emerge. Following 
this, I briefly discuss how an improved BMI understanding can potentially further the 
organizational designer’s knowledge about organizational complementarities. While there are other 
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critical areas for future BMI research, this thesis is dedicated to the organizational design of 
BMIs—a topic that has been almost completely neglected in academic and practitioner-oriented 
circles. This also constitutes an important topic in research on the strategic management of 
innovation, most notably because organizational design choices can be readily implemented in 
contrast to softer elements such as organizational culture. Organizational design, as Gulati, 
Puranam, and Tushman (2009: 575) note, “represent[s] some of the most powerful strategic levers 
available to the top management of the modern corporation.” 
  
 
3  
Toward an Organizational Design View of BMI 
As I will argue in this chapter, organizational design and BMI are inextricably linked. In Foss and 
Saebi’s (2015) view, the designable parts of an organization can potentially act as a cause for, a 
barrier to, a result of, or even an embodiment of, the firm’s BMI activities. Few scholars have 
followed Foss and Saebi’s attempt to link organizational design to BMI to gain a stronger 
theoretical grounding for BMI research. And yet, as noted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, 
there are many good reasons—especially from a BMI perspective—to engage in the productive 
exchange of ideas and in collaborative effort. Such integration would likely inform a number of 
critical questions present in both fields, as well as in the mainstream strategic management 
literature: Can we meaningfully articulate a theory of BMI without addressing the organization in 
which the activity takes place? How does the organizational structure influence BMI efforts? How 
does the formal organization (e.g., the allocation of resources and decision-making authority) affect 
the type, quality, and implementation of BMI? How and why do organizational complementarities 
emerge or disappear? 
To answer these fundamental questions, we need to combine insights from both BMI and 
organizational design. The present chapter deals with the potential for exchange of ideas, although 
primarily from the perspective of the BMI literature. I start by emphasizing the importance of 
organizational design and theorize about its potential roles in the BMI process. Efforts in this regard 
include the identification of relevant organizational design elements as well as a definition of BMI 
that draws on the organizational design literature. I then discuss some of the casual relationships 
between BMI and organizational design in an attempt to provide a much needed theoretical basis 
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upon which to explore the BMI construct. I end by briefly discussing what the theory of 
organizational design can gain through intersection with the BMI literature.                  
Why Organizational Design and BMI Belong Together 
Organizational design matters for several reasons. Nadler and Tushman (1997: 5) propose “that the 
last remaining source of truly sustainable competitive advantage lies in what [are described] as 
organizational capabilities—the unique ways in which each organization structures its work and 
motivate its people to achieve clearly articulated objectives.” The designable parts of an 
organization serve as levers that managers can pull to improve organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness while providing the necessary flexibility to cope with environmental change (such as 
changing customer needs and new technologies). Organizational design creates the infrastructure to 
enable strategy implementation (e.g., Gupta, 1987; Drazin and Howard, 1984). It provides 
accountability and motivation to employees by clearly defining roles and responsibilities. Design 
features have been associated with different types of innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; 
Aiken and Hage, 1971; Daft, 1978; Damanpour, 1991; Lakhani, Lifshitz-Assaf, and Tushman, 
2012), are used as information processing mechanisms that accelerate information flow and 
streamline decision making (Simon, 1945; Thompson, 1967), or can be seen as ways to absorb 
external knowledge (Jansen, van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2005; Foss, Laursen, and Pedersen, 
2011). The combined forces of competition and globalization force companies to split up their 
activities and search for foreign inputs, markets, and partners. This may lead to more division and 
the offshoring and/or outsourcing of core activities, which in turn result in added organizational 
complexity and a need to develop organizational design mechanisms that can accommodate such 
challenges (Pedersen, Venzin, Devinney, and Tihanyi, 2014). 
At a more general level, organizational design has some other notable features. First, it is 
durable and set up in such a way to allow it to persist over time by routinely and continuously 
supporting a myriad of activities (Hannan and Carroll, 1995). As noted by Scott (1998: 23), 
“attaining stability over time in spite of shifting participants is one of the major functions of 
formalization.” This is likely to be important for BMI, since new BMs rarely work when they are 
first introduced (Sosna et al., 2010). Second, organizational design provides reliability in the sense 
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that structures, rules and routines are set up to do the same activities over and over again (Scott, 
1998)—a feature that is likely to be beneficial for more incremental types of BMI.  
As shown in the previous chapter, the BMI literature often refers to notions such as design, 
system, structure, configuration and architecture. This directs attention to constructs that are central 
to organizational design, such as information processing (e.g., Simon, 1945; Thompson, 1967), 
contingency and fit (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), organizational structure (e.g., Child, 1972), 
complementarities (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) and interdependence (Aiken and Hage, 1968). 
Thus, it seems that organizational design plays a key role in coordinating BM activities between 
multiple stakeholders and supporting integration across the value creating and value appropriating 
processes of the firm. In other words, design choices seem to be an integral part of a firm’s BM so 
as to support the firm’s core strategy. This notion is particularly apparent in Santos, Spector and Van 
der Heyden’s (2015: 47-48) view of BMI. According to them (Table 3.1), BM changes can be 
characterized as  
(1) reactivating (an alteration that either adds to or removes an activity from the incumbent 
business model), (2) relinking (an alteration that involves either changing the transaction 
governance among activities or the interdependence among organizational units in the 
incumbent model), (3) repartitioning (an alteration that moves the organizational units 
performing an activity), [and] (4) relocating (an alteration that maintains the existing activity 
set of the incumbent model while moving the organizational unit to another country). 
 
Table 3.1 Typology of BM change 
 
Classification  
 
 
Type 
 
What is Changed 
Reactivating—altering the set of 
activities performed by the company 
Adding 
 
 
Removing 
Adding to the activity set of a 
company’s business model 
 
Removing from the activity set of a 
company’s business model  
 
Relinking—altering the linkages 
between activities 
 
Regoverning 
 
 
 
Resequencing 
 
The governance of transactions 
between market, hierarchy, and 
hybrid 
 
The order in which organizational 
units perform activities 
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or  
The interdependence among 
organizational units between pooled, 
sequential, and reciprocal 
 
Repartitioning—altering the 
boundaries of the focal company by 
moving an organizational unit across 
boundaries 
 
Insourcing/outsourcing 
 
 
 
 
Reassigning 
 
The location of an organizational 
unit moves from outside to inside 
the company or from inside to 
outside the company 
 
The location of an organizational 
unit moves from one unit to another 
within the company 
 
Relocating—altering the (physical, 
cultural, and/or institutional) 
location between organizational 
units performing activities 
 
Off-shoring 
 
 
 
 
On-shoring 
 
The geographic location of an 
organizational unit moves from the 
company’s home country to a 
foreign country 
 
The geographic location of an 
organizational unit moves from a 
foreign country into the home 
country 
Source: Adopted from Santos et al. (2015). 
 
Based on these insights, BMI can be defined as the reconfiguration of a firm’s core BM elements 
and/or architecture by weaving these elements together into a system that will enable the firm to 
create and deliver value to its target segment(s) (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Santos, Spector, and Van der 
Heyden, 2009). Such changes are closely linked to changes in the firm’s task environment, 
communication flows, roles and responsibilities, incentives and control systems—all of which are 
essentially changes to the various design features of the organization.   
As discussed earlier, BMI is heterogeneous. Some instances may be “incremental” in nature 
and deviate little from the original model, while others are more “radical,” involving the 
development of entirely new value propositions. Thus, different cases of BMI may differ with 
respect to the “depth” of changes (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). In a similar fashion, BMI can also be 
characterized in terms of “scope” or “breadth,” that is, some BMI may involve numerous changes to 
the individual BM elements (“architectural changes”), while others cases are confined to changes 
made to one or few elements (“modular changes”). More specifically, architectural changes rewire 
complementarities across business units and departments, while modular changes do not require 
changes in other parts of the BM or organization (Stieglitz and Foss, 2015).  Stieglitz and Foss 
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(2015) offer a useful framework that combines the two dimensions of BMI—notably, the depth and 
the breadth of (intended) changes to an existing BM. 
Given the above, it seems appropriate to draw on extant theorizing on organizational design to 
gain a more holistic understanding of BMI. The key premise of organizational design theory is that 
organization “solves” the problems of coordination that arise when integrating across a large 
number of interdependent activities (Galbraith, 1974). A considerable body of work in this domain 
has identified a set of key variables along which design features may be changed to solve problems 
of coordination. More specifically, this is achieved through means of structure, allocation of 
resources and work tasks (e.g., Burton and Obel, 2004; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Miller and Dröge, 
1986), such as (job and unit) specialization, and coordination of communication and information 
flows (Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Daft 1986). Organizational design is therefore likely to influence 
the efficiency with which existing resources can be utilized (Zahra and Nielsen, 2002) and it forms 
the context for strategic choices (Lefebvre, Mason, and Lefebvre, 1997). Since BMI usually involve 
changes along these variables, organizational design is likely to be linked to the type, quality and 
quantity of BMI it produces. Moreover, organizational design constitutes an important topic within 
research on the strategic management of innovation, notably due to the fact that organizational 
design choices can be readily implemented, in contrast to softer elements such as organizational 
culture. Given this understanding, organizational design offers a highly useful starting point from 
which develop a conceptual framework that will be useful for empirical work, and it can contribute 
to the development of a cumulative, robust, and testable theory of BMI. 
Organizational Design Drivers of BMI   
While most contributions in the BMI literature focus on environmental changes (e.g., globalization 
and new technology) as drivers of BMI, a firm’s organizational design is also likely to constitute an 
important driver. Given that organizational design, among other things, determines a firm’s division 
of labor (i.e., roles and responsibilities), its boundaries, and its ability to process information, it is 
likely to influence which part(s) of the BM get(s) innovated. Some organizations may develop very 
flat structures with considerable autonomy given to employees to start and participate in new and 
innovative projects. For example, Oticon’s adoption of this type of design restored the 
organization’s entrepreneurial spirit and resulted in a series of breakthrough innovations that led to 
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notable financial performance (see Foss, 2003). Dell’s revolutionary disintermediation BM was 
driven by design choices, namely the alteration of the firm’s boundaries by cutting out the 
traditional distributors of PCs. While this BMI also required new technology, especially ICT, the 
main motivation to change the BM was the organizational design. 
A number of scholars have associated BMI with the need for learning and experimentation 
(cf. Sosna et al., 2010; McGrath, 2010; Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Chesbrough, 2007; Wirtz et al., 
2010), with organizational change processes (Dunford et al., 2010), and with the importance of 
strategic sensitivity, leadership unity, and resource fluidity (Doz and Kosonen, 2010). Learning, 
organizational change, and the like may in turn be determined by the firm’s organizational design. 
For example, IKEA’s direct delivery and self-assembly model within the furniture industry was 
driven by design choices. Foss and Jonsson (2011: 1079) found that “IKEA has developed 
organizational mechanisms that support an ongoing learning process aimed at frequent modification 
of the format for replication. Another finding [was] that IKEA treats replication as hierarchical: 
lower-level features (marketing efforts, pricing, etc.) are allowed to vary across IKEA stores in 
response to market-based learning, while higher level features (fundamental values, vision, etc.) are 
replicated in  a uniform manner across stores.” Likewise, strategic sensitivity and sensing are also 
likely to be driven by organizational design considerations. In particular, the size and composition 
of the top management team might influence the company’s ability to interpret signals in the 
environment that may call for BM changes. A large top management team composed of diverse 
specialists who interact with the operational levels is in a good position to detect such signals (Foss 
and Saebi, 2015). The level of delegation of nontrivial tasks in an organization also matters. If 
employees (e.g., in marketing and R&D) are given extensive decision rights that enable them to 
cooperate more closely with external stakeholders, they will be more likely to be in the position to 
sense the need for BM changes (Foss and Saebi, 2015) and drive such change.     
Key Organizational Design Barriers to BMI 
The BMI literature has identified several organization-based barriers to BMI, including 
organizational inertia, lack of capabilities, and lack of rules and regulations (e.g., Chesbrough, 
2010; Richter, 2013; Hwang and Christensen, 2008). However, despite the potential role of 
organizational design in preventing or significantly slowing down BMI efforts, this topic has not 
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received much attention so far. Firms that attempt BMI may find that their existing design obstructs 
such efforts. Firms are often bound by their capacity to process information and to make sense of 
experience (March and Simon, 1958). Thus, information overload may be considered a barrier to 
BMI because learning everything about a new BM is difficult when there is so much to know and 
so much information to process. This challenge is compounded if firms decide to keep the value-
adding activities of their existing BMs intact. Gaining access to relevant information and 
knowledge can present a challenge. The functional boundaries of an organization may restrict 
access to the relevant information and knowledge needed to undertake the cooperative and 
collaborative activities of BMI. For example, firms often separate innovative activities from the rest 
of the organization (Galbraith, 1982) by creating distinct organizational units. This is intended to 
shelter such activities from the existing organization, as they often involve markedly different 
processes, structures, and goals. While innovation is characterized by unpredictability, 
experimentation, and randomness, more conventional activities rely on predictability, efficiency, 
and reliability. The innovation units are thus “loosely-coupled” (Weick, 1982) to the rest of the 
organization, with the purpose of mitigating unpredictability (Blau and Scott, 1962). Although this 
creates a favorable context in which creativity and innovation can flourish, the choice also has some 
less desirable consequences. Without proper integration mechanisms, isolated units may become 
repositories of knowledge that are rarely accessed (Lyytinen and Robey, 1999). This represents a 
considerable issue, since BMI is a systemic activity that involves a variety of actions taken within 
the larger system of which it is a component part. In other words, by separating learning 
(innovation) from doing (implementation), organizational designs make the results of BMI distant 
and something that can be easily ignored by the rest of the organization.      
The incentive systems of companies are usually designed to provide rewards on the basis of 
performance success rather than error or failure. Because of this, unsuccessful projects tend to be 
erased from the organization’s memory out of fear that they will recur. Consequently, important 
knowledge is lost and cannot be used for learning and testing purposes. This situation is highly 
problematic due to the discovery-driven, trial-and-error-based, and experimental nature of BMIs 
(e.g., McGrath, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). Relatedly, formal rules and procedures 
commonly attributed to organizations with a mechanistic structure may lower organizational 
commitment because such a design usually becomes a barrier to providing a service.  
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Implementing BMI through Organizational Design  
Despite the relevance of the topic, no work, to my knowledge, has systematically linked 
organizational design to the implementation of BMI. That is not say that implementation challenges 
related to BMI have been neglected; actually, this is far from being the case (e.g., Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Magretta, 2002; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2007; Chesbrough, 2007, 
2010; Demil and Lecoq, 2010; Doz and Kosenen, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2010; Amit 
and Zott, 2012). However, the existing research tends to focus more on the impediments to BMI, 
such as organizational inertia and resistance—and less the on managerial actions that are likely to 
reduce or remove such impediments. This is unfortunate, as we are thereby denied the opportunity 
to develop insights into how BMI is implemented after its initial adoption. Given that BMI varies in 
nature between cases, may occur at different levels, and can be both internal and external to the 
firm, organizational design is potentially an important facilitator of BMI. First of all, the purpose of 
organizational design is to “solve” the coordination problems that arise with interdependent 
activities. Due to the highly systemic nature of BMI, such problems are likely to occur frequently. 
Interdependencies or complementarities among BM activities are central to BMI due to their value-
enhancing effect (Amit and Zott, 2012). Moreover, complex interactions between many 
complementary activities are arguably more difficult for would-be imitators to copy than stand-
alone activities (Barney, 1991; Porter and Rivkin, 1997). Such interdependencies or 
complementarities may be facilitated by the use of organizational design principles, that is, design 
choices that encourage managers and employees to actively shape and design both the 
organizational activities and the links (transactions) that weave BM activities together into a 
system. 
The allocation of resources has an obvious impact on the proficiency with which BMI-related 
tasks will be implemented. If adequate resources (in terms of manpower, time and finances) are 
committed, then the BMI is more likely to progress through the initial phases of the implementation 
process. A cross-functional interface is a design mechanism that brings together various sources of 
expertise and increases lateral interaction between functional areas. It facilitates non-routine and 
reciprocal information processing (Egelhoff, 1991) and contributes to an organization’s ability to 
overcome differences, interpret issues, and build understanding of new knowledge (cf. Daft and 
Lengel, 1986). In addition, it supports employees in rethinking the systemic nature of existing 
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activities and in revisiting the ways that components are integrated (Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994). When armed with such architectural knowledge, it is likely to be easier for managers to 
identify how BM change efforts fit with the existing BM and organizational architecture. In other 
words, design choices may indirectly contribute to the development of BMI-specific capabilities.        
Formalization may help increase the legitimacy of more radical forms of BMI. BMI that is 
new to the world or industry may be constrained by a lack of legitimacy, credibility, and acceptance 
from important external stakeholders, including customers, providers of external marketing, 
suppliers, and distributors (cf. Aldrich, 1999; Stinchcombe, 1965). Due to the uncertainty associated 
with such BMI, customers and providers may rely on symbolic signals of competence. Formal 
positions such as Chief BMI Officer or Vice President of BMI signals can be introduced to signal 
management experience and know-how. Given that access to the external value network is critical 
for BMI, the increased credibility and legitimacy associated with role formalization will likely ease 
the implementation of a new BM.  
At a more general level, the organizational design can be viewed as a source of learning. Such 
new learning may in turn facilitate the growth of new capabilities that can serve as the foundation 
for new BMs. As stated by Foss, Pedersen, Pyndt, and Schultz (2012: 21), even if “resources and 
capabilities are stocks that may yield a flow of services, such services do not appear automatically 
[…] Rather, they are called forth and the diverse services from diverse resources have to be 
coordinated,” which is the main purpose of organizational design.    
Two sides of the same coin? 
The organizational design itself is likely to constitute an inherent part of many BM innovations. Not 
only is it a powerful lever that managers can use to change elements in the existing BM, but it is 
also part of the BMI outcome in its own right. For example, to realize the benefits of open 
innovation models, firms need to deploy different design mechanisms, such as extensive delegation, 
intensive lateral and vertical communication, and rewards for knowledge sharing (cf. Foss, Laursen, 
and Pedersen, 2011). In a similar fashion, firms that aspire to considerably increase the service 
content of their BMs must enact changes throughout their existing organizational design 
(Kindström and Kowalkowski, 2015). Because service-based BMs often involve a high level of 
“co-creation,” the underlying organization needs to be designed in such a way that external parties 
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are allowed to take part in the company’s specific activities (Storbacka, Frow, Nenonen, and Payne, 
2012).  
 In general, many of the challenges associated with BMI are to a large extent organizational 
design challenges that require new structure and control mechanisms, as well as choices regarding 
firm boundaries vis-á-vis other firms (Rasmussen and Foss, 2015). Different types of BMI and their 
supporting organizational structures are often followed by adjustments and/or renewal in other 
areas. For example, pharmaceutical firms deploy a number of complementary organizational 
practices (such as reallocation of resources and decision rights, lateral communication, and 
workshops) to mitigate the new coordination problems that arise from a changing task environment 
(Rasmussen and Foss, 2015). In a similar fashion, Birkinshaw and Ansari (2015) argue that BMI 
often requires changes to the firm’s “management model,” that is, the structuring, coordination, and 
motivation for work; the setting of goals; and the allocation of resources. In other words, 
organizational design seems to be intimately connected to the BMI construct and may be partly 
endogenous to it.  
What can organizational designers gain from BMI? 
Most of the classic organizational design research in the management literature is biased toward 
more traditional types of innovation (such as product and process innovation) and predominately 
focuses on large manufacturing firms (Damanpour and Gopalakrishan, 2001; Henderson and Clark, 
1990; Chandler, 1962). And yet, academics and practitioners seem to agree that, in the present 
environment of globalization, intensified competition and ICTs, a sustained competitive advantage 
is more likely to emerge from BMI activities. In particular, the holistic nature of BMI is well-
equipped to capture pieces of knowledge and bundle them together in such a manner that it 
becomes difficult for imitators to determine how the value is created and appropriated. This view 
accords with those found in the stream of organizational design literature that deals with the notion 
of new organizational forms. This notion “was propagated as shorthand for what was seen as a 
surge of firms experimenting with their [organizational designs]; that is, adopting new ways of 
structuring their boundaries and their internal organization” (Foss, 2005: 11). For example, “the 
learning organization,” “shamrock firms,” “the hollow corporation,” “the hypertext organization,” 
“the virtual enterprise,” and “the boundaryless organization” quickly emerged as buzzwords in the 
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management vocabulary (Foss, 2005; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). The common characteristics of 
these new organizational forms were an emphasis on cross-functional teams, extensive delayering, 
empowerment, faster decision making, decentralization, widespread use of ICTs, and high-powered 
incentives (Child and McGrath, 2001; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997). Some scholars even “argue that 
‘traditional’ coordination mechanisms such as price, authority, routines, standardization, etc., will 
diminish in relative importance” (Foss, 2005: 11). 
However, empirical validation of these new organizational arrangements and their offshoots 
remains limited, and the results mixed. According to Foss and Klein (2012), much of the empirical 
evidence on delegation and decentralization is not particularly clear. Relatedly, Lewin and Volberda 
(1999) note that most of the work on new organizational forms is based on retrospective accounts of 
single case studies. Yet, there is considerable evidence for the increasing adaptation of high-
performance work practices in specific industries and firms (e.g., Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, 
Olson, and Strauss, 1996; Capelli and Neumark, 2001; Delaney and Goddard, 2002). These 
diverging accounts indicate that gaps still exist in our knowledge of new organizational forms, 
especially with regard to how they emerge (cf. Romanelli, 1991).  
By adopting a BMI perspective, organizational design scholars may be better able to address 
some of these perplexing issues. As mentioned several times previously, the holistic characteristics 
of BMI are likely to have organization-wide implications. For example, in a multiple-case study of 
seven manufacturing firms, Kindström (2010) looked at the transition from product-based BMs 
toward service-based models. He found that a redesign of the organization (including a new reward 
system, new means of communication, dedicated roles for service, coordination across firm 
boundaries, etc.) was needed in order to incorporate the increased service content. In other words, a 
fundamentally different organizational form or architecture was created as a consequence of BMI 
activities. Moreover, the BMI perspective may also help reconcile the mixed evidence on delegation 
and decentralization. Although the organizational design literature frequently invokes these terms 
when talking about ways to increase creativity, innovation, knowledge sharing, and faster decision-
making, they may produce less desirable outcomes during the implementation stage of BMI, 
especially if the intention is to completely transform the entire BM. The firm would not only incur 
substantial coordination costs, but would also forgo speedy implementation, as various 
organizational units and functions would need to haggle over budget and resource allocations, or 
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about the design of the BM and the underlying organization. On the other hand, in the early stages 
of a new BM, delegation and decentralized structures might be useful for developing novel BMI 
ideas and carrying out BM experiments in distinct markets or units. In other words, the ability to 
detect or perceive organizational complementarities during various stages of the BMI process is 
critical. While the organizational design literature has dealt with the concept of complementarity for 
nearly three decades, little is known about “the conditions under which complementarities are likely 
to emerge, or on the nature of the elements or factors (e.g., organizational characteristics) among 
which complementarities exist” (Ennen and Richter, 2010: 2). This may in part be due to the narrow 
perspective offered by organizational design theory, which usually deals with the organizational 
design aspects of strategy and innovation implementation (i.e., the how). In contrast, the holistic 
approach offered by the BMI construct may be better for grasping complexities that stem from 
organizational complementarities, since it extends the how to the what and who. As such, the BMI 
literature offers a process view that not only can help us better understand why some of these new 
organizational forms fail in certain situations and succeed in others, but it can provide ample detail 
on complementarities.          
Summary 
Organizational design theory provides important conceptual and empirical bases for 
understanding the emerging field of BMI. Not only does it deal with similar or related terms such as 
systems, structure, architecture, complementarities, etc., but it also deals with coordination issues 
arising from interdependent activities. Since BMIs are widely regarded as holistic and systemic in 
nature, such coordination issues are likely to occur often. To solve these issues, managers can use 
the designable elements of the organization to redefine the value proposition, value chain and 
mechanisms of appropriation by, for example, establishing new organizational units, determining 
budget and resource allocations, and revising work tasks and responsibilities. Thus, the theory of 
organizational design and the literature on BMI seem to be intimately linked. As such, I argue that 
the firm’s organizational design is likely to play several roles in the BMI process, including that of 
a driver, a facilitator, a barrier, or even a configuration that embodies both the core BM elements 
and the underlying architecture. 
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The BMI literature may help further our understanding of new organizational forms and 
complementarities. In particular, BMI calls for organization-wide attention, which may in turn lead 
to the development of a fundamentally different organizational form. Moreover, while the classic 
organizational design literature mainly focuses on how strategy, innovation and change can be 
implemented, the BMI construct focuses on the what, who and how simultaneously. Such a holistic 
approach is probably better able to explain why organizational complementarities can be 
achieved/approximated (or why not) than more limited viewpoints can. 
  
 
4  
Methods 
As noted in the previous chapters, research on BMI is still in a nascent stage, and it has yet to 
develop into a mature field of study with clearly distinguished constructs and articulated 
relationships between them. The role of organizational design in particular is poorly understood. 
The purpose of this study is to build theory by conceptually and empirically linking BMI to 
organizational design theory in answer to recent calls for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the organizational dimension of BMI (see Foss and Saebi, 2015). Specifically, this research aims to 
shed light on the context of BMI and how such innovations have unfolded in three select players of 
the pharmaceutical industry—with a particular focus on the role of organizational design in the 
process of BMI. In what follows, I start by discussing the appropriateness of the study’s research 
design for answering this type of research question. I then describe the research context from which 
the cases were sampled. Next, the sources of data (collection procedures) are examined, and the 
chapter ends with a discussion of the data analysis methods.       
Research design 
To advance our understanding of the role of organizational design in BMI, I draw on an inductive, 
multiple-case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989). This qualitative research design is appropriate 
because it allows  for a higher level of immersion, and thus learning, about which 
organizational design and BMI constructs are important, and how they may be causally related 
(Birkinshaw, Brannen, and Tung, 2011; Doz, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Edmondson and McManus, 
2007). Such an in-depth qualitative inquiry is also useful for capturing the systemic, complex and 
dynamic aspects of BMI, which require attention to immediate, local causes and temporal causal 
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orders (Miles and Huberman, 1994) as well as to the need for rich contextual and situational 
information and data. It is exactly this level of depth that makes multiple-case study research 
particularly useful for unpacking a complex phenomenon about which little is known (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Gephart, 2004). As Dyer and Wilkins (1991: 617) explain, if performed appropriately, case 
studies can be  
extremely powerful [when] authors have described general phenomena so well that others 
have little difficulty seeing the same phenomena in their own experience and research. We 
turn to the classics because they are good stories, not because they merely clear statements 
of a construct.   
In large-N research, the distance between conceptual constructs and measureable variables is often 
significantly larger, which makes it harder to (1) really capture the underlying mechanisms, (2) 
determine whether a causal relationship between A and B actually exists, and (3) unravel the 
underlying dynamics of phenomena that play out over time (Siggelkow, 2007). While in this thesis 
the theoretical background precedes the empirical material, the study is phenomenon-driven and 
intended to provide inspiration rather than an illustration of theory (Siggelkow, 2007). 
Specifically, this study is exploratory and designed to build theory on BMI and allow for 
theory development in an area where research is currently sparse (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). To do 
this, I draw on a multiple-case study design because it allows for more theory-driven variance and 
divergence in the data than single-case studies. It permits cross-case comparisons that can help 
clarify whether an emerging insight is simply idiosyncratic to a single case or consistently 
replicated in other cases (Eisenhardt, 1991). Such corroboration can help researchers more easily 
identify patterns of covariation and remove variables that do not show covariance with the 
dependent variable. For instance, if both of two firms under study change their organizational 
design to accompany BMI, it may indicate that the role of organizational design is not merely 
isolated to a single case, and could therefore point to a more widespread phenomenon. Moreover, 
key constructs and causal mechanisms are more precisely specified because it is easier to infer 
accurate definitions and obtain sufficient levels of construct abstraction from multiple cases 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). For example, Ambos and Birkinshaw (2010) studied the process 
of evolution in new ventures, some of which focused on technology and capability development, 
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while others stressed market needs and alliance partners during the evolution process. Through the 
use of multiple cases, the authors were able to reach an appropriate level of abstraction to more 
accurately describe and specify the various archetypes of evolutionary change in science-based 
ventures. 
The cases in the present study were selected with the primary objective of achieving 
maximum variation along relevant dimensions while keeping other dimensions fixed.2 This required 
the selection of cases that would enable me to display the full range of heterogeneity characterizing 
X, Y, and some particular X/Y relationship (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Thus, I deliberately chose 
both typical and atypical cases of BMI, as will be discussed further below. This level of 
heterogeneity will allow me to highlight complementary aspects of the phenomenon, specifically by 
matching up the individual case patterns in order to produce a more complete theoretical 
understanding of BMI. For example, Patton (2002: 235) asserts that maximum variation sampling 
yields “(1) high-quality, detailed descriptions of each case, which are useful for documenting 
uniqueness, and (2) important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance 
from having emerged out of heterogeneity.” This in turn leads to more robust theory because 
propositions are derived from, and rooted in, more varied empirical evidence.   
Another important aspect of the research question relates to the processual nature of BMI. 
Process-based theorizing focuses on the temporal order and sequence by which a discrete series of 
events, activities or choices produces a phenomenon (Abott, 1988; Langley, 1999; Mohr, 1982). 
Rather than showing changes in the states of BMI or what causes BM change, process-based 
theorizing shows us how change occurs by specifying the “sequence of events in terms of some 
underlying generative mechanisms or laws that have the power to cause events to happen in the real 
world and the particular circumstances or contingencies when these mechanisms operate (Van de 
Ven and Huber, 1990: 213).” As such, the process-based view supports the maximum variation 
method. More specifically, while variance-based theorizing aims to explain the relationships 
between X and Y by isolating the net effects of single variables, process-based theorizing explains 
why the relationship exists by developing a story about how a series of events unfold that allow X 
                                                 
2 The maximum variation method is related to J. S. Mill’s joint method of agreement and difference (Mill, 1872), which 
is to say, a combination of the most similar and most different cases.  
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(independent variable) to exert its influence on Y (dependent variable) (Van de Ven and Huber, 
1990). 
Throughout the present multiple-case study, I adopt an inductive approach inspired by the 
grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), which is well-suited to building new theory. 
However, I do not enter the research context with a “blank mind,” in line with what Suddaby (2006) 
recommends. Rather, I rely on the theoretical background introduced in the previous chapters as a 
practical starting point and stimulus for the study.          
Research context 
The pharmaceutical industry is an ideal context in which to study BMI. The sector has attracted a 
great deal of general interest because of its importance in the development of medical innovations, 
and partly due to this reason, has been subject to heavy regulation around the world (Rasmussen 
and Foss, 2015). The pharmaceutical industry has also stimulated long-standing scholarly interest 
because of the emphasis on innovation, environmental influences, persistent abnormal returns, and 
the dynamics of firm boundaries that have defined this industry (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994; Penner-Hahn, 1998; Pisano, 1991;). More recently, questions about whether the industry’s 
traditional BM (the so-called “blockbuster” model) is becoming obsolete or at least insufficient, 
have dominated academic debate (Gilbert, Henske, and Singh, 2003; Kola and Landis, 2004; 
Munos, 2009; Christensen, Grossman, and Hwang, 2009; Lindgardt, Reeves, Stalk, and Deimler, 
2009; Chesbrough, 2010; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010). The reason for this is that the industry, 
on the whole, is currently facing significant structural, technological, and regulatory change.  
With regard to structural change, a number of changes related to the costs of health care along 
with a decreased willingness and ability of governments and insurance carriers to pay for treatments 
have jointly driven industry margins down. This trend has been exacerbated by a growing emphasis 
on fiscal austerity since the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007. Data from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015) shows that per capita spending on 
health care across the OECD countries has slowed down in the wake of the financial crisis. From 
2009 to 2013, the average annual health care spending growth in the OECD countries was 0.6%, in 
contrast to the 3.4% in the period between 2005 and 2009. The data also indicate that prior to 2005, 
spending on pharmaceuticals grew at faster rate than any other health care service, including 
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inpatient and outpatient care, and was a major driver of overall health care expenditures (see Figure 
4.1). Over the following decade, however, the growth in pharmaceutical spending significantly 
slowed as patents for many blockbuster drugs expired and cost-containment policies were 
implemented, particularly as a consequence of financial turmoil in the economy. In addition to this, 
increasing life expectancies, coupled with declining fertility rates, mean that older people are 
making up an ever-greater proportion of the population across the OECD countries. For example, 
on average, within the OECD, the share of the population aged over 65 rose from less than 9% in 
1960 to 15% in 2010, and is projected to double in the subsequent four decades to reach 
approximately 27% in 2050 (OECD, 2015). Similarly, population ageing is expected to accelerate 
in countries like China, India, Indonesia and Brazil. This demographic trend will put further 
pressure on health care payers, since people aged over 65 years consume the most medicine per 
capita. As a result, health care payers are taking measures to reduce drug expenditures, meaning that 
pharmaceutical companies can no longer expect the same favorable reimbursement levels or enjoy 
market exclusivity for the entire patent life of a product, and nor can they afford to continue clinical 
development of drug candidates with no demonstrated superiority over existing treatments.  
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Figure 4.1 Average annual growth in pharmaceutical and total health care expenditures per capita, in real terms, 
averaged across OECD countries, 1990 to 2013. Source: OECD Health Statistics 2015 
 
 In terms of technological change, despite steadily increasing expenditures on R&D during the 
last two decades, the pharmaceutical industry is facing a continuous decline in the number of new 
product approvals (Light and Lexchin, 2012). This is partially due to the fact that the industry has 
already collected all the “low-hanging fruits” and partly due to conservative management practices 
(Munos and Chin, 2011). Thus, it seems that the industry’s conventional BM is not well calibrated 
for today’s environment of escalating health care costs and an emphasis on true innovation rather 
than marginal improvements of existing treatment regimes. On the other hand, today’s environment 
presents a number of opportunities for the industry to reinvent and reinvigorate its BM. Recent 
advances in ICTs provide an opportunity for pharmaceutical companies to create new value for 
patients, payers, and health care professionals. Through the use of digitized health information 
systems, the introduction of new mobile digital devices and wearable, implanted or inserted 
biosensors, and the digitization of individuals’ genomic sequencing data (Lupton, 2013), 
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pharmaceutical companies can potentially help patients improve their treatment outcomes and 
compliance. However, the rise of ICTs also means that patients are more empowered by “on-
demand” access to information, which will, in turn, make them more critical toward treatment 
options. 
With regard to regulatory change, regulators have become increasingly tough in the last 
decade and a half, giving rise to new and challenging impediments that must be cleared by any new 
drug candidate prior to market entry. Data offered by George Mason University’s Mercatus Center 
and analyzed by Regulatory Focus shows that the number of regulatory requirements imposed by 
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rose by 15% between 2000 and 2012.3 These 
requirements include safety and efficacy evaluations, pricing and reimbursement, patient reported 
measures, and additional clinical trial data and reporting requirements. As a consequence of this 
more cumbersome regulatory process, drug development costs have increased. 
For these reasons, the pharmaceutical industry provides a compelling context in which to 
study BMI. It is an industry that is undergoing unprecedented changes caused by growing demand 
from payers, a strengthening of the role of patients and other stakeholders, a changing regulatory 
environment, and perhaps most importantly, the declining success of the industry’s traditional 
“blockbuster” model (see the following chapter for a more detailed description of the industry 
context). Moreover, the industry constitutes a somewhat homogenous organizational field 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) in the sense that its firms have similar relationships with key stakeholders (such 
as patients and physicians) and deal with the same regulatory, compliance and payer environments; 
such homogeneity is important for minimizing external variation beyond the phenomenon of 
interest, thereby allowing cross-case comparisons to be made. 
Sampling of cases 
The unit of analysis in this study is the BMI process in the focal firm. Specifically, I seek to 
improve our understanding of not only the BMI activity as it unfolds, but also the various roles of 
organizational design, as well as where the activity resides. The research looks at three cases of 
BMI, and in all cases the focal firm is attempting to transition from a predominately product-
                                                 
3 Retrieved January 2017 from http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2014/10/30/20656/Its-Not-Just-You-FDA-
Regulatory-Requirements-Really-Are-Increasing/  
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centered orientation toward more of a service orientation. The transition is driven by a host of 
external factors, such as cost containment measures, advancements in digital health technologies, 
and more stringent regulatory requirements, as well as internal motivators, such as new sources of 
revenue, opportunities for differentiation and stronger customer relationships (Vandermerwe and 
Rada, 1988; Kindstöm, 2010). The three selected case firms also share a number of other 
similarities that will aid with comparison and replication, yet display sufficient heterogeneity so as 
to produce a more complete and accurate theory of BMI. The selection method used is known as 
maximum variation sampling, in which the selected cases vary on one or a few dimension(s), while 
sharing similar characteristics on others (Flybjerg, 2006; Seawright and Gerring, 2008). 
Specifically, my aim was to select a range of cases that would exhibit the full range of heterogeneity 
to be found among the empirical occurrences of the phenomenon under study (Paton, 2002). As 
such, I attempted to achieve representativeness of all aspects of BMI across the case firms, meaning 
that I selected both typical and atypical cases of BMI. 
In terms of similarities, I selected pharmaceutical companies that (1) are moving into services, 
(2) are predominately focused on treatment of chronic conditions, and (3) have a somewhat narrow 
value proposition. For the first point, transitioning into an increased service orientation is likely to 
cause changes to the focal firm’s existing BM, as services involve a number of attributes that are 
fundamentally different from products. While products are tangible entities separate from the 
producer, services include characteristics such as intangibility, inseparability of production and 
consumption, heterogeneity and perishability (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1985). These 
differences present a number of managerial challenges. For example, Oliva and Kallenberg (2003: 
161) argue that “services require organizational principles, structures and processes new to the 
product manufacturer. Not only are new capabilities, metrics and incentives needed, but also 
emphasis of the business model changes from transaction- to relationship-based.” It should be noted 
that the case firms did by no means abandon their core value proposition of drug development and 
delivery. Rather, services are being used as add-ons to provide additional value to the core product 
offerings. Among other things, the new services included patient support programs, educational 
services, pricing schemes and various devices for more convenient drug delivery. Regarding my 
second criterion, I selected firms with a focus on treatment of chronic diseases such as diabetes, 
psoriasis and, epilepsy for two reasons. First, patients live with the disease for many years or even 
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for the rest of their lives, and they and their families must be educated on how to adapt and cope 
with the condition. These patients are often the most demanding in terms of treatment outcomes. 
They also tend to be more knowledgeable than other patient segments about treatment options 
offered by health care providers. Second, health care payers are aware of the fact that chronic 
diseases place a substantial economic burden on society if not managed properly and promptly. 
According to the World Economics Council and the Harvard School of Public Health, the cost of 
chronic diseases is expected to account for a staggering 48% of global gross domestic product by 
the end of 2030 (Dietert and Luebke, 2012). Payers must place an increased focus on chronic 
diseases and put pressure on drug prices as well as market access; the use of generics is also 
dramatically increasing (cf. Alazraki, 2011). Consequently, pharmaceutical companies serving the 
chronic disease segments are more likely to make frequent changes to their incumbent BMs than 
others. In line with the third criterion, large pharmaceutical conglomerates (such as, Merck, Pfizer 
and GlaxoSmithKline) were purposely omitted from the sample because they operate in so many 
disease or therapy areas; this would make it complicated to observe and isolate the dynamics of 
BMI. Instead, firms with narrower value propositions (e.g. fewer disease areas) were selected, 
allowing me to more easily study the phenomenon.  
To gain heterogeneity, I chose firms specialized in different disease areas—diabetes, epilepsy 
and psoriasis—that were of various sizes in terms of annual revenues, number of employees, 
number of patients and number of markets. This enabled me to identify settings in which various 
types of BMI can emerge and develop. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the three cases: Novo 
Nordisk, UCB Pharma and LEO Pharma. Studying such diverse players provided a better grounding 
for the emerging theory than a more homogenous group would have (Harris and Sutton, 1986). 
 
Table 4.1 Overview of case firms 
 
Characteristics 
  
 
Novo Nordisk 
 
LEO Pharma  
 
UCB Pharma 
Services 
 
Drug delivery devices, 
pricing schemes and 
educational services 
 
Patient support programs 
and drug delivery devices  
Patient support programs 
and drug delivery devices 
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Type of condition and 
specialization 
 
 
Chronic (diabetes) 
 
Chronic (psoriasis) 
 
Chronic (epilepsy) 
 
Therapy areas 
 
Diabetes, obesity and 
hemostasis  
 
Dermatology and 
thrombosis  
 
Central nervous system 
and immunological 
disorders 
 
Annual revenues 
(millions) 
 
 
DKK 78,026 
 
DKK 8,216 
 
EURO 3,462 
 
Number of employees 
 
 
34,731 
 
4,783 
 
9,048 
 
Number of markets 
(countries) 
 
 
75 
 
61 
 
66 
 
Year founded 
 
1923 
 
1908 
 
1928 
Sources: The firms’ 2012 annual reports 
 
Novo Nordisk is one of the most successful pharmaceutical companies in the world, having 
demonstrated double-digit growth for twelve consecutive years, the longest streak among European 
companies. It is also the most specialized of the three firms, with a strong and narrow focus on 
diabetes. For example, 78%4 of Novo Nordisk’s total sales in 2012 were generated by the diabetes 
care business. Interestingly, despite many industry experts’ claims that the days of the conventional 
BM (the “blockbuster” model) are numbered (Aspinall and Hamermesh, 2007), Novo Nordisk is 
leveraging existing capabilities to enact a more or less incremental change to the basic value 
proposition. The company’s narrow focus and extensive experience in diabetes care have allowed it 
to perfect the model to a degree almost unmatched by any other pharmaceutical company. As such, 
Novo Nordisk represents an atypical case of BMI. In particular, the case illustrates that, despite 
claims that the conventional BM is becoming obsolete, it is still viable—although environmental 
pressures, such as soaring health care costs, and technological and regulatory change, pose a threat. 
At the other end of the extreme is UCB Pharma. While Novo Nordisk is focused on 
preserving and improving the conventional BM, UCB Pharma is transforming it in radical ways by, 
for example, introducing a range of new patient support services, establishing partnerships with 
                                                 
4 See Novo Nordisk’s annual report 2012.  
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non-traditional pharmaceutical stakeholders (such as kitchen appliance manufacturers and software 
and social media companies). Perhaps most importantly, the company has completely transformed 
the entire organization’s structure, not only to support the increasing service content but also to 
capture external ideas and insights from other stakeholders (such as patients, payers and health care 
professionals). Recently, a number of other pharmaceutical companies (including LEO Pharma) 
have launched similar patient support programs or services, but to my knowledge (and that of other 
industry experts), no company has systematically changed its entire organization to the extent that 
UCB Pharma has. 
Meanwhile, LEO Pharma represents a more typical case of BMI in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Like most other pharmaceutical companies, LEO Pharma is facing the loss of exclusivity 
for key products and a less promising pipeline compared to, for example, Novo Nordisk. As such, 
LEO Pharma’s existing BM no longer seems viable. Instead, top management is attempting to shore 
up the deteriorating model by implementing new service offerings and experimenting with BM 
pilots within confined areas of the organization. In other words, this case constitutes an “in-
between” configuration, where incumbent elements (such as the overall architecture) are largely 
preserved (similar to Novo Nordisk), while new and more radical elements are being introduced 
(similar to UCB Pharma). Thus, similar to many other companies, LEO Pharma is in a situation in 
which new sources of revenue are needed, but the company is still reluctant to fundamentally 
change the incumbent BM to the extent that UCB Pharma has. 
In spite of all the changes in the environment, there still seems to be a place for the 
conventional pharmaceutical BM, as illustrated by the case of Novo Nordisk. The company is just 
executing the BM much better than any other company. At the same time, other companies such as 
LEO Pharma and UCB Pharma face greater challenges to the traditional way of operating, and are 
therefore resorting to more fundamental and radical changes.     
Data collection  
To address the longitudinal aspects of the study, I used a combination of real-time and retrospective 
analyses. I started to collect data in 2012. The main fieldwork lasted from January 2013 to July 
2015. Given my employment as an industrial PhD at LEO Pharma, I was able follow the company’s 
BMI process in real-time throughout the entire period of the study (from 2012 to 2015). For the 
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cases of UCB Pharma and Novo Nordisk, it was only possible to follow their most recent changes 
over the course of two years, from 2013 to 2014 (UCB Pharma)5 and 2014 to 2015 (Novo 
Nordisk)6. In all three cases, the remaining years7 (especially the earlier ones, in which the changes 
to their incumbent BMs were made) were covered by means of a retrospective analysis of archival 
materials and the recollections of important and long-tenured individuals (cf. Leonard Barton, 
1990). Semi-structured interviews represented the primary method for gathering inductive data, 
while archival data in the form of internal documents and publicly available information not only 
helped triangulate the data (Yin, 2003), but also created a rich understanding of each case context 
(including strategic, BM, and organizational design features), thereby providing insights to refute or 
reinforce interview findings (Foster, 1994).        
Semi-structured interviews. Prior research has identified the BM construct as a unifying and 
boundary-spanning unit of analysis that captures value creation arising from multiple sources (both 
internal and external) (Morris et al., 2005). This warrants a holistic and ideally multi-level research 
strategy to unearth the process by which BMI occurs in incumbent firms. The transition toward a 
new BM is partly social or informal, in the sense that managers initiate the process by convincing 
others of the value embedded in the new model; and partly structural or formal as changes are made 
to the way of organizing to better accommodate the new model. As noted by Stieglitz and Foss 
(2015: 104), the process is “far from homogenous. Some may involve relatively minor changes … 
[while others] may be massive corporate-wide processes that involve basically all employees and all 
processes and activities.” Hence, the process involves a myriad of different elements and levels of 
interaction among actors, both within the firm and across organizational boundaries. Consequently, 
I sought viewpoints from multiple informants at various levels of the organizational hierarchy and 
in different functions to better capture the holistic nature of BMI. This also enabled me to develop a 
more complete picture of how the emerging theoretical constructs are interrelated (Straus and 
Corbin, 1990). While the use of multiple informants limited the potential individual and 
                                                 
5 In total, I made three visits to UCB Pharma at their headquarters in Brussels (Belgium), where I stayed between one 
and two weeks each time. The first visit was in February 2013, the second in November 2013, and the third in October 
2014.  
6 In total, I made twelve visits to Novo Nordisk at their headquarters in Bagsværd (Denmark), where I stayed between 
one and five hours each time. The first wave of visits was carried out in 2014 between January and June, and the second 
in 2015 between April and July.     
7 From 2000 to 2011 and 2012. 
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retrospective biases, it also induced richer and more elaborated models because individuals often 
focus on different but (sometimes) complementary aspects of major decisions (Golden, 1992; 
Miller, Cardinal, and Glick, 1997; Schwenk, 1985). For each case firm, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with the major internal stakeholders involved in the BMI process, including employees, 
project leads, senior executives, directors, and key partners. Interviews lasted 51 minutes on 
average, with the length ranging from 30 minutes to two hours. As summarized in Table 4.2, a total 
of 81 semi-structured interviews with 69 different informants were audio-recorded, transcribed, and 
analyzed using NVivo 10.  
Initially, I chose top managers who would be the most able to provide information on the 
main research question concerning the process of BMI. Next, a “snowball” method was adopted by 
asking each key informant for his or her recommendations as to who could best explain the 
processes of interest.  
 
Table 4.2 Overview of respondents and archival material 
 
Details 
 
Novo Nordisk 
 
LEO Pharma 
 
UCB Pharma 
Number of internal interviews  15 20 17 
Tenure  
 
From 1 to 24 years From 1 to 21 years From 1 to 22 years 
Function of interviewees8 in 
managerial positions 
CVP9f, VP, Global 
Directorf, General 
Manager 
 
 
 
(Strategic planning, 
Marketing and sales, 
Value facilitator, R&D, 
HR) 
 
CEO, EVPf, RVP10f, 
Senior Directorf, 
Directorf, Executive 
Director, General 
Manager, Unit headf 
 
(Marketing and sales, 
R&D, Strategic 
planning, HR, Market 
access) 
EVP, SVP, VPf, Senior 
Director, Director, 
General Manager, Unit 
head 
 
 
(Patient solution team, 
HR, Marketing and 
sales, Finance, R&D) 
                                                 
8 Interviewees marked with the subscript “f” are persons who I interviewed more than once.  
9 Corporate Vice President.  
10 Regional Vice President. 
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Function of interviewees in non-
managerial positions  
Executive Assistant, 
Senior Manager, 
Manager 
 
(Finance, R&D, 
Strategic planning, 
Market access, HR, 
Operations, Patient 
insights, Marketing and 
sales, Compliance and 
legal) 
 
Executive Assistantf, 
Senior Managerf, 
Managerf 
 
(Global patient 
engagement, Marketing 
and sales, Market 
access, R&D, HR, 
Operations, Patient 
insights, Compliance 
and legal) 
Senior Managerf, 
Manager 
 
 
(Patient solution team, 
Market access, HR, 
Patient insights, 
Operations, R&D, The 
New Journey Board, 
Marketing and sales, 
Compliance and legal) 
Number of external interviewse 3 9 5 
Background/title of external 
interviewees 
CEO of a partner 
organization, 
management 
consultant, professor 
Founder of a partner 
organization, Project 
director/employee of a 
partner organization, 
management consultant 
Management 
consultant, professor, 
market access expert, 
Vice president of a 
partner organization 
Total number of interviews11 (15i) + (3e) + (2f) 
= 20 
(20i) + (9e) + (8f) 
= 37 
(17i) + (5e) + (2f) 
= 24 
Public archival material  Annual reports, analyst 
reports, business press 
 
Annual reports, 
business press 
 
Annual reports, analyst 
reports, business press 
Internal archival material Memos, company 
newsletters 
Memos, emails, 
strategic and tactical 
plans, intranet 
Memos, company 
newsletter, intranet 
 
Past studies on strategic management and organizational behavior have used the snowball method 
with success to identify relevant and influential (but not always obvious) individuals involved in the 
process of organizational change and entrepreneurship. This sampling technique has been used in 
studies on managers’ interpretations of unfolding change (Isabella, 1990), the shaping of 
organizational boundaries (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009), dynamic corporate forms (Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 2001), and more recently, strategic adaptation in multi-business firms (Joseph and 
Ocasio, 2012). However, there is also an inherent danger in the snowball method. As noted by 
Penrod, Cain, and Starks (2003: 102), if researchers primarily rely on “participant-initiated 
referrals, only participants who share some social network would be researched—others ‘like me.’” 
                                                 
11 The following superscript letters indicate the type of informant and interview: i= Internal informant; e= External 
informant. 
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Yet the social networks of informants are often limited, therefore limiting the application of the 
findings. Thus, in addition to the snowball method, the following criteria were used to select 
informants. First, varying tenure length in the firm provided a temporal perspective on the case 
firm’s BMI process, while at the same time limiting biases related to tenure. Second, the informant 
needed to have direct or indirect involvement in the BMI process, either as a process sponsor or 
decision maker, which would provide deep first-hand knowledge. Third, I interviewed individuals 
with different functional and hierarchical positions, which enabled me to gain a variety of 
perspectives. In particular, such heterogeneity in perspective allowed me to understand how the 
process of BMI influenced day-to-day activities in various parts of the organization. An important 
aim of these interviews was to fully understand the organization-wide consequences of transitioning 
to a new BM. The internal perspectives were complemented by five types of external informants: 
former employees, employees with experience in more than one case company, business partners, 
competitors, and industry experts. These informants offered an outsider perspective on BMI and 
brought a “reality check” to the internal perspectives. 
The initial interview protocol was composed of two parts. The first part consisted of open-
ended questions that allowed informants to provide a broad view of the history and evolution of the 
company’s BM, the internal challenges, the environmental challenges and the company’s responses 
to them. The second part focused on specific BM decisions or issues in which the informant was 
directly involved. At times, different probing questions were added, allowing the interviewee to 
react flexibly to the questions. Open-ended questions have been found to result in higher accuracy 
in retrospective reports (Miller et al., 1997; Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). Using the constant 
comparison method (Straus and Corbin, 1990), I adjusted the interview protocol as the data 
collection progressed in order to refine the emerging theoretical themes. Specifically, questions in 
the first wave of interviews focused on identifying the case firm’s initial BM, whereas the second 
wave of questions focused on how coordination problems emerged as a consequence of BM 
changes, and how such problems could be alleviated or circumvented. In the interviews, the 
employees talked freely about the problems they have encountered during the BMI process. This 
open-ended format allowed to me delve deeper into the mechanisms underlying the innovation of 
an incumbent BM, as well as the associated challenges. For example, sub-themes related to 
coordination challenges, information flows, type of BMI, organizational structure, organizational 
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inertia, resources and capabilities gradually emerged. A number of individual follow-up interviews 
were conducted with key informants as “member checks” to ensure that the emerging themes were 
“sensible to, and affirmed by, those living the phenomenon of interest” (Nag, Corley, and Gioia, 
2007: 829). In particular, respondents were asked to review statements and examples from prior 
interviews to clarify the validity of key events and the emerging constructs.      
Archival data. I gathered extensive archival data from both internal and external sources that 
amounted to 102 documents containing 3,175 pages of data related to the case firms’ BMI 
activities. The internal sources consisted of press releases, internal documents and presentations 
related to the BMI process. The external sources consisted of business press articles about each 
firm, located using the ABI/Inform database (from 2000 to 2015). These sources were further 
complemented by annual reports, analyst reports, and books about each firm, when available. I used 
NVivo 10 to create categories for filing, retrieving, and analyzing the archival data, separating 
earlier and later documents. The earlier documents for each firm described the strategies and 
assumptions behind the initial BM and contained clear statements about the firm’s emphasis on a 
product- and science-based BM. Later documents described the BM differently. For instance, 
documents between 2007 and 2015 contained elements such as patient centricity, services, 
digitalization, change management, innovation, new solution- and customer-based BMs, and so on, 
whereas in the early 2000s, the documents mostly mentioned products and physicians.       
The extensive archival data were instrumental in the development of chronological case 
histories for each firm. Whenever possible, the data were used as important sources of triangulation 
and supplementary information for use in gaining a deeper understanding of the processes, how 
they were presented to different constituencies, and divergence among informants, as well as means 
to gain a broader perspective on important issues (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Moreover, not only 
did the documents provide additional information, but they also allowed me to control for memory 
bias by comparing the interview statements with the collected documentary data (Miller et al., 
1997). 
Exclusive access to LEO Pharma. A number of observational studies were conducted at LEO 
Pharma. This included observing organizational actions, employees’ routines (e.g., handling of 
partner calls and interactive problem solving with other functional areas), and social interactions 
(e.g., team and department meetings, and offsite workshops), with the aim of obtaining potentially 
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insightful data pertaining to individual and interpersonal issues related to BMI. In 2012, a one-day 
workshop was at held at Bella Sky in Copenhagen. The workshop’s working title was “LEO 
Pharma’s future BM,” and it included members of the top management team, department heads or 
directors, and senior managers. I took detailed field notes during the 7-hour workshop and, in the 
process, not only captured items of potential merit for answering the research question, but also 
acquired useful information about LEO Pharma’s history, values, and industry to aid in 
understanding the specific organizational context in which this company’s BMI process occurs. 
My attendance was only possible because I was employed by LEO Pharma as a part of the 
Danish Industrial PhD program. There, I was part of the Department of Global Patient Engagement, 
a unit within the global sales and marketing organization. The unit was largely responsible for LEO 
Pharma’s BMI efforts, including the development and implementation of a new patient support 
program (QualityCareTM). My role offered a unique opportunity for observation; I occasionally 
shadowed organizational members as they went about their daily activities. Moreover, being one of 
the few BM experts in the organization, I was often invited to participate in meetings about BMI 
and organizational change. As a result, I gained unique insights and knowledge about the complex 
process of BMI that I otherwise would not have been able to obtain. I saw and experienced first-
hand how various internal stakeholders resisted change by, for example, not allocating the 
necessary time and resources. Other barriers to change were a lack of support from top 
management, a reluctance to change control and incentive systems, as well as the struggle for 
resources and managerial attention. Obviously, my employment at LEO Pharma would be expected 
to give rise to biases in judgment and recall of events or issues pertaining to BMI. To mitigate this 
issue and enhance the validity of my findings, I relied on respondent validation (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1990). Unfortunately, neither Novo Nordisk nor UCB Pharma allowed me to conduct on-site 
observation. Instead, I made detailed field notes regarding the setting, words, actions, and so on, 
that I observed prior to interviews and immediately after in order to reconstruct the experience as 
accurately as possible.     
Validity and reliability of the data 
Data validity (i.e., construct credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability) was 
checked in several ways. The use of several data collection methods (e.g., multiple informants, 
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semi-structured interviews, and archival data) was important given the lack of construct clarity. 
These methods not only enabled me to gain vast insight into various organizational levels, but they 
also allowed me to gain a holistic understanding of various organizational topics related to BMI, 
such as organizational structure, information flows, incentive systems, strategy, challenges, and 
resources and capabilities. This allowed triangulation of data for accuracy and authenticity, and thus 
paved the way for stronger substantiation of constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989). The data was 
meticulously managed through the development of a case study protocol which specified how the 
entire case study would unfold. The protocol included contact records, interview transcripts, field 
notes, and documents. It was structured in such a way as to offer retrieval for later investigators 
(Yin, 1994). Peer debriefing was used to discuss emerging patterns in the data with other 
researchers not involved in the study in order to “confirm interpretations and coding decisions 
including the development of categories” (Foster, 2004: 231). As Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 
(2013) suggest, this method allows the field researcher to run his or her ideas by another researcher 
to obtain an outsider’s perspective. In this study, the peers were department members (from the 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization). Finally, to further strengthen the study’s 
validity, respondent validation of the transcripts was applied, particularly in the case of LEO 
Pharma, where I was employed.  
Data analysis 
The focus on BMI and the organizational design that accompanies it emerged through an iterative 
process. Based on analyses of the comprehensive field data and existing research on BMI and 
organizational design, I identified a number of interrelated core concepts that described the BMI 
processes that unfolded during Novo Nordisk’s, UCB Pharma’s and LEO Pharma’s transition 
toward a more service-based BM. Similar to prior studies on organizational change (e.g., Balogun 
and Johson, 2004; Barley, 1986; Siggelkow, 2002), my inductive inference was done in parallel 
with the data coding process so as to allow the identification of core concepts at different points in 
each company’s history (Langley, 2007).  
 According to Langley (1999: 691), “no analysis strategy will produce theory without an 
uncodifiable creative leap, however small.” In order to initiate the leap in the data, I relied on well-
known and widely used techniques such as constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles 
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and Huberman, 1984) and content analysis (Weber, 1990). These techniques are instrumental for 
interpreting and making sense of data (Patton, 2015). For the content analysis, I first used NVivo 
10’s word frequency and text search query features to annotate sections in the transcribed 
interviews and documents for each case. Next, I examined all the transcripts and documents, and 
identified patterns and variance in descriptions of BMI using language indicators such as value 
proposition, patient support services, innovation, change, transformation, pipeline, products, patient 
insights, value chain, new partnerships, diversification, core capabilities, narrow focus, and old and 
new elements. I noticed that some broad organizational actions were not BMIs per se, namely, new 
ways of organizing, flatter structures, agility, more freedom to experiment and innovate, lack of 
motivation, and knowledge sharing. For instance, UCB Pharma structured its entire organization 
around the so-called “patient solution teams” in order to deliver more value-added and integrated 
solutions to patients. These actions did not represent changes to the core BM components in the 
same manner as the indicators listed above (e.g., value proposition and new partnerships). 
Nevertheless, my analysis revealed that these other broad-based forms of action, or more accurately, 
organizational design changes (or lack thereof) played multiple roles in the BMI process. I relied on 
in vivo codes (i.e., first-order concepts comprised of language used by my informants) or a short, 
descriptive phrase when it was impossible to obtain a meaningful code. These first-order concepts 
provided general insights into BMI and the accompanying organizational design, as described by 
informants. 
I developed the second-order constructs by searching for links between and among the first-
order concepts, which allowed me to “lift [the] data to a conceptual level” (Suddaby, 2006: 636). 
Adhering to the inductive nature of the study, the second-order constructs emerged from my 
analysis. A number of the second-order constructs (including “the type of BM change,” “the degree 
of BMI,” “organizational structure,” “complementarities,” and “performance measures”) were 
captured by labels already in use in the scholarly literature, while others (such as “which part of the 
BM is being innovated”) required a new label.  
Finally, I used cross-case analysis to identify similar concepts and relationships across cases, 
comparing the second-order constructs that I established above. Similar constructs were compiled 
into overarching themes that served as the basis of for my understanding of the BMI process. I 
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labeled these dimensions (e.g., BMI, organizational design role) by capturing the content at an even 
higher level of abstraction or by using similar notions from the relevant literature.   
Based on these analytical procedures, I managed to create a data structure consisting of first-
order categories, second-order constructs, and overarching themes (Figure 4.2) (Corley and Gioia, 
2004), which were identified through the following questions: (1) What are the external drivers that 
lead the focal firm to innovate its incumbent BM? (2) How did the BM and organizational design 
change over the period of the study? And (3) What role does the organizational design play during 
BMI? I used the second-order constructs and overarching dimensions depicted in Figure 4.2 to 
shape my account and track how each case firm’s BM and organizational design changed over time. 
As a result, I was able to combine the literature on BMI and organizational design with my growing 
understanding of the BMI process and move between data and theory. In the following chapters (6-
8) I present the empirical data for the individual cases, and in the subsequent findings and 
discussion chapters (9-10) I provide my interpretation of the data.     
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Figure 4.2 Data structure 
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Figure 4.2 Continued 
  
 
5  
The Pharmaceutical Industry: Key Characteristics and External Drivers of 
BMI 
The pharmaceutical industry is unique in that it is considerably more linked to science and more 
heavily regulated than many other industries. Since pharmaceutical innovations greatly influence 
people’s quality of life, regulators, health care providers (e.g., physicians and pharmacists) and 
payers (i.e., the government and/or insurers) aim to protect the public health at reasonable cost 
(Ding, Eliashberg, and Stremersch, 2014).  
For decades, the industry has been described by the following key characteristics: innovation, 
blockbuster model, finite lifespan, and marketing. Pharmaceutical companies “live or die” by their 
ability to develop innovative new drugs to alleviate diseases and improve public health. Without 
innovation, they are no longer in a position to generate new drugs with sufficiently profitable patent 
protection. 
The so-called “blockbuster model” relies on the identification of promising new drug 
candidates aimed at large disease populations, that have the potential to generate at least $1 billion 
dollars per year in revenue. Most pharmaceutical companies hesitate to abandon that model to focus 
on other types of drugs with more limited market potential (Aspinall and Hammeresh, 2007) 
because the cost of pharmaceutical innovation is enormous. According to many estimates, the 
average cost of taking a drug from discovery to market is more than $1 billion dollars ($0.8-1.8 
billions) when adjusted for post-approval expenses and costs associated with approval in non-US 
markets (Munos, 2009). 
With the exception of a few biological drugs, most drugs are bounded by a finite lifespan, that 
is, they only have a limited time to create shareholder value. The standard lifespan of a drug is 
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usually linked to the validity and duration of the patent. The vast majority of drugs are chemical 
products and have no way of extending their standard lifespan. Since the manufacturing of chemical 
drugs is standardized, it is generally relatively easy for competitors to produce a generic equivalent 
once the patent expires. The nature of biological drugs, on the other hand, is considerably more 
complex because they are more difficult to manufacture and have higher variable production costs.  
Unlike many other products and services, pharmaceutical drugs are viewed both as a 
consumer product that addresses specific customer needs, and as something to which people have a 
fundamental right. This duality makes pharmaceutical marketing increasingly complex: On the one 
hand, all the basic rules of commerce should apply, but on the other hand, if the drug is something 
that people have a basic right to, then standard marketing practices are no longer sufficient. For 
example, most people will accept a neighbor being able to afford a Ferrari while they cannot. In 
contrast, if the neighbor gets access to an expensive but effective treatment for a disease, most 
people will most likely demand the same access, regardless of their financial situation. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies need to consider these two conflicting roles of pharmaceutical drugs 
when they attempt to extract value from their innovations. In order to extract maximum value, 
pharmaceutical companies not only need to offer drugs that are safe and efficacious, but must also 
ensure careful management of their relationship with three key stakeholders—patients, health care 
providers (e.g., physicians and pharmacists), and payers. These stakeholders are important because 
a pharmaceutical drug purchase is a joint decision between the patient (user) and the health care 
provider (gatekeeper). Although the gatekeeper usually has the final decision-making authority on 
what drug a patient should use, a patient can switch to another physician or passively object by 
either not getting the prescription filled or not using the drug according to the physician’s 
instructions (non-compliance). For many decades, pharmaceutical companies have specifically 
directed marketing efforts toward influencing physicians’ prescribing behavior. 
Together, the above characteristics of pharmaceuticals determine the context of 
pharmaceutical innovation. More recently, questions about whether these characteristics will persist 
or be replaced by new ones have dominated academic and practitioner debate (Gilbert et al., 2003; 
Kola and Landis, 2004; Munos, 2009; Ding et al., 2014; Khanna, 2012; Kessel, 2011; Mattke, 
Klautzer, and Mengistu, 2012). The main reason for this debate is that the pharmaceutical industry 
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is currently facing tremendous challenges due to significant structural, technological, and regulatory 
change.  
Structural change 
Today’s health care systems are under extreme pressure to control costs and justify expenditures. 
Estimates from the OECD show that health care spending per capita in OECD countries has risen 
by over 70% in real terms since the early 1990s (OECD, 2010). Similarly, since 2000, the average 
spending on pharmaceuticals has increased by nearly 50% in real terms (OECD, 2011), while 
pharmaceutical spending across OECD countries in 2013 reached approximately $800 billion US 
dollars—accounting for roughly 20% of total health care spending when pharmaceutical drug 
consumption in hospitals was added to consumption in the retail sector (OECD, 2015). The 
principal driving force behind the escalating cost of health care lies in the demographic, 
epidemiological and economic shifts occurring across the world. 
The impact of changing demographics and chronic diseases 
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs has projected that the world’s 
population will reach 8.5 billion in 2030, with 1.4 billion (16.4%) aged 60 and over (United 
Nations, 2015). On average, the share of the population aged over 65 years across OECD countries 
is projected to reach 27% in 2050 as a consequence of longer life expectancies and declining 
fertility rates (OECD, 2015). This specific segment of the population is also the one that consumes 
the most medicine per capita. In a cross-sectional study on age- and sex-specific health care costs 
and mortality, Alemayehu and Warner (2004) found that nearly half (48.6%) of a cohort’s health 
care expenditures occurs during the post-65 years. Moreover, due to scientific advances, improved 
lifestyle and better education, life expectancy at birth continues to rise gradually across the OECD, 
increasing by 3 to 4 months on average each year (OECD, 2015). Although countries such as India, 
Indonesia, Brazil and China are nowhere near the OECD average, they have achieved significant 
gains in longevity over the past four decades (OECD, 2015). Although global rates of mortality 
from cardiovascular diseases and cancer have declined substantially in recent decades, improved 
life expectancy means that more and more people are living with one or more chronic conditions for 
longer periods. This conversion of previously terminal diseases into chronic diseases has increased 
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the need for long-term treatment and medications, placing new, longer-term requirements on health 
care systems. For example, in 2014, it was estimated that more than 380 million people had 
diabetes, and by 2035 this number is projected to reach almost 600 million people.12 Chronic 
diseases are expected to be the primary cause of disability globally by 2020, and if not managed 
well, they will arguably become the most expensive problem faced by health care systems (WHO, 
2002). According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the US Department of 
Health and Human Services, chronic diseases account for 70% of deaths and for more than 75% of 
direct health care costs in the US (Thrall, 2005). 
The acute care model 
Most current health care systems are designed to treat acute problems related to illness, such as 
diagnosing, testing, providing symptom relief, and developing effective treatments. Although these 
functions are relevant to acute and episodic health problems, a remarkable discrepancy arises when 
this model of care is applied to the management of chronic diseases. This is because chronic 
diseases differ from acute conditions in a number of important ways. While acute conditions 
generally have a sudden onset and last only for a short period of time without requiring ongoing 
treatment, chronic diseases are persistent, lasting for a considerable period of time, are not self-
limiting, wax and wane in terms of symptom severity, and can usually not be cured (Priester, Kane, 
and Totten, 2005). In addition to these differences, chronic diseases often have multiple causes and 
can appear long after the causative exposure or behavior. Finally, chronic conditions tend to have a 
larger impact on a person’s quality of life. For most acute conditions, the threat to the person’s 
health is isolated to a single event and is relatively short-lived, but for chronic diseases, the threat is 
ongoing, long-lasting and affects the social, physical, psychological and economic aspects of the 
person’s life. The current acute care model leaves little, if any, room to address the social, 
psychological and behavioral dimensions of chronic disease (Tinetti and Fried, 2004). In other 
words, it is not designed to provide the continual care needed to manage chronic diseases, nor does 
it deploy an integrated approach that bundles prevention and intervention strategies to effectively 
and equitably address the chronic disease burden. Instead, current health care systems tend to adopt 
a fragmented approach of care, in which subsystems (i.e., primary, secondary and tertiary care) 
                                                 
12 Retrieved April 2017 from http://www.idf.org/diabetesatlas/update-2014  
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operate independently from one another. This has led to a misalignment of incentives and a lack of 
coordination that together undermine the efficient allocation of resources, and thus adversely affect 
the quality, cost and outcome of care (Enthoven, 2009). The fragmented nature of health care is also 
problematic when it comes to the needs of chronically ill patients, as they often require coordinated 
care from several health care entities. For example, failure to provide patients with carefully 
coordinated care may allow small issues to escalate into medical emergencies. Such situations can 
result in unnecessary hospitalization, increased mortality, and higher overall system costs. In 
addition, fragmentation not only frustrates patients who find it difficult to navigate the complex web 
of providers, but also causes delays in diagnosis and initiation of treatment, leading to late-stage 
disease and higher mortality rates. 
The growing importance of health care payers 
 As a consequence of escalating health care costs and growing constraints on government budgets, 
there is a clear need for payers to take action to ensure better management of health care resources. 
Health care expenditure absorbs, on average, 15% of total government expenditure across OECD 
countries, with large between-country variations (OECD, 2015). Perhaps surprisingly, countries that 
spend the most are not necessarily those with the best health outcomes or value for the money 
spent. As Figure 5.1 shows, spending more for health care does not correlate directly with 
improvements in life expectancy.13 There is no straightforward answer for why this is the case. 
Scholars have examined the performance of modern health care systems and have found 
discrepancies in the setup. For example, in a systematic review of the association between health 
care quality and costs, Hussey, Wertheimer, and Mehrotra (2013) found that of the sixty-one studies 
reviewed, (1) 21 concluded that higher cost was associated with higher quality, (2) 18 concluded 
that higher cost was associated with lower quality or that the relationship was mixed, and (3) 22 
concluded that no significant association, or an indeterminate association, existed between cost and 
quality. McGlynn et al. (2003) compared the actual quality of care provided to patients and found 
                                                 
13 Efficiency of health care spending uses life expectancy as the outcome of health spending. It could be argued that this 
is a partial indicator, since it does not reflect the prevalence of disease, disability or quality of life, and the data 
constraints are significant. A study by Joumard, André, Nicq, and Chatal (2010) showed that life expectancy is highly 
correlated with other indicators of health status, including infant and premature mortality and better quality of life due 
to improved medical treatment. Life expectancy not only reflects health spending but also lifestyle choices, such as 
tobacco use, alcohol consumption and education level. 
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significant gaps between what is known to work and the actual care provided. Specifically, the 
study showed that, on average, Americans only receive 55% of the care that is recommended by 
established medical standards. This incomplete provision of care is almost equal across the broad 
types of treatment, such as preventive care, acute care, and chronic care (McGlynn et al., 2003).           
  
 
Figure 5.1 Differences in life expectancy and health care spending across OECD countries, 2013. Source: OECD Health 
Statistics 2015 
 
Similar findings have been reported in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom (e.g., Hussey et al., 2004). As mentioned earlier, the fragmented nature of health 
care gives rise to coordination problems between the various providers, which can result in an 
inefficient use of resources. Moreover, for several decades, health care authorities such as the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) and The European Medicines Agency (EMA) have mainly relied 
on comparisons between a single treatment and an extant treatment or placebo during the drug 
approval process (cf. Schoen et al., 2007). Requirements have been even less stringent when it 
comes to medical devices, where a new device only needs to be substantially equivalent to another 
device already on the market (Zuckerman, Brown, and Nissen, 2011). In other words, there has 
been little incentive for drug and device manufacturers to develop solutions that are more effective 
or less costly than current approved treatment regimens. As a result, expensive new therapies are 
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approved without good evidence that they improve patient outcomes and decrease health care costs. 
A recent example relates to the approval of new cancer drugs, which can cost well over $100,000 
dollars per year to purchase and are often expected to prolong the life of cancer patients for little 
more than a month (Kantarjian, Fojo, Mathisen, and Zwelling, 2013). 
However, as a consequence of increasing costs and poor quality of care, the willingness and 
ability of health care payers to accept new drugs that only provide marginal improvements over 
existing treatment regimens (in terms of efficacy, compliance, cost-effectiveness, etc.) has vanished. 
Most notably, the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007 was a turning point that prompted 
governments to rapidly implement cost containment and quality-of-care strategies.  
Across Europe, EU member states have introduced policies related to pharmaceutical pricing, 
reimbursement, and expenditure control (Table 5.1), as well as policies targeting specific health care 
stakeholders, such as physicians and pharmacists (Table 5.2). In most EU member states, price 
reductions and external reference pricing are some of the most frequently used policy interventions. 
External reference pricing refers to the practice in which a drug price is set on the basis of the 
lowest prices offered in other markets. This type of pricing mainly applies to reimbursable 
medicines, whereas non-reimbursable medicines are normally priced freely. Governments are 
increasingly using external reference pricing in combination with health technology assessments, 
where pricing is made conditional on evidence of value added (in terms of efficacy and/or cost-
effectiveness) of drug innovations compared to existing treatment options (Carone, Schwierz, and 
Xavier, 2012).  
The second most common type of intervention relates to product reimbursement and co-
payments. Reimbursement schemes establish the maximum price that can be reimbursed by third-
party payers (internal reference pricing). Governments also introduce lists that specify which drugs 
are eligible and not eligible for public reimbursement (Aaserud, Austvoll-Dahlgren, and Sturm, 
2006). Several EU member states are also increasing co-payments (by which the patient pays for 
part of the drug cost) by, for example, decreasing the reimbursement rate or increasing the 
percentage co-pay on specific treatments.  
Third, governments are taking steps to directly limit pharmaceutical expenditure. This is 
achieved by price freezes and discounts offered by producers and distributors of pharmaceuticals to 
purchasers. Furthermore, payback and clawback policies are adopted to prevent budget overruns by 
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demanding refunds from the pharmaceutical industry once a target budget is exceeded (Vogler, 
Zimmermann, Leopold, and Joncheere, 2011). 
 
Table 5.1 Pharmaceutical pricing, reimbursement, and expenditure policies 
Price regulations Examples 
Price reductions: Both reimbursable and non-
reimbursable drug prices can be reduced  
UK: price cut of 1.9% on branded NHS medicines 
Spain: generic drug prices reduced by 30% 
Ireland: price reductions for on-patent drugs 
 
External reference pricing: Compares drug prices in 
one country against prices of the same drug in a 
basket of selected other countries  
 
This procedure is applied in 24 EU member states 
(except for Denmark, Sweden, and the UK) 
 
Internal reference pricing: Establishes the maximum 
price to be reimbursed by a third-party payer 
(“reference price”). The patient pays the difference 
between the retail price and the reference price, in 
addition to any co-payment required. The reference 
price applies to all pharmaceuticals within the 
corresponding group of products  
 
Estonia: inclusion of 50% reimbursable drugs in the 
internal reference price system 
Romania: change to therapeutic reference pricing (i.e., 
broader clusters of drugs can be compared) 
Lithuania: change in methodology of price of most 
expensive drugs in a cluster (lower prices) 
 
VAT: Most drugs have a value-added tax below the 
standard VAT rate. 
Finland: increase (8  9%) 
Greece: increase (9  10%) 
Latvia: increase (10  12%) 
 
Product reimbursement and co-payments Examples 
Positive/negative lists: Specify which 
pharmaceuticals are eligible for reimbursement and 
which are not. 
 
Iceland: changes in reimbursement status (from 
general to individual) for some drugs 
Portugal: negative listings of some drugs 
Greece: re-introduction of positive list and negative list 
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Co-payments: Patients are paying an increasing 
portion of the drug cost.  
Belgium: increase of percentage co-pay for some drugs 
Denmark: increase in co-pay for fertility drugs 
France: the overall reimbursement rate is decreased 
(35  30%) 
Expenditure controls Examples 
Discounts, payback and other arrangements: policies 
directly targeting cost-containment 
Italy: choice between payback and price cuts 
Portugal: discount of 6% for reimbursable drugs 
Sources: Espin and Rovira (2010); Zimmermann et al. (2011) 
 
Finally, governments are implementing policies that are an attempt to influence the behavior of 
wholesalers, physicians, and pharmacists. For instance, a number of the EU member states have 
enacted policies that obligate pharmacies to dispense the cheapest—often generic—equivalent 
drugs. The use of mark-ups by distributors of pharmaceuticals may also influence dispensing 
behavior. Meanwhile, the autonomy of physicians is constrained by closer monitoring of their 
prescription patterns, mandatory prescription guidelines, budget ceilings, prescription quotas, 
financial (dis-)incentives and educational and informational policies (Carone et al., 2012). 
 
Table 5.2 Policies aimed at health care stakeholders 
Wholesalers and pharmacists  
Generic substitution: Pharmacists may be induced or mandated to dispense the cheapest bioequivalent 
medicine, often called “generic substitution.” It is mandatory in 8 EU member states, indicative in 14 and 
disallowed in 7. 
Mark-ups: Twenty-three EU member states apply wholesalers’ mark-ups of the pharmaceutical prices set by 
law and all EU member states apply pharmacists’ mark-ups. These can be linear, regressive, a fixed-fee (NL) or 
fee-for-service (UK).  
Physicians 
Monitoring of prescribing behavior: At least 22 EU member states monitor prescribing behavior to some extent, 
for example, through looking at electronic prescriptions. 
Pharmaceutical budgets: A maximum pharmaceutical budget may be established per period, region, field of 
specialty and physician (at least 9 EU Member States). 
Prescription quotas: These may define a target percentage of generics to be prescribed by each physician or 
may target the average cost of prescriptions (at least 6 EU Member States). 
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Financial incentives: Physicians may be incentivized or punished financially by following or disregarding 
prescription guidelines, quotas and budgets (at least 11 EU Member States). 
Source: adapted from Carone et al. (2012: 13) 
 
Although health care payers in Europe are taking drastic steps to control pharmaceutical 
expenditures, the US has also introduced new reforms to manage excessive spending on health care. 
Most importantly, the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed into law in 2010, 
included a number of cost-containment procedures. Most of the procedures are similar to those 
employed by the EU member states, such as preferred drug lists, generic substitution, health 
technology assessment, discounts, budget ceilings, and so on. The impact of these policies is that 
health care payers have more power and control over pharmaceutical expenditures and the quality 
of care delivered to patients. As a consequence, pharmaceutical companies can no longer rely on 
drug innovations that only modestly improve efficacy, patient outcomes and cost-effectiveness. In 
fact, the FDA recently rejected a number of prescription drugs, including RLX30 (Novartis), 
Taltorvic (Merck), Tresiba (Novo Nordisk), Ezogabine (Valeant Pharmaceuticals and 
GlaxoSmithKline), on the basis of these parameters. Instead, companies need to focus on delivering 
real innovations that are markedly better than existing treatment options in order to receive 
favorable pricing and reimbursement terms. Apart from that, they also need to shift focus from 
physicians toward payers and patients. The increasing use of prescription guidelines, monitoring of 
prescribing behavior, quotas, and so forth, means that physicians have less autonomy and control 
over prescription decisions, whereas payers can more directly control the accessibility to drugs. As 
a consequence, the pharmaceutical industry has experienced massive layoffs in recent years. 
According to Cegedim Strategic Data14, the size of the US pharmaceutical sales force declined by 
approximately 2% between 2013 and 2014, to less than 65,000—a 40% drop compared its peak 
level in 2006, when there were more than 100,000 US pharmaceutical sales representatives. 
                                                 
14 Retrieved March 2017 from http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/03/05/712594/10123438/en/CEGEDIM-
STRATEGIC-DATA-Worldwide-Pharma-Industry-Sales-Force-Levels-Flat-in-201.html  
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Technological change 
Data from the Global Health Observatory show that the average global life expectancy increased by 
5 years from 2000 to 2015, the fastest increase since the 1960s.15 Much of this can be credited to 
significant advances in pharmacotherapy. Over the last fifteen years, however, the companies that 
brought us insulin, antibiotics, and a host of other “wonder drugs” seem to have lost their ability to 
innovate (Munos and Chin, 2011). As such, there appears to be declining technological 
opportunities, at least in the conventional mode of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry. 
However, recent advances in ICTs may facilitate the change in operating philosophy from the 
classical “blockbuster” model to a range of new BMs. 
Innovation crisis – myth or reality? 
Despite staggering R&D spending and notable advances in the basic sciences, the pharmaceutical 
industry has not managed to avoid a continuous decline in the number of new molecular entities 
(NMEs) that make it all the way through clinical development to final market approval (Light and 
Lexchin, 2012; Munos and Chin, 2011). To illustrate this point, in 2002, only 17 NMEs received 
market approval from the FDA—only a minor fraction of the fifty-six NMEs approved in 1996 and 
the lowest since 1983 (Cockburn, 2004). This trend is by no means isolated to the US. Between 
1998 and 2008, the total output of NMEs declined by almost 50% and attrition rates have increased 
sharply, particularly in late-phase clinical trials (Pammolli, Magazzini, and Riccaboni, 2011). 
Although the number of NMEs is an imperfect measure of research outcomes, as it does not account 
for the quality of the R&D output, there is a growing concern about the causes and consequences of 
the so-called innovation crisis within pharmaceutical research. Other scholars (e.g., Hopkins, 
Martin, Nightingale, 2007; Munos, 2009; Schmid and Smith, 2005), however, argue that these 
concerns are almost surely blown out of proportion. They claim that the so-called innovation crisis 
rests on the drop in NME output from a sharp peak in 1996, which resulted from the rapid reduction 
in the backlog of applications after the FDA deployed staff hired under the Prescription Drug User 
Fee Act of 1992 to reduce approval times (Scherer, 2007). This drop ended in 2006, when approval 
                                                 
15 Retrieved March 2017 from http://www.who.int/gho/mortality_burden_disease/life_tables/situation_trends_text/en/  
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times reverted to their long-term mean of between 15 and 25 approvals per year.16 Similarly, based 
on FDA records, Munos (2009) showed that the R&D output of pharmaceutical companies has been 
more or less constant for almost 60 years, and that new biologics17 have followed a similar pattern. 
Whether the innovation crisis is real or a myth, it is far more interesting to look at the number of 
drugs that offer an actual therapeutic advance, as opposed to solely looking at the total number of 
approved drugs each year. Although innovation is often measured by the industry and its analysts in 
terms of the number of NMEs, as a stand-in for therapeutically superior new medicines, most of 
these NMEs have only provided modest clinical advantages over existing treatment options (Light 
and Lexchin, 2012). This is not a new phenomenon, but it has received more attention in recent 
years as a result of the increasing health care costs and aging populations. In a comprehensive study 
of all internationally marketed NMEs from 1974 to 1994, the industry’s Barral report found that 
only 11% were therapeutically and pharmacologically innovative (Light and Lexchin, 2012). Since 
the mid-1990s, independent reviews have reached nearly the same conclusion, namely that about 
85-90% of all NMEs provide trivial or no clinical advantages to patients (e.g., Angell, 2005; Luijn, 
Van Gribnau, and Leufkens, 2010). 
Why is this the case? One reason may relate to the emergence of the “blockbuster” model in 
the mid-1990s. Before this, R&D units were largely independent of the company’s commercial 
activities and were therefore free to pursue autonomous research, even if the resulting medicines 
targeted diseases beyond the scope of the organization’s commercial capabilities (Munos and Chin, 
2011). Nevertheless, to improve the commercial applications of drug research, a closer link between 
R&D and market demand was needed. Thus, pharmaceutical executives directed their researchers to 
focus mainly on the development of “blockbuster” drugs (those with peak annual single-product 
global sales of at least 1 billion dollars) in order to support the companies’ marketing efforts. 
Advanced portfolio management practices (Evans, Hinds, Hammock, 2009) were adopted to 
systematically optimize research outcomes, limit financial risk, and bring order and predictability to 
                                                 
16 Retrieved March 2017 from 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandB
iologicApprovalReports/UCM242695.pdf  
17 Biological products are manufactured in a living system such as a microorganism, or plant or animal cells. Most 
biologics are very large, complex molecules or mixtures of molecules. Many biologics are produced using recombinant 
DNA technology. Most drugs are usually manufactured through chemical synthesis, which means that it is made by 
combining specific chemical ingredients in an ordered process. Retrieved March 2017 from 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ucm133077.htm  
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a discovery process that was largely regarded as “chaotic” and unpredictable. Despite the good 
intentions of pharmaceutical executives, the new BM, with its emphasis on structure and 
predictability, limited the creative and autonomous characteristics of scientific discovery. Moreover, 
as the cost of bringing a new drug to market continued to rise sharply, many pharmaceutical 
companies could not justify investing in drug candidates with lower or moderate market potential 
(<300 million dollars) (Kessel, 2011; Khanna, 2012). This has led to an industry dominated by risk 
averse companies that are more inclined to pursue “safe” incremental innovations (such as “me-too” 
or “follow on” drugs18), rather than “breakthrough” products that offer significant therapeutic 
advantages over existing drugs. 
At the same time, health care payers are determined to get more value for their money. Not 
only do they demand products that offer clinical advantages over existing treatments, but they also 
have requirements for cost effectiveness and patient outcomes. Clearly, this makes it increasingly 
difficult to sustain the blockbuster model in today’s environment. This is especially reflected in the 
industry’s withering drug pipelines and increasing generic competition (Dolgin, 2010). In addition, 
many mature blockbusters that once contributed to the sustenance and growth of pharmaceutical 
companies have lost proprietary protection. For example, well-known drugs such as Lipitor 
(atorvastatin), Plavix (clopidogrel), and Singulair (montelukast) came off patent in 2011. Estimates 
from EvaluatePharma show that 120 billion dollars in sales were lost to patent expirations between 
2009 and 2014, and it is forecasted that 215 billion dollars in sales are at risk from patent 
expirations occurring between 2015 and 2020.19 Yet in spite of these clear issues, many companies 
are still attempting to patch the traditional BM by purchasing revenues through mergers and 
acquisitions to replace declining sales. In addition, from 2007 to 2012, the ten biggest 
pharmaceutical companies eliminated more than 200, 000 jobs (Khanna, 2012). Although these 
strategies have helped curtail expenses in the short run, they do little to address the industry’s 
fundamental innovation challenge. 
                                                 
18 Hollis (2004: 1) defines ‘me-too’ drugs as “products which largely duplicate the action of existing drugs.” 
19 Retrieved April 2017 from http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/wp15.pdf  
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The rise of ICT-based health care technologies 
Recent advances in digital technologies such as mobile apps, social media, sensors, wearable 
devices, and other technologies present a wide spectrum of opportunities through which incumbent 
pharmaceutical companies can embrace a broader logic for value creation. These technologies can 
be used to promote patient adherence and can also help with lifestyle changes that are critical to 
therapeutic success and the patients’ general quality of life, especially for the chronically ill. For 
example, in diabetes care, where effective disease management requires a coordinated and 
integrated approach, new mobile apps assist patients in not only controlling their blood glucose 
levels but also in managing other aspects of their lives, such as diet and exercise. The range of 
technologies targeting adherence is by no means limited to diabetes. Such technologies include 
apps, devices, sensors and patient support websites that help patients keep track of vaccination 
schedules (e.g., Novartis’ VaxTrak), improve patient-physician communication (e.g., UCB 
Pharma’s Parkinson’s Well-Being Map), and notify caregivers of adherence and reorder drugs from 
the pharmacy (Vitality’s GlowCap). The common denominator among these technologies is their 
ability to store data and report trends. In this way, deeper insights into the lives of patients can be 
gained. Such knowledge can inform patient-centered drug development that takes into account, for 
example, which adverse events lead to drug discontinuation and what causes non-compliance in 
different patient segments, and that combines an effective compound with a targeted engagement 
model (Mattke et al., 2012). In addition, the accumulated data can be used for patient outcome 
studies, which are becoming increasingly important for justifying higher prices and reimbursement 
rates in negotiations with payers.  
 The implementation of ICTs has also led to considerable cost savings, particularly in sales and 
marketing organizations. Instead of employing a massive sales force, some pharmaceutical 
companies are investing heavily in e-detailing, which refers to “an IT-supported sales dialogue via 
the internet (Heutschi, Legner, Schiesser, Barak, and Österle, 2003: 263). Rather than having 
pharmaceutical sales representatives visit physicians, companies can simply use digital technology 
to relay the latest information on the firm’s prescription drugs that is relevant to the specific 
physician’s specialty. As a result, not only are companies able to dramatically lower sales force 
expenses, but they are also able to offer more value to physicians. In particular, e-detailing enables 
physicians to retrieve information on demand rather than using valuable office time to consult with 
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sales representatives. When coupled with the other digital technologies, pharmaceutical companies 
can also add value to the physicians by providing new insights on patients’ experiences with the 
drugs. 
Historically, patients have played a relatively passive role in the medical dialogue with 
physicians [see Guadagnoli and Ward (1998) for a comprehensive review of patient participation in 
decision-making]. In most cultures, patients have always wanted to be well informed but they have 
preferred critical decisions to be made by their physicians. Compared to patients, physicians have 
accumulated medical knowledge through several years of education, training, and experience, 
which puts them in better position to make such decisions. Moreover, the widespread use of health 
insurance has, in many markets, protected patients from financial risk and out-of-pocket costs. As 
such, price considerations have not, until recently, changed patients’ decision-making behavior. 
Consequently, for many years, the medical dialogue has largely been dominated by the expert 
authority of physicians, while patients have passively accepted that authority without much 
question. However, driven by the digitization of data and new modes of digital communication—for 
example, via social media sites such as Facebook, PatientsLikeMe, and Instagram—patients have 
more ready access to information. In other words, today’s patients are more empowered to partner 
with their health care providers when making decisions about treatment options and disease 
management, and they expect more personal attention. Thus, the practice of health care is gradually 
shifting toward a patient-centric model. This means that pharmaceutical companies need to direct 
their attention toward the end users, rather than mainly focusing on influencing the prescribing 
behavior of physicians.  
Regulatory change 
The regulatory hurdles that a new drug must clear prior to market approval are increasing. 
Estimates from George Mason University’s Mercatus Center and Regulatory Focus show that the 
number of regulatory requirements imposed by the FDA increased by 15% between 2000 and 
2012.20 As a consequence of the well-publicized market withdrawals of high-profile drugs such as 
Vioxx (Merck), Baycol (Bayer), Rezulin (Warner-Lambert) and Propulsid (Janssen Pharmaceutica), 
                                                 
20 Retrieved March 2017 from http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2014/10/30/20656/Its-Not-Just-You-FDA-
Regulatory-Requirements-Really-Are-Increasing/  
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the FDA and its counterparts in other major markets have placed more emphasis on pre-approval 
safety evaluations and have implemented more post-approval systems to monitor drug safety and 
use (Kaitin, 2010). In response to the FDA Amendments Act of 2007, the FDA introduced the 
Sentinel Initiative in 2008. It enables the FDA to “access the capabilities of multiple, existing data 
systems (e.g., electronic health record systems, medical claims databases.”21 The system is designed 
to both detect issues (such as higher-than-expected numbers of adverse events) and to confirm 
problems, including those supported by other sources (Platt et al., 2009). This system has 
strengthened the FDA’s ability to proactively monitor the safety of medical products throughout 
their life cycle. The FDA not only requires pharmaceutical companies to submit an application for 
regulatory approval along with various risk and mitigation strategies, but can also demand post-
market clinical studies on approved products if safety issues are detected or confirmed. Depending 
on the outcomes of such studies, the FDA can either withdraw the product or restrict its use by, for 
example, mandating changes to the drug’s approved labeling and distribution channels (Kaitin, 
2010). European regulators have similarly implemented new rules that impose a range of different 
pre- and post-market requirements on drug manufacturers. In 2012, the European Medicines 
Agency (EMEA) established the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee to help improve 
all aspects of risk management for human medicines. The committee’s role is two-fold. First, it 
takes part in the pre-approval activities by conducting a pre-marketing pharmacovigilance 
inspection to assess the drug applicant’s ability and capacity to meet the proposed 
pharmacovigilance measures (Laroche et al., 2016). The committee can also advise EMEA to 
impose certain conditions on a marketing authorization, such as making the approval decision 
conditional on, for example, specific safety measures, additional post-authorization studies, and 
stricter adverse event reporting requirements. Second, to keep track of unexpected complications 
with already approved products, the Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee, among other 
things, investigates safety issues identified by the EMEA or member states, conducts periodic 
inspections of a company’s pharmacovigilance system, and verifies the drug manufacturer’s 
corrective and preventive action submissions, as related to their pharmacovigilance measures (Borg 
et al., 2015). 
                                                 
21 Retrieved March 2017 (13) from https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/UCM124701.pdf   
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As an outcome of these regulatory changes, the process of drug development has become 
increasingly complex, protracted and costly over the last decades, with the average length of 
clinical development being more than 7-12 years, the number of studies averaging 66, and 
expenditures reaching 0.802-1.8 billion dollars per approved new drug (DiMasi, Hansen, and 
Grabowski, 2003; Lesko, Rowland, Peck, and Blaschke, 2000; Williams and Ette, 2007; Munos, 
2009). In other words, the costs and challenges associated with drug development continue to rise, 
while the duration of market exclusivity decreases as a consequence of the additional requirements 
from health care regulators.  
Implications for the pharmaceutical industry 
The search for the next blockbuster drugs “has served the pharmaceutical industry well, generating 
over 13% annual growth in market capitalization between 1992 and 2002 (Gilbert et al., 2003: 6). 
Thus, pharmaceutical companies have invested heavily in large infrastructure around the 
blockbuster model, including massive R&D and production facilities, as well as a considerable sales 
force. Organizations of that type are likely to exhibit considerable inertia in their strategies and 
structures. Even though the business environment for pharmaceutical companies has changed 
dramatically in the past decade and a half, the blockbuster model remains largely unchanged. 
However, as a consequence of the substantial structural, technological, and regulatory changes 
faced by the industry, the blockbuster model is gradually becoming obsolete (see Table 5.3). Based 
on estimates of investment levels, success rates, and projections of commercial performance, 
Gilbert et al. (2003: 2) “expect the blockbuster drug model to deliver just 5% return on 
investment—significantly lower than the industry’s risk-adjusted cost of capital.”  
 
Table 5.3 Environmental changes and implications for the pharmaceutical industry 
Structural change Technological change Regulatory change 
The Pharmaceutical Industry: Key Characteristics and External Drivers of BMI 
93 
 
 Escalating health care costs 
 Changing demographics 
 The rise of chronic 
diseases 
 Growing influence of 
payers  
 Increasing R&D costs 
 Lack of “true” innovation 
 New digital health 
technologies 
 Increasing regulation 
 More challenging and 
complex pre- and post-
approval processes 
 Shorter market exclusivity 
Implications for the pharmaceutical industry 
 Drug manufacturers will be paid for patient outcomes and cost-effectiveness, rather than for producing 
“me-too” drugs, thus demonstrating “real” value for money. 
 The ability to develop solutions that go beyond treating physical symptoms alone to also encompass the 
material, social, and emotional wellbeing of patients 
 The ability to collect patient data from multiple sources and turn it into insights will be key. 
 Shifting focus from physicians toward payers and patients 
 Transition from a product- to a patient-centric BM 
 New partnerships and closer collaboration with payers, patients, physicians and regulators 
 
Rather than continuing with the traditional model, pharmaceutical companies should adopt new 
BMs to markedly broaden the scope of their translational research efforts in order to provide more 
value to their stakeholders and ultimately ensure survival. Through the use of new digital 
technologies such as health information systems, mobile apps, social media, sensors, data mining, 
wearable devices, and so on, pharmaceutical executives can design a range of new BMs that not 
only offer innovative solutions that more accurately reflect customer preferences, but also 
differentiate the offering beyond the drug. 
  
  
 
6  
Novo Nordisk: A BM Refiner  
Companies that pursue BM refinement are concerned with preserving and extending the traditional 
pharmaceutical capability of building new, but related tasks. In a nutshell, BM changes are designed 
to enable the firm to capture maximum opportunities with the lowest risk of failure. Thus, rather 
than fundamentally changing the basic value proposition or engaging in radically new partnerships, 
most “refiners” modify and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the traditional blockbuster 
model. For example, they vigorously search for opportunities to remove non-value-adding 
activities, while strategic partnerships are forged across the drug value chain to not only improve 
the efficacy, safety and ease of use, but also to permit access to particular groups of patients who 
hitherto have been denied access to a specific drug. 
This incremental approach to BMI is illustrated by the case of Novo Nordisk. Novo Nordisk 
began with two small Danish companies, Nordisk Insulinlaboratorium and Novo Terapeutisk 
Laboratorium, founded in 1923 and 1925, respectively. Under modest circumstances, the companies 
initiated production of the groundbreaking new drug insulin, which had been recently discovered by 
two Canadian scientists. The two insulin manufacturers were in fierce competition with one another 
for several decades. Both companies had insulin manufacturing and delivery as their core area of 
expertise and therefore competed for the same market segments and growth limiting resources, such 
as researchers and scientific staff within the field of insulin and diabetes. In 1989, the two 
companies merged to become Novo Nordisk. Currently, Novo Nordisk is a global health care 
company with more than ninety years of innovation and leadership in diabetes care; it also has 
strong and leading positions in obesity, hemophilia and growth disorders. The company is 
headquartered in Denmark, employs 42,446 people in 77 countries, and markets its products in 
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around 170 countries. Estimates from IMS show that Novo Nordisk’s diabetes portfolio accounts 
for approximately 27% of the global market for diabetes care products.22 In the following 
subsections, I will describe in detail Novo Nordisk’s BM refinements and the choices that its 
management took with respect to organizational design during the period of 2000-2015 (Figure 
6.1).  
 
Figure 6.1 Novo Nordisk’s BMI process 
Note: The upper dark grey boxes represent BM changes while the lower light grey boxes represent organizational 
design changes. The (+) and (-) notations represent the addition and removal of elements, respectively.   
2000-2002: Redefining the BM 
Novo Nordisk reached a point where a decision was imminent as to whether the company should 
continue within health care and enzymes for industrial use or divest one of those activities. Prior to 
this, the two businesses shared a common interest related to the accumulation of knowledge in the 
areas of fermentation, recovery processes and related technologies. However, over the years, 
differences between the two increased to the extent that synergies no longer existed.          
                                                 
22 See Novo Nordisk’s annual report (2016: 16) 
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Incompatible BM elements   
As described above, it no longer made sense to keep the health care and enzyme activities under the 
same organization, as over time, the activities had come to represent quite different BMs in terms of 
target market segments, business cycles, economics and investment requirements. While the 
enzyme business was broadly structured around market segments as diverse as detergents, fuel, 
leather, baking, brewing, fats, and various animal feed products, the health care business was 
narrowly focused on diabetes care. For example, customers within food and beverages were 
interested in enzymes that could increase industrial efficiency by improving food production for 
anything from animal feed products to beer while reducing environmental impact. Meanwhile, the 
health care area focused on developing life-saving treatments for people with diabetes. 
Novo Nordisk’s core capabilities primarily resided in diabetes care, and shareholders and 
capital markets had historically focused on the health care, and to a lesser extent on the enzyme 
business. As summarized by one corporate vice president of R&D, 
“Since the beginning, our strengths have been within engineering, formulating, 
developing and delivering protein-based treatments to people with diabetes … A 
little later we also began excelling at industrial enzymes, but it was always 
regarded as a side activity to diabetes care.” 
Reactivating by removing. Due to this divergence in businesses, top management decided to 
divest the enzyme business into a new company called Novozymes A/S that was separate from 
Novo Nordisk’s health care business. Also aided by other strategic considerations, the decision 
allowed each company to adopt its own unique BM. Put differently, the elements of value creation, 
appropriation, network and architecture could be designed to address the peculiarities of the health 
care (notably diabetes care) and enzyme businesses. This meant that each company could be more 
easily identified by its respective stakeholders. The path toward more value creating partnerships 
was also strengthened because issues such as exposure to unrelated business activities were no 
longer present. Most importantly, the divestment enabled Novo Nordisk to concentrate its efforts 
and resources on health care, and especially diabetes care. 
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Although the separation process was substantial and challenging due to the number of 
organizational functions and people involved, it merely constituted a minor change to Novo 
Nordisk’s BM, as the core health care model remained intact. As a result, the divestment freed up 
not only managerial attention but also the capacity to explore new BM opportunities within health 
care. Thus, two new elements were added to the BM, namely what Novo Nordisk broadly referred 
to as “sustainable management” and “patient centricity.”      
Reactivating by adding. The idea behind sustainable management was to enlarge Novo 
Nordisk’s value creating activities, as well as to add a social, bioethical and environmental 
dimension to the organization’s value proposition. At the time, the pharmaceutical industry was 
going through a major public relations crisis in South Africa over the prices of HIV-AIDS drugs. 
Although Novo Nordisk was not involved, the situation inspired the company’s new CEO, Lars 
Rebien Sørensen, to launch the World Diabetes Foundation (a non-profit organization) and a 
differential pricing policy for the least developed countries. The foundation was established in 2002 
as an independent trust to support the prevention and treatment of diabetes, while the pricing policy 
was introduced a year earlier to improve access to the millions of people living in low-and middle-
income countries. These initiatives were instrumental to forming Novo Nordisk’s reputation as a 
responsible company committed to understanding the people it served rather than solely focusing on 
profit maximization. That said, there was a clear business purpose for implementing such 
initiatives, as the CEO explains in an interview with Harvard Business Review:23 
“Our philosophy is that corporate social responsibility is nothing but 
maximizing the value of the company over a long period of time, because in the 
long term, social and environmental issues become financial issues. There is 
really no hocus-pocus about this … If we keep polluting, stricter regulations will 
be imposed, and energy consumption will become more costly. The same thing 
applies on the social side. If we don’t treat employees well, if we don’t behave 
as good corporate citizens in our local communities, and if we don’t provide 
inexpensive products for poorer countries, governments will impose regulations 
on us that will end up being very costly.” 
                                                 
23 Retrieved January 2017 from https://hbr.org/2015/11/novo-nordisk-ceo-on-what-propelled-him-to-the-top.  
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At first glance, selling inexpensive insulin to developing countries does not seem like an obvious 
driver of revenues, but the CEO knew that tapping into the bottom-of-the-pyramid markets presents 
other promising opportunities. First, these markets have enormous growth potential, as they 
represent two-thirds of the world’s population, along with the possibility of making an incalculable 
contribution to mankind. Second, lifting millions out of poverty by ensuring access to reliable and 
affordable insulin will translate into revenues in the long term. In brief, as countries get richer, they 
can afford better health care for their people. Unlike many other pharmaceutical companies, Novo 
Nordisk was owned by an independent Danish foundation (The Novo Nordisk Foundation), which 
allowed the company to focus on the long term. Third, Novo Nordisk’s broad portfolio of insulin 
products made it possible to serve the world’s poorer countries, while at the same time offering 
more advanced products to affluent countries. Finally, the new activities allowed Novo Nordisk to 
increase its value creation; “the more value a firm creates, the more likely it is to benefit from some 
of the value in the form of appropriable, if transient, rents. And what the innovator does not get in 
rents society gets in progress” (Moran and Ghoshal, 1996: 465). 
An interesting change was made to Novo Nordisk’s value network to reinforce the BM’s new 
value creating activities. In particular, a shift in focus from the physician to the patient and other 
stakeholders was made in order to reflect the company’s commitment to its social and 
environmental context. The new focus was invaluable because it not only positioned Novo Nordisk 
as a socially and environmentally responsible organization, but it also made sense from a BM 
perspective. For example, building relationships and collaborative arrangements between 
governments, local communities, patient associations, NGOs, and so on, helped Novo Nordisk 
provide the initial basis for insulin distribution in developing countries. As noted by a senior market 
access manager, 
“A key characteristic of Novo Nordisk is our ability to enter a market early and 
be very patient. In this way, we are able to create a considerable amount of 
goodwill that can be used in different ways to provide better care for patients.” 
Top management, and notably, the newly established Global Stakeholder Engagement unit, utilized 
new partnerships to extend Novo Nordisk’s capabilities well beyond its original scope. Without 
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them, it would have been impossible to establish the infrastructure necessary for insulin 
distribution. 
Relocating by off-shoring. As part of Novo Nordisk’s internationalization process, top 
management decided establish a new R&D center in Beijing in 2001 as a wholly owned subsidiary. 
They believed that this center could act as a bridge between the scientific communities in China and 
Europe. Not only did it represent an important milestone for the company’s future competitiveness, 
but it also enabled the company to gain legitimacy and goodwill from the Chinese government.   
The initial BM change characteristics. The BM changes were incremental, for example, in 
the form of (1) removing peripheral activities (e.g., divesting the enzyme business) from, and 
adding new features (e.g., a differential pricing policy) to, the existing value proposition, which 
improved access to markets in developing countries and positioned the company as socially and 
environmentally responsible, and (2) strengthening and maintaining Novo Nordisk’s current path as 
a world leader in diabetes care. In sum, these incremental adjustments reflect processes of 
“innovative BM refinement” that contribute only to strengthening or improving the existing BM, 
and not to radically transforming it.         
New organizational units, tasks, responsibilities, and performance measures  
The changes made to Novo Nordisk’s value creation and network components were accompanied 
by concomitant changes to the organizational design. The separation of the enzyme and health care 
businesses had significant implications for Novo Nordisk’s formal organization, but for the BM, it 
was merely a matter of removing an activity and replacing it with a new one. Previously, although 
synergies still existed in some form, these did not extend beyond the discovery unit. This was a 
particular problem for units such as international marketing and product supply—activities between 
the enzyme and health care segments were simply dissimilar in terms of manufacturing processes 
and equipment. In terms of the nature and roles of marketing, for example, the enzyme business 
could use the entire marketing mix (i.e. the four P’s: product, price, place, and promotion), while 
the health care business was limited to promotion, which was itself highly regulated. This had not 
posed a problem earlier, but significant growth, particularly in the health care segment, led to 
increasing bottlenecks in manufacturing and marketing. As the corporate vice president of 
marketing summarized, 
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“Back then, we had to run really fast in marketing … even though we had 
separate brand teams serving both health care and enzymes, there were simply 
not enough people. Moreover, our insulin portfolio was so broad, with several 
indications, claims, features … that individual marketing campaigns were 
almost needed. I remember it was hard as a marketer, because you had a variety 
of quality products but you could only offer mediocre campaigns.” 
Relinking by resequencing. The divestment set up the organization to best use its corporate 
resources and factors of production to implement the chosen BM. At the same time, it also made 
room for new and more compatible organizational and BM changes. For example, the choice to 
include stakeholder relations as part of the top management team in 2002 was one of the more 
changes. In less than two years, stakeholder relations moved from a peripheral position within the 
organization to become part of Novo Nordisk’s core, which already included discovery (R&D) and 
international operations and product supply (manufacturing). As one corporate vice president of 
strategy explained,  
“moving stakeholder engagement into [top management] was a genius and bold 
move at the time … To my knowledge, there were very few companies that had 
CSR represented in [top management] … and certainly not pharma. In 
retrospect, I don’t think many of the succeeding programs [BM changes] would 
have been as successful if our unit had been placed lower in the hierarchy. Novo 
Nordisk is run from the top down … the higher up you are, the more resources 
and talent that are allocated.” 
Not surprisingly, the location within the organizational structure played an important role in 
driving BMI at Novo Nordisk. As the informant noted above, stakeholder relations’ new core status 
enabled it to attract more resources and talent, which subsequently translated into better ideas for 
BM design improvements. Moreover, being part of top management also eased the implementation 
of such improvements. A higher position in the management hierarchy confers a bundle of 
advantages in this regard: easier access to information, less internal communication or bargaining 
needed to implement change, access to the best people, and so forth. Prior to this, ideas for 
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improving the BM had mainly emerged from within manufacturing or R&D due to the 
organization’s intense focus on (1) engineering, formulating, developing and delivering protein-
based treatments, and (2) efficient large-scale production of proteins. During that period, it would 
be unusual if a stakeholder relations unit could drive changes in the BM.  
Not only did stakeholder relations move into top management, but it became a new source of 
innovation for Novo Nordisk. In addition to the new differential pricing policy, the unit also 
launched the so-called DAWN program—a study intended to improve the understanding of the 
psychosocial burden of diabetes and identify critical gaps in the overall care offering. At the time, it 
was common to study and publish findings on disease-related symptoms, but efforts to uncover the 
psychosocial burden of diseases were uncommon. Not only did the DAWN study mark Novo 
Nordisk’s commitment to patient centricity, but it opened numerous opportunities for the company 
to engage with a series of powerful stakeholders and build the foundation for longer-term 
relationships and co-operation with patients, health care professionals (HCPs), governments, 
researchers, and others—all of whom had complementary knowledge and assets that could form the 
basis for future BM improvements at Novo Nordisk.       
On the surface, moving from a product-oriented BM toward a more socially and 
environmentally sustainable model might seem problematic due to seemingly different logics of 
value creation and appropriation. But for Novo Nordisk, it was almost a natural progression, as one 
director of marketing explained: 
“You could ask, ‘What does it mean to be patient centric?’ Well, ultimately 
patients want to be cured or in some way relieved of their symptoms or signs of 
illness … As a pharma company, the best way we can help is to produce high 
quality products that hopefully one day lead to a cure. This has always been our 
main priority … to make the best products and devices available for patients so 
they can live a normal life. Thus, talking to patients and other stakeholders and 
launching pro-social and environmental programs was quite natural for us … It 
was just another way to create more value for patients and society at large.” 
Although the new model elements represented an extension of Novo Nordisk’s BM, another 
set of supporting practices was employed to facilitate the transition. Perhaps the most far-reaching 
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of the various formal mechanisms for implementing BM changes was Triple Bottom Line reporting. 
The Triple Bottom line was seen as a reaction to the growing concerns of globalization, access to 
health care, human rights, bioethics, and so on, and it presumably helped differentiate Novo 
Nordisk’s value proposition from competitors. In 2001, Novo Nordisk’s stakeholder relations 
department outlined the approach in their report, “Reporting on the Triple Bottom Line”: 
“We are building the business case for sustainable development. This way, the 
Triple Bottom Line approach becomes integrated with the traditional definition 
of shareholder interest. We believe that a broader business approach modelled 
on the Triple Bottom Line is the right thing to do. It also makes good business 
sense and enables us to be a player in setting the new global agenda for 
pharmaceutical companies.”       
The Triple Bottom Line was partly a new strategic framework outlining the adoption and 
implementation of social and environmental responsibility, and partly new targets and performance 
measures reflecting those actions. A list of nineteen performance targets was compiled on the basis 
of the social and environmental dimensions—for example, one target included the development of 
sustainable BMs (e.g. the differential pricing policy) in developing countries to improve access for 
people with diabetes. Others included assisting governments with the development and 
implementation of national diabetes strategies. This set of targets linked into Novo Nordisk’s 
balanced scorecard system to ensure proper cascading of the Triple Bottom Line approach across 
the organization. Specifically, the balanced scorecard was cascaded to the business unit level, and 
then converted into personal targets for the individual employees, which would be determined and 
evaluated on a biannual basis. Nearly all informants agreed that the balanced scorecard was highly 
effective at getting things done. One strategy manager explained: 
“We try to quantify all the things we do, including softer elements such as 
patient centricity … In general, it works really well at Novo Nordisk because it 
holds people accountable and provides a source of motivation. It ensures that 
all units and functions are moving in the same direction.” 
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Moreover, the effectiveness of The Triple Bottom Line and the balanced scorecard was 
largely influenced by a unique organizational practice, namely the use of so-called ‘Facilitators’—a 
small team of high profile professionals24 employed by the holding company, Novo A/S. The 
purpose of the facilitator team is threefold: It provides (1) a systematic way to ensure that Novo 
Nordisk’s core values are translated into action; (2) best practice sharing; and (3) problem solving. 
More specifically, a typical facilitation consists of a series of confidential, one-on-one interviews 
with the managers and employees of a specific unit. The interviews are supplemented with various 
written documentation and statements from external stakeholders. Interviewees are not asked to 
prepare in advance for their interview—rather the interviewer is interested in having an honest 
dialogue about successes and challenges in the interviewees’ work context. The names of individual 
employees are never revealed in a facilitation report. However, if the facilitators find a general trend 
or issue that needs attention, that issue will be included in the final report, and they will also help 
the unit manager with finding ways to alleviate the problem and assure timely follow-up to monitor 
progress. Furthermore, the facilitators typically work in pairs; most departments, subsidiaries and 
business units are facilitated every 3-5 years, whereas strategically important areas that are under 
expansion will be ‘facilitated’ more frequently. The facilitation process was introduced in 1997, and 
by the early 2000s had become a well-established practice within the organization. Managers gave 
the following comments: 
“Facilitations are taken very seriously at Novo Nordisk … They can influence 
your career if you have serious findings … a topic that people love to gossip 
about.” (General manager) 
“It’s nice being able to give your opinion to someone more experienced, instead 
of filling out those engagement questionnaires.” (Regulatory affairs manager) 
“Our CEO reads all the reports … and if you violate the Novo Nordisk Way and 
your employees are not doing well due to deviating leadership then you get 
fired.” (Vice president of R&D) 
                                                 
24 Each facilitator has experience in senior specialist or managerial positions at Novo Nordisk or Novozymes.  
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The presence of facilitators, combined with the balanced scorecard and The Triple Bottom 
Line, produced a strong apparatus for implementing Novo Nordisk’s initial BM changes. The Triple 
Bottom Line highlighted areas of the BM (e.g., the social and environmental aspects) that needed to 
be addressed, while at the same time securing employee motivation and commitment internally. 
This was supplemented by the balanced scorecard, which operationalized the social and 
environmental aspects of the BM using more quantitative measures. These practices were weaved 
together to create an effective implementation capability of the facilitators, who served as a control 
mechanism and problem-solving mechanism. Finally, the host of organizational practices also 
served as an important driver of BM improvements. In particular, they carried information 
pertaining to BM performance, change progress, implementation barriers, and so forth. 
Despite the inclusion of stakeholder relations in top management, many of the organizational 
practices had already been in place since the mid- to late 1990s, and therefore had become 
stabilized as the way of doing things at Novo Nordisk. This way is similar to the kaizen philosophy, 
where “there can be no improvement where there are no standards” (Masaaki, 1986: 74). Thus, 
changes to Novo Nordisk’s value creating activities and network were postponed until the 
organization had incorporated the appropriate standards and measures to ensure proper 
implementation. 
2003-2004: BM Continuity and Global Growth     
This period emerged after the initial redefinition of Novo Nordisk’s BM. The first outcomes of the 
BM change efforts started to show, as well as the implications for the underlying organizational 
design. More importantly, it was a time in which Novo Nordisk experienced significant growth in 
sales (especially in the attractive US market), new product launches, and reorganizing activities in 
Europe. Meanwhile, its new BM elements also proved to be successful in positioning Novo Nordisk 
as a responsible organization, in contrast to the eroding reputation of the industry in general. This 
led to a series of new projects that were used to further test the value contribution of a more patient-
centric BM.            
Novo Nordisk: A BM Refiner 
105 
 
Stability and BM Refinements  
Novo Nordisk’s BM remained relatively unchanged during this period—no fundamental changes 
were made to its core elements. Rather, it was a period best described as insightful, as it showed the 
effectiveness of Novo Nordisk’s former BM changes. As summarized by a vice president of R&D, 
“Hmm it’s a difficult question … In hindsight initiatives such as DAWN and 
sustainable business models played an important role in improving our 
reputation, but our business model was still science-based … and ultimately that 
was the key value and profitability driver.” 
While the new elements fulfilled an important social and environmental role, they still took a 
backseat to Novo Nordisk’s core BM elements, and to the search for better methods of diabetes 
treatment. With the launch of Levemir® in Europe, Novo Nordisk became the first company with a 
complete range of insulin analogues. This was an important achievement in several ways. An 
insulin analog is similar to regular human insulin, but is slightly modified to allow it to act faster 
(e.g. NovoRapid®) or slower (e.g. Levemir®) than regular human insulin25, providing greater 
convenience and improved control of glucose levels. For people with diabetes, the ability to control 
glucose levels is crucial because it helps minimize diabetes-related complications (Hartman, 2008). 
Moreover, not only did Levemir® open the market for long-acting insulin and offer more 
predictable day-to-day control of glucose levels than conventional insulin forms and competing 
analogues, it was “the only insulin product in the world, that doesn’t make you put on weight” 
(Annual report, 2004: 7). Having a broad portfolio of insulin products was another way of 
demonstrating commitment to patient centricity. This level of product differentiation allowed Novo 
Nordisk to adopt a market segmentation strategy to more clearly meet the needs of people with 
diabetes. In some situations, fast-acting insulin might the best choice, while in others, long-acting 
insulin is preferable; this choice depends on the people’s individual lifestyles and personal needs. 
As the executive vice president and chief of science officer explained, 
                                                 
25 Retrieved April 2017 from http://type1diabetes.about.com/od/insulinandmedications/p/Insulin-Analog.htm 
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“that is why Novo Nordisk has developed the broadest and most comprehensive 
portfolio on the market […] There is no one-size-fits-all [approach to] diabetes 
management” (Annual report, 2004: 7). 
This broad portfolio also made it feasible for Novo Nordisk to provide inexpensive products (such 
as human insulin) to developing countries, while offering its more advanced and expensive products 
to the more affluent countries. Finally, the approval of Levemir® illustrated the variability of Novo 
Nordisk’s core BM elements—notably, its ability to develop and deliver superior products and 
devices within the diabetes management sector. Relatedly, the company’s diverse selection of 
analogues helped it to penetrate the challenging US market, especially with NovoRapid® 
(NovoLog® in the US) and the launch of NovoMix30® (NovoLogMix 70/30 in the US) packaged 
in the disposable delivery device FlexPen®. 
New strategic partnerships. Although Novo Nordisk’s BM remained relatively unchanged 
during 2003-2004, particular refinements were made to support the company’s new focus on patient 
centricity and sustainable management. In 2003, Novo Nordisk, in collaboration with Oxford 
University, founded Oxford Vision 2020, whose goal was to direct attention “to the fact that three 
risk factors (tobacco, diet and lack of physical exercise) cause four chronic diseases (cardiovascular 
disease, diabetes, chronic lung disease, and some type of cancer) that are responsible for 50% of 
deaths globally” (Annual report, 2004: 3). The intention was threefold:  (1) to put more emphasis on 
preventing the pandemic growth of chronic diseases rather than merely treating them; (2) and 
perhaps more importantly, to promote healthier lifestyles; and (3) to show that a combined effort 
from several stakeholders is required to tackle the leading chronic diseases. Besides its founding 
members, the alliance included government and public health agencies, universities, and 
corporations such as Johnson and Johnson, Nestlé, Unilever, the World Bank, the WHO, and the 
World Heart Federation. Novo Nordisk’s BM was not built around prevention, given that its main 
value-creating activities entered the picture only after people had already developed diabetes. In 
fact, one could argue that a prevention-based BM would cannibalize the company’s core elements 
(i.e., diabetes treatments). Nevertheless, top management was convinced that Novo Nordisk could 
potentially benefit from such involvement, as the chief executive officer explained: 
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“As a knowledge-based company, we know that type 2 diabetes is caused 
largely by factors which can be prevented. If society is moving in the direction 
of prevention, it makes sense for us to be involved, not only because we have 
knowledge about how to potentially postpone or prevent the disease, but also 
because we need to be alert to changes in society that could affect our long-term 
activities. It is about turning what could be considered a risk into an 
opportunity” (Annual report, 2004: 4). 
Reactivating by adding a service dimension. To support the growing insulin portfolio, top 
management made it clear that Novo Nordisk should provide not only superior products and 
devices but also a range of services that would make the company the preferred partner in diabetes 
care. Novo Nordisk used service offerings to increase its value creation ability across the value 
chain. The company arranged a number of training seminars targeted at HCPs within diabetes care, 
particularly in developing countries. For example, a program was launched in sub-Saharan Africa to 
educate physicians and nurses as well as people with diabetes. Physicians and nurses often did not 
have the necessary training and education to properly diagnose people with diabetes. They also 
lacked knowledge about the latest treatments and how to manage the balance between diet, blood 
glucose response and daily activities. Similar programs were launched in Afghanistan, India and 
China, and a total of 130 initiatives were launched to support governments across the world in 
implementing strategies for improved diabetes care. Each program was backed by new and useful 
tools, such as the National Diabetes Programmes Toolbox, the Diabetes Atlas, and the Guide for 
Diabetes Guidelines created in collaboration with the International Diabetes Federation.  
At the time, recognizing the systemic nature of diabetes care (and chronic diseases in 
general), top management was preoccupied with notions such as holistic care, a multi-pronged 
approach, and not least, the Triple Bottom Line. Services are ideal for tackling systemic issues 
because they can be invoked during the various stages of the disease journey. People with diabetes 
go through the following stages: (1) prevention (e.g. diet and exercise); (2) diagnosis (e.g., using 
A1c26 tests and other tests); and (3) diabetes management (e.g., diet, exercise, medication and 
emotional well-being). The various stages may include interactions with a host of different HCPs, 
                                                 
26 The A1c test is common blood test used to diagnose type 1 and type 2 diabetes. 
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such as an endocrinologist, psychologist, ophthalmologist, dietician, podiatrist, and cardiologist. 
Moreover, having diabetes is something that usually lasts for a lifetime, since it cannot be cured; it 
therefore requires intensive, long-term self-management. The sum of these characteristics created a 
context that is prone to mistakes as well as opportunities for additional value creation. Capitalizing 
on the latter, many of the company’s programs were based on improving the training of HCPs, 
which translated into added value by: (1) improving HCPs’ ability to diagnose, select the proper 
treatment and offer advice and guidance to patients; and (2) improving the satisfaction (and 
potentially the adherence to treatment) of patients and families. Other programs promoted diabetes 
awareness and healthier lifestyles through collaborative efforts with local communities and 
governments, thereby creating value in the stage of prevention.  
Consequently, although Novo Nordisk had a narrower scope than other pharmaceutical 
companies in terms of the number of therapy areas targeted, they were able to expand the value 
proposition, and utilize the value network and architecture to a greater extent than competitors. 
Novo Nordisk was now present during all stages of the disease journey (i.e., from prevention to 
diabetes management), while competitors and the industry as a whole were more concerned with 
disease treatment. Many informants working at the company at that time stated that such patient-
centered and prevention-based activities were unusual in the industry, but that the company’s 
strategic focus allowed such a pursuit. A corporate vice president of marketing added: 
“Our strategic focus on diabetes allowed us to put far more efforts into a 
narrower area … and diabetes is actually not that narrow commercially. 
Therefore, it was possible for us to do things, I would argue, much better than 
any of our competitors. Doing the kind of things we are doing is impossible if 
you are in seven major therapeutic areas.”    
A vice president of strategy and planning explained that it was a deliberate choice for Novo Nordisk 
to have a presence at multiple points in the value chain: 
“Adding services to the mix was part of becoming a diabetes care provider 
rather than being perceived as only another insulin manufacturer.”   
Or, as the vice president of clinical trials put it, 
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“At Novo, we tend to do everything related to diabetes in house [example from 
clinical trials]. Small things such as blood samples and some safety procedures 
we outsource, but monitoring and all other things we do in house because we 
want to collaborate with KOLs [key opinion leaders]. And when they think 
diabetes, they think Novo Nordisk. We can’t have a monitor coming from 
Quintiles and asking who is conducting this study. [For] clinical trials within 
diabetes, we know that we are the best because we look at CMR benchmark 
data. Their partners say ‘Novo is the best to conduct these things.’ So if we 
come and ask for certain types of patients, they are more open to let us do it 
because they know Novo makes the best insulin.” 
This quote reflects top management’s ambition to make Novo Nordisk synonymous with diabetes—
so that key opinion leaders27 and ultimately physicians would recommend and prescribe Novo 
Nordisk’s products and devices. Specifically, the added service dimension allowed the company to 
(1) lock out competitors; (2) lock in important gatekeepers and, in the end, patients; (3) unlock 
more value from the growing insulin portfolio (cf. Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988); (4) access 
important resources or capabilities; and (5) ultimately differentiate from competing insulin suppliers 
and other pharmaceutical companies in terms of value provided. 
Even though the new alliance and added service dimension were minor changes relative to 
earlier BM changes (i.e., removal of elements and introduction of new elements)—in the sense that 
they constituted elaborations of existing elements (namely, sustainable management and patient 
centricity)—they offered a bundle of complementary features that reinforced prior BM choices. 
More specifically, training and educating HCPs could lead to: (1) higher prescribing rates and brand 
loyalty for Novo Nordisk products; and (2) opportunities to gain valuable insights from HCPs that 
could be used to further improve the BM. It was relatively easy for Novo Nordisk to legitimize the 
new service offering, because the company not only had the most advanced insulin products and 
devices, but it also possessed decades of experience dealing with research on diabetes, not to 
mention the recent DAWN findings, which showed the psychosocial burden of diabetes and lack of 
                                                 
27 In the pharmaceutical industry, “key opinion leaders are physicians who influence their peers’ medical practice, 
including but not limited to prescribing behaviour.” Retrieved April 2017 from http://www.pharma-
mkting.com/glossary/keyopinionleader.htm 
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reliable treatment options. As a result, Novo Nordisk was in a good position to offer these types of 
services related to training and education. Overall, the new service dimension, coupled with new 
partnerships, allowed Novo Nordisk to extend its value proposition and enter other key areas of the 
value chain.    
Realizing complementarities and the organization of servitization 
As with the BM changes, the degree of organizational design change at Novo Nordisk remained 
relatively low, especially in relation to the previous divestment and move of stakeholder relations 
into top management. During this period, not only was continuity prioritized, but important new 
roles were added and intra-organizational coordination and optimization activities took place. In 
particular, the international marketing unit came to play a prominent part in the improvement of 
Novo Nordisk’s BM. One corporate vice president of marketing summarized it nicely: 
“We had just started gaining some traction in the US market and the 
organization was finally settled in after the demerger.” 
This period could be interpreted as a post-change period—in which stability allowed for change to 
better manifest itself and mesh with the surrounding organization. Although only on a small scale, 
Novo Nordisk did alter some elements of its formal design to improve the meshing process. Perhaps 
the most critical one included the reorganization of Novo Nordisk’s European activities. The 
combination of high growth rates and new product launches had stifled coordination within the 
European market, and in order to improve it, a new European headquarters was built in Zurich, 
Switzerland in 2002. In addition, seven business areas were consolidated into five equal-sized areas 
to strengthen sales and marketing activities. During the same period, sales and marketing activities 
were also significantly expanded in key growth markets such as the US, Brazil and China. As one 
general manager noted, 
“You could argue it was really the rise of marketing at Novo Nordisk. It was a 
strange time with a lot of growth and expansion but at the same time fierce 
competition. Until then, our main focus had always been on R&D … and to 
some degree production due to the quality issues in the late 90s … But now 
there was an urgent need to improve the sales organization. This was really 
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frustrating for us in the affiliate companies, because demand was high and we 
probably had the best products … but we lacked sales reps and sophisticated 
marketing methods.” 
While marketing had always played an integral role at Novo Nordisk, it was always 
secondary to the discovery and operation units. Yet the increasing growth, particularly in the US led 
top management to devote even more resources toward marketing. To effectively market the 
growing portfolio of analogues, a larger and more diverse sales force was needed, particularly in the 
US. As mentioned earlier, although diabetes represents a single therapeutic area, it is a very broad 
field due to its inherent complexity. Thus, a diverse selection of products is needed, as each has its 
own distinct advantages and disadvantages, depending on the patient’s unique circumstances. Novo 
Nordisk had this diverse selection of products and devices, but physicians were not up to date with 
the latest treatment options. The role of marketing was to make the prescribing physician aware of 
those options. Thus, the US sales force was increased by 150 sales representatives who would 
specialize in key strategic products, including NovoLog®, NovoLogMix® 70/30 and FlexPen®. 
Similarly, Novo Nordisk’s move into services also required additional workers—especially at 
the subsidiary level. During the previous four years, Novo Nordisk had been developing a model for 
sustainable diabetes care in developing countries. The roll-out of the model started with the 
introduction of the differential pricing policy and the establishment of relationships with key 
stakeholders (e.g., governments, NGOs, and local communities), followed by the provision of 
services. In 2003, Novo Nordisk funded a network of nationwide diabetes clinics in Tanzania. The 
Ministry of Health in Tanzania staffed the clinics with physicians and nurses from the national 
regional hospitals, while Novo Nordisk was responsible for training and educating the HCPs. 
Similar programs were launched in India, Malaysia, Costa Rica, China, and Bangladesh. The task of 
setting up clinics and establishing the right relationships with relevant actors was delegated to the 
local subsidiary, while the international marketing unit at corporate headquarters developed the core 
material for the training sessions. However, even though marketing received more resources at the 
subsidiary level, most of the resources were allocated to traditional sales and marketing activities in 
the form of, for example, sales staff increases and promotional activities.  
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Importantly, including services as part of the value proposition indirectly led to greater 
integration between discovery, international marketing, stakeholder relations, international 
operations and product supply. The core part of the HCP training material was based on the 
company’s considerable knowledge accumulated within its discovery unit over the years. This gave 
rise to increased interactions between discovery and international marketing. The People, 
Reputation and Relations unit (formerly, stakeholder relations) allowed Novo Nordisk to (1) secure 
important macro-level relationships, (2) translate and integrate Triple Bottom Line thinking into all 
business processes, and (3) monitor progress on the Triple Bottom Line. Before this period, there 
was little internal communication and knowledge sharing along the horizontal dimension of the 
organization. As one vice president noted, 
“We have always been very science-based and functionally structured, but some 
of the BOP [bottom of the pyramid] projects really helped breaking down silos 
and reshape the company” 
The stakeholder relations unit had been expanded in 2004 to include corporate 
communications, human resources and occupational health services. This indicated continued 
support of the unit from top management. The People, Reputation and Relations department was 
headed by Lise Kingo, executive vice president. She argued that the unit controlled two of the 
company’s most important assets—namely, its people and its reputation (Morsing and Oswald 
2009). But it was the unit’s dual role as an integrator and monitor that helped the organization 
identify and realize complementarities. This role was further strengthened as the Triple Bottom 
Line got added to Novo Nordisk’s Articles of Association “to specify that the company will strive 
to conduct its activities in a financially, environmentally and socially responsible way” (Annual 
report, 2004: 9). 
2005-2007: Discontinuing small molecules and changing diabetes   
The previous period could be described as stable, without any notable changes to the BM. Time was 
given for the new BM elements and organizational tasks to mesh together into a coherent whole. 
But during those years, it also became apparent that the BM could be even more focused on 
diabetes care and more compatible with Novo Nordisk’s core capabilities. Therefore, top 
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management decided, once again, to reactivate the BM, including, most importantly, discontinuing 
Novo Nordisk’s small molecule business. 2003-2004 was also a period in which the organization 
performed better than ever financially and operationally, but at the same time faced growing 
pressure from globalization and payers.  
A more intense focus on the core   
The period of 2005-2007 represented another defining moment in Novo Nordisk’s BM refinement 
process. The initial changes made in the early 2000s involving the divestment (focusing) and 
expansion of the value proposition (expanding the scope) had proven to be a successful model for 
value creation and appropriation. As a result, top management decided to elaborate further on the 
element of sustainable management by introducing the Changing Diabetes® movement. Despite the 
company’s success, however, there was an growing consensus among top managers that presence in 
the small molecule segment was perhaps not commercially viable. 
Reactivating by adding. Novo Nordisk entered 2005 with astonishing reports of growth in 
sales and earnings of 16% and 17%, respectively, compared to the previous year. This provided 
proof of the efficiency and effectiveness with which the organization had managed to implement 
and refine its BM over the previous five years. Being a world leader in diabetes care, however, 
entailed responsibility, and there was still room for improved methods of intervention. The 
incidence of diabetes was escalating at an ever-faster pace in low- and middle-income countries as a 
result of increased urbanization and growing affluence, which led to more inactive lifestyles and the 
consumption Western-style nutrition containing high amounts of fat, sugar and salt. To confront the 
growing pandemic, Novo Nordisk launched yet another initiative, Changing Diabetes®. This was 
not just another initiative. In fact, it became part of the organization’s mission statement. The 
Changing Diabetes® program represented an extension of previous activities within, for example, 
DAWNTM. It also reflected increasing interest from other stakeholders in fighting diabetes and other 
chronic diseases. Training of HCPs was improved as a consequence of Changing Diabetes® buses, 
which drove around in various countries and not only helped improve disease awareness, but also 
aided in diagnosis and disease management. This indicated another incremental improvement built 
upon the foundational elements laid down in previous years.        
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Reactivating by removing. After several years of concerted effort, top management decided 
in 2007 to discontinue Novo Nordisk’s research and development on small molecule oral therapies 
for type 2 diabetes. This change seemed like a natural progression, as the organization’s core focus 
was always on large molecules, a priority that has not changed since the formation of Novo 
Nordisk’s parent companies in the 1920s. As the chief of science officer Mads Krogsgaard also 
explained:28 
“Our core competencies lie within therapeutic proteins [large molecules], and 
it is within this area that we can make the greatest difference in terms of patient 
outcomes and company growth. Therefore, it is a logical move to focus all our 
research and development efforts on this area.” 
The magnitude of change varied greatly from the divestment in 2000. In fact, the decision only 
impacted approximately 180 employees. Nevertheless, it still signified an important decision in 
terms of Novo Nordisk’s BM design. This was addressed by several informants. The corporate vice 
president of marketing stated: 
“Small molecules are fantastic. They are fast to develop and you can reach big 
populations with them. They are also promiscuous in a way—chemically 
promiscuous in the body biologically, and they are active in many more sites 
than you probably know in a typical clinical program, which is also why you see 
great safety concerns … I think we took a brave decision to say even if small 
molecules play a role in diabetes (and they do, and there are plenty of them), we 
decided not to pursue them … In those days there was no certainty that we 
would continue to be successful in the biologic space. Therefore, it was a bold 
move to say … half of the market we are not going to address.”  
One R&D director also added: 
                                                 
28 Retrieved April 2017 from http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Preclinical-Research/Novo-Nordisk-stops-small-
molecule-drug-development 
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“We flirted a little bit with small molecules, didn’t get much traction and then 
we took the decision to go back to basics, but small molecules were almost half 
of the diabetes market.” 
Here, making a deliberate choice or trade-off about what to do and what not to do was at the heart 
of the strategy. In the end, the choice was informed by Novo Nordisk’s underlying BM, which was 
more compatible with serving the market for large molecules.  
Organizational design as a preserving and implementing mechanism 
Novo Nordisk’s organizational design remained more or less unchanged in the 2005-2007 period. 
Despite the significance of removing small molecules from the value proposition, the change 
merely involved closing down a smaller area of discovery that had 180 people, of whom half were 
offered other positions within the company. While there are notable differences between small and 
large molecules from a scientific point of view, the characteristics underlying developing, 
manufacturing, and marketing products based on small and large molecules technologies are quite 
similar (Rozek, 2013). Thus, changes to the formal organization could be kept to a minimum. 
While Novo Nordisk’s formal design remained relatively intact, the small change served a 
secondary but still important role in explaining the effectiveness of the company’s BM. 
Specifically, the organizational design was associated with stability—a continuation of direction 
with minor refinements of and extensions to existing organizational units. As one executive 
assistant stated, 
“We are very conservative and rarely change things around here, which can be 
quite annoying at times. On the other hand, people know the organization very 
well—the direction of the company—and what is expected.” 
Or, as noted by one vice president of marketing: 
“We are here to serve patients and the best way we can do that is by delivering 
optimal treatments. So let’s focus on that instead of doing a lot of crazy things.”     
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The ability to preserve the structure also made it easier for managers to suggest and/or 
implement BM changes, because they could with greater certainty assess: (1) what kind of changes 
would be in alignment with the structure; and (2) follow the existing procedures of implementation. 
The fundamental implementation issue with any strategic change relates to coping with uncertainty 
(March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). Although Novo Nordisk performed better than ever 
and seemed to have found the proper balance between change and stability, it could not entirely 
escape the consequences of globalization. One of the company’s core BM elements was particularly 
threatened, namely that of the Novo Nordisk Way of Management. This element was unique, 
especially since it was partly an element of the BM and partly organizational—extending all the 
way from R&D through manufacturing and marketing, and then beyond firm boundaries to external 
stakeholders. The Novo Nordisk Way of Management was the overarching organizational and 
cultural framework of the organization. Not only did it encompass the demand that deliverables 
meet the company’s vision, values, commitments, fundamentals, but it also delineated the 
methodology (i.e., sustainability reporting, balanced scorecard, and facilitation) upon which these 
factors would be measured and scrutinized. As the corporate vice president of strategy and planning 
explained, 
“It’s a robust framework for getting things done, because it’s very consistent 
and coherent—that means even though things change slightly, the Novo Nordisk 
Way remains more or less constant … And you know what is within its scope 
and what is not. At the same time, it enables us to systematically measure things 
and thereby forces people to quantify ideas and projects.” 
The framework was also useful for coordinating and aligning various tasks and activities between 
the organizational units. Equally important is that it was commonly used for (1) settling disputes; 
(2) reducing ambiguity; and (3) judging incommensurable things. These functions were mentioned 
by several informants, especially the point about settling disputes and coming into agreement. The 
corporate vice president of marketing provided a good example: 
“I have often referred to the Novo Nordisk Way of Management when I needed 
to legitimize specific priorities. In marketing we serve a number of different 
stakeholders … and all of them think they are important, but that is not always 
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the case. Then they get angry if they don’t get the attention that they feel they 
deserve … Therefore, I always ask my team to prioritize projects that are more 
in accordance with the Novo Nordisk Way. Then there is not so much to discuss 
… And it also makes things easier for me when I have to argue for budget 
allocations.” 
Nevertheless, with the increasing presence of globalization and continued growth of the 
company, the integrative properties of the Novo Nordisk Way of Management ran the risk of being 
spread too thinly. These integrative properties were derived from the people who worked according 
to the framework; without the right people, it would be impossible to execute and uphold the Novo 
Nordisk Way of Management, which essentially glued together organizational units and BM 
elements into bundles of value creation and appropriation, which underpin the implementation of 
BMI. The Novo Nordisk Way was fundamentally based on respect for the individual as well as 
social and environmental responsibility—a set of Scandinavian values that did not readily lend itself 
to implementation in some new markets. Consequently, top management decided to exert additional 
efforts to maintain and spread the framework because it was such an important component of the 
company’s culture, organization and BM.  
2008-2015: BM Success, Decline, and Refocus 
The period of 2008-2015 was a particularly long and, in many ways, defining period for Novo 
Nordisk’s BM endeavors. The period began with the unfolding financial crisis in 2008. While many 
companies, large and small, were severely affected, Novo Nordisk managed to report positive 
performance. However, even though the pharmaceutical industry was more resilient than others—
due to the fact that people continue to become ill and need treatment irrespective of global 
economic forces—pharmaceutical companies and even Novo Nordisk were challenged. For almost 
a decade, Novo Nordisk’s BM remained unchanged with respect to adding new (or removing 
active) BM elements. A lengthy process of repetition was started to build upon the firm’s prior and 
core BM choices, ultimately leading to an extended focus on marketing, and a move away from 
people, reputation and relations.       
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Oscillating between value creation and appropriation 
During the 2008-2015 period, not a single new element was added to Novo Nordisk’s BM, nor was 
anything removed, even in light of a more challenging environment. The top management team was 
firmly convinced that they had a winning BM. As summarized by a vice president of marketing, 
“Many pharma companies are changing these days, because they are unable to 
deliver on innovation. Instead they try to deliver through increased M&A 
activity, new business models, or both. We, on the other hand, have a model that 
works … so why change it.” 
Once again, the strength of Novo Nordisk’s BM became apparent when top management 
introduced Victoza®, the first once-daily human GLP-1 analogue, approved for launch in Europe in 
2009 and in the US and Japan in 2010. Victoza® represented the latest and most advanced analogue 
to date, and included benefits such as administration once a day at any time not related to meals, 
and lowered appetite, which resulted in weight loss over time. The product was approved as 
supplementary to diet and exercise to improve glycose control in adults suffering from type 2 
diabetes. The approval allowed Victoza® to be used as a monotherapy, or as a second-line 
treatment in combination with other oral medications prescribed for diabetes. In addition, the US 
market for GLP-1 drugs was especially attractive because Eli Lilly’s Byetta was the only drug on 
the market and Victoza® was superior in terms of safety and efficacy. A few years later, in 2011, 
Victoza® reached the status of a blockbuster drug, generating more than $1 billion in sales. This 
success demonstrated Novo Nordisk’s longstanding tradition within diabetes care and protein 
engineering. Several informants highlighted the excellence of Novo Nordisk’s R&D organization. 
As the corporate vice president of strategy and planning nicely put it, 
“We have focused a lot on our R&D side. So many of the products are 
developed organically within the same area … Because of that we have 
developed very good competencies, which increases the probability of finding 
something of high quality—compared to if you are a pharma company that is in 
many different therapy areas. We have been in diabetes for more than 90 years. 
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This means that we have special competencies which cannot be readily 
developed if you don’t have the same kind of history as us.” 
The R&D director stated, 
“We have people who have been in the field of diabetes for more than three 
decades.” 
Or, as one vice president of clinical trials mentioned, 
“As far as I recall, we have never bought any significant molecule or product at 
Novo.” 
2008-2015 was an interesting period. While most pharmaceutical companies had problems 
delivering on innovation, therefore resorting to mergers and acquisitions (M&As), Novo Nordisk 
continued with its organic growth model and promising diabetes pipeline. In contrast to many other 
companies, and especially the so-called ‘Big Pharma,’ Novo Nordisk’s R&D organization 
innovated within a much narrower field—and had been doing so for several decades. That made the 
probability of finding the right drug candidates higher, thus making their model feasible. 
However, in spite of Novo Nordisk’s excellent R&D capabilities, they were eventually unable 
to escape the pressure from more rigorous and demanding payers. In 2013, the FDA rejected the 
marketing authorization for Novo Nordisk’s long-acting basal insulin Tresiba®, instead requesting 
additional data from a dedicated cardiovascular outcomes trial before approval could be granted. 
Such as study would likely delay the launch of Tresiba® in the US by two to three years. After the 
great success of Victoza®, which had one of the most successful drug launches in history, this 
action came as a shock to many inside Novo Nordisk. As summarized by an executive assistant, 
“Yes it was a big surprise when we didn’t get the Tresiba approval. It was even 
a shock for [top management] I think … because suddenly we had to run very 
fast in marketing and figure out what to do. There was not really a Plan B—
everything had been set up and prepared for the Tresiba launch. In hindsight, 
we should probably have had an alternative plan, but on the other hand you 
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have to believe […] We ended up launching a new campaign for Levemir® even 
though our focus at corporate is on future insulin products.” 
As a consequence of the increasing difficulties with payers and regulators, top management decided 
not to change Novo Nordisk’s BM but to redirect attention away from the more peripheral value 
creating activities (such as sustainable management) and toward value appropriation, especially 
market access.    
Toward a marketing organization 
Throughout 2008-2015, a few notable changes were made to Novo Nordisk’s underlying 
organizational design to deal with the increasing pressures from payers and regulators. In 
collaboration with the board, the CEO changed the composition and responsibilities of the top 
management team. At the same time, new core capabilities within marketing were developed, 
specifically for the early stages of drug launch. As summarized by one vice president of HR, 
“I think in the past three or five years we have been recruiting more market 
access people at corporate … And in many markets you are moving away from 
the traditional sales rep because physicians don’t want to talk to them anymore. 
Instead you see a trend toward medical liaisons … a more advanced rep who 
can talk to authorities and specialists.” 
The most critical events during this period surrounded the launch of Victoza® and Tresbia®, 
in 2009 and 2013, respectively. The launch process for Victoza® started in 2008, one year before 
the actual launch. The activities surrounding the launch drew on previous experience; the successful 
roll-out of Levemir® in particular provided valuable insights into coordinating multiple individual 
launches. The Victoza® launch team was headed by the senior vice president of global marketing, 
Jakob Riis. Not only had he held key positions in strategic markets (e.g., the US and Japan), but 
more importantly, he had gained knowledge from both sides (i.e., subsidiaries and headquarters) 
during the roll-out of Levemir®. The importance and potential of Victoza® was further underlined 
when top management relieved Riis of his other duties as senior vice president of global marketing 
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so that he could mobilize all of his efforts toward the launch. As one senior manager of medical 
affairs stated, 
“The Victoza® launch was crazy almost from the early get-go … The 
atmosphere was fever-pitch … and we worked unbelievingly long hours because 
we had to prepare so many different launches.” 
Jakob Riis later explained in an interview that he initially thought it was possible to devise and 
forcefully implement a structured plan. However, he quickly came to realize that the health care 
environment had become much more dynamic and diverse compared to five years earlier, when 
Levemir® was launched.  
New coordination mechanisms. To address the changed landscape, cross-functional and 
boundary-spanning teams (so-called ‘global commercial teams’) were set up and granted the 
necessary decision-making rights. This permitted the gathering of insights ranging from specific 
prescriber behavior and payer needs, to competitive dynamics and patient profiles. The 
organizational setup also had the required power to rapidly operationalize decisions based on those 
insights. In addition, the launch lead was allowed to build his own team—he could select from 
among Novo Nordisk’s top talent within the various functional areas. A vice president of clinical 
trials described how employee performance records are used to select such teams: 
“Then we go from little league to professional league. Prior to that I cannot just 
say to line management that I need her or him … Everything is in the system … 
Twice a year I give feedback to line management on how their staff members 
have performed on a given project. And I can track those reports years back. 
For example, I can see how Anders has performed the past three years if I don’t 
know him very well. We have that on all people in Novo Nordisk.” 
Access to such granular employee-level data was crucial to building the right team, as one vice 
president of marketing nicely summarized: 
“It becomes easier for me to spot if it’s someone who’s all mouth and no 
action.” 
Novo Nordisk: A BM Refiner 
122 
 
Identifying the right people was essential, because even if authority was granted, this did not 
necessarily mean that people would be able exercise it. Essentially, the complexity surrounding the 
launch created literally thousands of decision-making situations each week, which required prompt 
corrective interventions. One example would be a change in prescriber behavior or payer needs—
something that could change from month to month, and thus required an immediate remedy. 
Ultimately, the Victoza® team carried one of the most successful drug launches in history. 
Following that launch, a so-called launch excellence framework was developed on the basis of 
insights gained from Victoza®, and this was later used for Tresiba®. The Victoza® launch also 
demonstrated the growing importance of marketing, which a couple of years prior was merely 
considered a support function. Many informants commented about this shift. One vice president of 
HR commented, 
“If you have been following the business press then you can see there is lots of 
talk about him [Jakob Riis] being the next CEO. I don’t think it’s entirely true, 
but he has definitely achieved a hero status inside Novo Nordisk.” 
Changing roles and responsibilities. This was further strengthened when Jakob Riis became 
part of Novo Nordisk’s top management team in 2013, taking the role of executive vice president of 
global marketing and medical affairs. This also meant that Lise Kingo’s remit became narrower; as 
a result, she decided to leave Novo Nordisk in 2014. Such a rotation indicated not only a shift 
toward a greater influence of global marketing, but also a shift in the BM toward value 
appropriation.  
In 2013 came the disappointment of FDA’s rejection of Tresiba® due to insufficient clinical 
trial data on cardiovascular outcomes. Not only had Novo Nordisk lost valuable early time in the 
marketplace, which is critical for any drug launch, but it also had a larger US sales force that would 
have to redirect its efforts toward Victoza® and Levemir®. In 2015, the company finally managed 
to obtain FDA approval. However, shortly after, it encountered problems with the German health 
care authorities, who declared that the product failed to offer any significant benefits over existing 
insulin products in the marketplace. As a consequence, top management decided to pull Tresiba® 
from the German market. As executive vice president of marketing and medical affairs Jakob Riis 
explained in an interview, 
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“We are very sad that it has not been possible to reach a price agreement with 
the insurance fund … The pricing decision didn’t acknowledge Tresiba’s 
important benefits and … accepting the offer would undermine R&D efforts.” 
This occurrence illustrated the increasing power of health care payers. In a few years, the 
environment had completely changed. A general manager provided a very nice summary of the 
situation: 
“The last launch [Tresiba®] [found it] more difficult than usual to receive 
reimbursement and agreement about price with the authorities in Europe. Now 
we have been on the market for two years and it is only few countries where 
there is good access to the product. So where we have good access, sales are 
good, because it is a very good molecule and physicians can see the benefits. 
But because we demand a price premium on the product that corresponds to the 
innovation—at least we believe that—authorities are not willing to pay … If you 
compare Tresiba’s® first two years with earlier launches (Victoza® and 
Levemir®), there are a lot fewer countries where we have received market 
access compared to earlier. 
A director of market access elaborated, 
“The launch of Victoza® was in 2008-2009 … It was a good product and we got 
access relatively easy. But Tresiba® is also a really good product with clear 
benefits, yet even five years after the crisis getting access is much tougher 
compared to the Victoza® Launch.” 
 The launch period is probably the most critical moment in the lifecycle of pharmaceutical 
drugs. In fact, in 85% of pharmaceutical launches, the demand trajectory is determined in the first 
six months. (McKinsey & Co., 2014). This is because physicians typically get quickly accustomed 
to prescribing certain drugs. Thus, if a product fails to gain access within the first couple of years, 
even if it is superior to competing products, physicians will just use the other products because they 
have become accustomed to doing so in their prescribing behavior. For these reasons, marketing 
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and market access in particular became increasingly relevant. A wide selection of advanced 
analogues carries little value without proper market access.   
Summary of findings 
Novo Nordisk’s BMI process went through four distinct but related stages (see Figure 6.1). First, 
the incumbent BM was redefined by the divestment of the enzyme business and the introduction of 
patient centricity and sustainable management. The goal was not only to focus on Novo Nordisk’s 
core capabilities (i.e., developing protein-based treatments for people with diabetes), but to extend 
well beyond the original scope by placing the patient at the center of the therapeutic relationship. 
Thus, top management pursued changes that would not disrupt or radically transform the incumbent 
model, but rather would add supporting features in an incremental manner. The second stage built 
upon the previous one by expanding the value proposition beyond products to provide HCPs with 
services in the form of training and education seminars. The third stage resembled the earlier stages, 
with the introduction of a new service element (Changing Diabetes®) that was informed by earlier 
efforts, while the small molecule business was discontinued to permit an even more focused value 
proposition. In the final stage, Novo Nordisk’s BM not only reached its potential (through 
Victoza®’s success), but also its limits (with Tresiba®’s failure) in an environment characterized by 
increased pressure from health care payers and regulators. Despite the limits, top management did 
not find it necessary to implement further BM changes. Instead, they changed the relative 
importance of value creation and value appropriation by placing more emphasis on obtaining good 
pricing and reimbursement terms, and reducing the emphasis on patient centricity and sustainable 
management. 
Changes to Novo Nordisk’s BM were accompanied by concomitant changes in the 
organizational design. These changes sometimes preceded changes to the BM. For example, the 
newly established Global Stakeholder unit championed a number of BM changes, including 
DAWNTM, the differential pricing policy, and Changing Diabetes®. In this regard, the firm’s 
organizational design served as a driver of BMI. In other situations, the organizational design 
offered the stability that allowed previous BM changes to become embedded and manifest 
themselves in the organizational context. In other words, Novo Nordisk would not have been able to 
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continuously refine and improve its BM without mobilizing organizational action in the form of 
new organizational units, tasks, performance measures, roles and responsibilities.            
7 
UCB: BM Transformation 
BM transformation involves substantial and radical changes (i.e., changes that break with the 
dominant BM design), which are made to the firm’s core BM elements and often must be embedded 
in a fundamentally new architecture. Companies that enact this type of BMI can be characterized as 
“first movers” or “pioneers,” who forge radically new BMs that change the dimensionality of the 
customer decision and provide the impetus for wider industry transformation. These companies’ 
value propositions are designed to provide customized solutions, that is, unique combinations of 
products and services that address specific customer needs (cf. Brady, Davies, and Gann, 2005). To 
implement such a value proposition, radically new partnerships (e.g., co-creating with the end 
customer) are required in order to tap into external sources of knowledge, while the organization is 
designed specifically to rapidly transform information and knowledge into insights, and insights 
into solutions. 
The case of Union Chimique Belge (UCB) demonstrates the radical and far-reaching aspects 
of “transformers’” BMI efforts. The company was founded in Brussels by Emmanuel Jannsen in 
1928. Several decades later, UCB made some significant breakthroughs. In the period of 1980-
1990, UCB launched Zyrtec® (a new antihistamine product) and Keppra® (an anti-epileptic drug). 
Both turned out to be blockbuster drugs, paving the way for global growth. Today, UCB is a global 
biopharmaceutical leader (notably in epilepsy) that focuses on patients suffering from severe 
diseases in two therapeutic areas, namely neurology and immunology. The company is widely 
recognized by industry experts and their peers as being one of the most—if not the most—patient 
centric company in the pharmaceutical industry. It is headquartered Belgium, employs more than 
7,700 people across 40 countries, and posted revenues of 4.2 billion euros in 2016, of which 48% 
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and 34% were generated by the neurology and immunology businesses, respectively. In the 
following subsections, I will describe in detail UCB’s BM transformation and the 
accompanying organizational design choices made by management as the change unfolded 
from 2000 to the end of 2015 (Figure 7.1).           
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Figure 7.1 UCB's BMI process 
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2000-2003: UCB’s Conglomerate Model 
During the early 2000s, the UCB Group was a conglomerate, diversified across pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and films. The pharmaceutical division specialized in two therapeutic areas—
allergy/asthma and neurology—while forming a global presence in the most significant 
pharmaceutical markets—Europe, Japan, and the US. The chemical division was focused on 
industrial resins, which are useful for, among other things, graphic arts, printed circuits, artificial 
woods (office furniture), and real wood (parquet). Most notably, the UCB Group was a market 
leader in the environmentally friendly Radcure resins segment, with approximately 30% of market 
share. The film division was concerned with bioriented polypropylene film; with a capacity of 
75,000 tons per year, it was the sixth largest manufacturer in the world. 
Refocusing the BM through consolidation   
At the end of 2002, top management decided to consolidate the chemical and film divisions into a 
new unit called “Surface Specialities.” In addition, the UCB Group acquired the Resins, Additives 
and Adhesives activities from Solutia, further strengthening its pipeline and R&D capabilities. The 
intention behind the consolidation was twofold: (1) to realize synergies between the two divisions, 
which was urgently needed due to a growing demand for integrated technical solutions; and (2) to 
concentrate efforts on the pharmaceutical division, which had increasingly become the UCB 
Group’s main activity. This was largely driven by the “blockbuster” anti-allergic drug Zyrtec®, 
which was widely popular among physicians in the US; in fact, it was the only antihistamine that 
could be prescribed for babies from six months until two years. Meanwhile, the company’s new 
antiepileptic drug Keppra® was also immensely successful, with a sales increase of 89% in 2002, 
from 122 million euros in 2001 to 231 million euros in 2002, of which 164 million were generated 
in the US. 
The internal consolidation was a way to refocus the BM around two core units instead of 
three. Although the conglomerate model remained intact in the sense that no elements were added 
or removed, the attention on some elements and units was increased, while others received less.           
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2004-2005: A New BM, Divestments and the Acquisition of Celltech   
The UCB Group (UCB) reached the point where its conglomerate model was no longer viable. 
Although the Surface Specialties division acquired the resins, additives and adhesives activities 
from Solutia, Inc., the Pharmaceutical division contributed 83% of the Group’s ordinary profits. 
Thus, it seemed reasonable to divest the Surface Specialties division—particularly when there were 
no apparent synergies to be gained between the two distinct operating entities. The potential of 
having another blockbuster drug (Keppra®) also triggered divestiture, as significant resources 
would be needed in that process. But more importantly, the divestment of Surface Specialties 
allowed top management to acquire in 2004 the UK-based Celltech Group (Celltech), one of 
Europe’s leaders in biotechnology. Meanwhile, Roch Doliveux had been appointed as the new CEO 
of UCB, and was tasked with leading the transformation from a conglomerate into a pure 
biopharmaceutical company. Figure 7.1 shows the set of changes made to UCB’s BM and 
underlying organizational structure during the 2004-2005 period. 
Architectural BM change 
As mentioned above, the conglomerate model became obsolete owing to limited synergies, a 
potential blockbuster drug, and a strategic acquisition that could propel the pharmaceutical business 
to new heights in terms of scale, business opportunities and profitability. In other words, the 
Surface Specialties division represented a constraint to the company’s health care business. As the 
vice president of new patient solutions and alliance and portfolio management summarized, 
“[The] biggest change … was probably the divestments of our Film and 
Chemical divisions in the early 2000s … and the acquisition of Celltech, which 
transformed us into a biopharma company. Those divestments enabled us to 
focus more on the pharma side.” 
Reactivating by removing and adding activities. In just two years, the new CEO and his 
colleagues managed to transform the BM through a host of interrelated changes. To begin with, 
they removed the film and chemical businesses, which constituted separate BMs in their own right. 
This freed up substantial resources for the acquisition of Celltech—an acquisition that set in motion 
a series of changes.  
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Not only did the acquisition expand UCB Pharma’s value proposition by enriching the late 
stage pipeline—notably within central nervous system (CNS), inflammation and immunology and 
oncology—but it also allowed access to Celltech’s promising R&D engine, which had particular 
expertise in large molecules. Specifically, UCB would be able to adopt a dual R&D strategy, 
encompassing both small and large molecules. This was beneficial because it provided the ability to 
address disease pathways at different points within targeted therapeutic areas. Large molecules, for 
example, are often the only option for blocking protein interactions, while drug targets of a more 
intracellular nature are better addressed using small molecules. Furthermore, having both small and 
large molecules offered different benefits to patients in terms of convenience. While small 
molecules are taken orally, large molecules are generally administered by injection but can act more 
rapidly and for a longer period of time. The investment risks associated with each type of molecule 
differed at various stages of development, and therefore resulted in a more balanced risk profile. 
 Relinking and reactivating. Next, top management changed the role of R&D (resequencing) 
by introducing the notion of ‘Centres of Excellence’—with the intention of reducing bureaucracy 
and other constraints related to large organizations. Finally, UCB wanted to serve the enormous 
primary care segment (reactivating) by partnering up (regoverning) with major pharmaceutical 
players like Pfizer. Prior to this, UCB almost exclusively focused on physician specialists and the 
market of severe disease treatments. 
The level of BM change that UCB attempted during this period was substantial and 
fundamental, especially because it included changes to the model’s core elements. Not only did top 
management dissolve the conglomerate operating model, but they also significantly expanded the 
value proposition to include a broader scope of treatment options (small molecules) and market 
segments (primary care). The change process was difficult because it involved changes to the firm’s 
core BM elements; such elements tend to be path-dependent (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990, 
1994; Collis, 1991; Mahoney, 1995), linked with organizational survival (Romanelli and Tushman 
1994), and highly interdependent with other elements and organizational units (cf. Siggelkow 
2002). In other words, an element derives its “coreness” from its architectural features—notably the 
extent to which it is embedded in the larger organization’s strategic planning processes, goals, 
boards, resources, communication structure, and so on. That means it cannot be changed without 
setting in motion subsequent changes to other parts of the organization and their respective BM 
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elements. As the vice president of new patient solutions, and alliance and portfolio management 
summarized, 
“When change is of that magnitude and is radical, then you have to change 
many things fast to avoid too much disturbance in the organization … But of 
course … you cannot avoid that people get hurt and you lose some … And it will 
take some time to establish new relations and get the organization up and 
running again.” 
The decision-making authority needed to “change many things fast” typically rests in top 
management. In sum, the fundamental and radical adjustments undertaken by UCB reflect 
processes of ‘BM transformation,’ which contributes to the development of new core elements as 
the basis of an entirely new BM.       
 Organizational design as a barrier to and facilitator of BM change  
The organizational design played multiple roles in the transformation of UCB’s BM. On the one 
hand, it acted as a barrier to UCB’s transformation, since a multidivisional structure did not seem 
appropriate for a BM with a much narrower scope. On the other hand, the structure provided the 
vehicle for acquiring Celltech, and subsequently allowed for a smooth integration. As one R&D 
director noted, 
“Compared to Schwarz this was one of the happier M&A episodes. My answer 
is probably very biased because I was part of the pharma division back then. It 
was two different companies operating in different industries—one in pharma 
and another in the film sector. Even though we were part of the UCB Group we 
didn’t have much in common … When we acquired Celltech we got nearly 2,000 
new colleagues with supplementary expertise in large molecule drug 
development.” 
The transformation journey was spearheaded by the new CEO, Roch Doliveux. He and his 
team needed to create a fundamentally new BM, which included defining a new value offering that 
would be accepted by customers and would thrive in the market at a profit; developing the required 
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technological and commercial capabilities related to the offering; and most importantly, designing 
an organizational structure that would support the implementation of the chosen BM. The last point 
involved assigning new roles and responsibilities, defining new tasks, changing resource allocations 
and budgeting procedures, and so on.  
New units and cross-functional coordination. Some of the more notable structural design 
examples included the introduction of centers of excellence and multidisciplinary teams. More 
specifically, the R&D organization was split into three therapeutically-focused centers of excellence 
located in Braine-I’Alleud (Belgium), Slough (UK) and Cambridge (UK)—covering oncology and 
immunology, and inflammation, including multiple sclerosis and CNS disorders. The unit in Slough 
(UK) was the Celltech Antibody Centre of Excellence, which provided antibody expertise for the 
three other centers. Each center had its own dedicated resources, such as R&D facilities, scientists, 
time and money. This created a context in which to focus on therapeutic priorities, free of the 
organizational rigidities and other constraints often associated with the previous R&D organization. 
In addition, scientists were encouraged to spend time on their own personal research interests and 
projects. In fact, three of UCB’s most sophisticated products—Zyrtec®, Keppra® and CimziaTM—
originated that way. Moreover, each center had a multidisciplinary team consisting of members 
from development, manufacturing, intellectual property, sales and marketing, and other important 
functions. The purpose of the teams was threefold: (1) to reduce the time needed to turn molecules 
into commercial realities; (2) to improve knowledge sharing across subunits, especially between 
centers of excellence; and (3) to start life-cycle management early on.  
More importantly, the centers of excellence and accompanying multidisciplinary teams served 
as an important integrating mechanism between UCB and Celltech. Specifically, by breaking up the 
formal organization, it became easier for Celltech employees to reconcile with UCB employees and 
vice versa. As the vice president of global manufacturing explained, 
“I would say … on one hand, it was competence destroying because you ruin 
ties between people when you move them around. But on the other hand, 
Celltech very quickly became part of UCB—because the changes [i.e., the 
centers of excellence and multidisciplinary teams] were new to us all.” 
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If top management had decided not to restructure the organization by introducing the 
multidisciplinary teams and centers of excellence, it would arguably have been far less likely for the 
integration to have led to effective synergy realization. Specifically, without a re-organization, the 
need to establish new working ties would not have been salient. 
An equally important aspect of UCB’s transformation pertained to speed. Not only did the 
faster integration help reduce uncertainty among UCB and Celltech employees, but the time spent 
in a suboptimal configuration was minimized (cf. Angwin, 2004; Homburg and Bucerius, 2005). As 
a result, UCB was able to realize greater and faster synergies than initially anticipated. A few of the 
more important outcomes are highlighted in UCB’s annual report of 2005: 
“The synergies are reflected through higher sales made possible thanks to an 
enhanced share of voice; economies of scale and industrial improvements in 
manufacturing; savings in purchasing; [and] reduction of manpower promotion 
expenses.” (Annual report, 2005: 59) 
Top management used the gains to accelerate the potent R&D pipeline, and particularly to 
capitalize on Celltech’s most promising molecule, CimziaTM, which would be UCB’s first large 
molecule drug.         
2005-2007: Adding New BM and Organizational Design Dimensions  
The previous period brought fundamental changes to UCB’s BM and supporting structure. 
Similarly, 2005-2007 brought about far-reaching changes, especially to the company’s 
organizational design. Most notably, the changes included another, but far more complicated, 
merger, as well as new core BM elements, namely those of connectivity and services. The period 
emerged as the final phase of UCB’s transformation, as the CEO explained in an interview with 
PMLiVE (Marts, 2011): 
“The first measure we took to ensure long-term growth was to transform 
completely from a diversified chemical group into a pure, high-end biopharma 
company specializing in neurology and immunology […] by divesting all non-
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pharma businesses and acquiring Celltech and Schwarz Pharma. What we’ve 
done is create a new company out of three different entities.” 
Servitization and BM elaboration  
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, UCB’s BM once again underwent fundamental alterations in terms of 
its composition of core elements. The changes started with the 2006 acquisition of Schwarz 
Pharma, a Germany-based pharmaceutical firm specialized in neurology and with several attractive 
late-stage products. The acquisition as such did not lead to the removal or addition of (new) BM 
elements, but rather to an elaboration of existing elements. The acquisition brought about three new 
products in advanced late-stage development, including two with a broad range of indications in the 
central nervous system, contributing to UCB’s long-standing expertise within this field. The 
indications encompassed Parkinson’s disease (Neupro®, a special transdermal patch, approved for 
marketing in Europe and filed for approval in the US); restless leg syndrome (rotigotine); epilepsy 
(lacosamide); and diabetic neuropathic pain (lacosamide). As a result, the CNS core element was 
improved by allowing UCB reach new customers, such as patients with restless leg syndrome and 
Parkinson’s disease, as well as by providing a product with a new mode of action for treating 
epilepsy (30% of epileptic patients were not treated optimally by the current therapies). An equally 
important aspect was related to possible strategic complementarities between Schwarz Pharma’s 
advanced CNS products (value creation) and UCB’s marketing capabilities (value appropriation) in 
the field of CNS. As the senior vice president of marketing noted, 
“It was really a perfect match because we had the infrastructure, so to speak … 
the strong direct links with patients, their caregivers, CNS specialists, and most 
importantly, neurologists, while Schwarz provided much needed products and 
expertise.” 
More specifically, not only would UCB be able to serve new patients within the CNS segment, but 
they would markedly improve the BM of neurologists by arming them with a wider treatment 
regimen. This could potentially influence sales force productivity by allowing them to promote 
more products to the individual neurologists. Relatedly, with Schwarz Pharma, UCB would be able 
increase its presence in Eastern Europe and China, where Schwarz Pharma was already well 
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established. In other words, there was a possibility that the improved value creation would translate 
into increased bargaining power, which would in turn result in higher value appropriation. 
New services and opening up the innovation process. Meanwhile, additional core elements 
were incorporated into the BM. First, the element of patient centricity went from being a non-core 
activity to a core activity, facilitating the next phase of UCB’s transformation. Patient centricity was 
no longer a peripheral activity but a mainstay of UCB’s BM. This change was evident in the 
growing number of patient-centric projects—ranging from creating patient communities, to 
connecting patients with HCPs, to ensuring that all employees meet patients with severe diseases. 
These new services were radical in the sense that they were not only some of the first services 
offered by a pharmaceutical company, but they were directly aimed at the patient. An interesting 
example was the ‘Canine Assistance Programme,’ designed to sponsor the training and care of 
seizure response dogs that would aide patients with epilepsy across the US. UCB formed a novel 
partnership (relinking) with Canine Assistants, who would train the dogs on more than 90 general 
commands, including picking up medicine, opening doors, and advanced commands related to 
helping patients experiencing a seizure safely move to the ground and then going for help. As one 
patient affairs manager noted, 
“Epilepsy is often associated with profound physical, psychological and social 
consequences that significantly impact the quality of life. Many patients isolate 
themselves from social, educational and employment activities … usually out of 
fear of having another seizure.”  
Jennifer Arnold, founder and Executive Director of Canine Assistants elaborated further in an 
interview with Marketwired:29 
“The impact these dogs have is enormous—recipients want to go back to school, 
they get involved in extracurricular activities again and they come out of their 
shells to lead more independent lives with a renewed sense of confidence.” 
                                                 
29 Retrieved January 2016 from http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/adopt-an-assistance-dog-in-training-from-
canine-companions-2081397.htm.  
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While Canine Assistants was responsible for the training of the special seizure response dogs, UCB 
provided financial aid in terms of care, training and lifetime veterinary costs for all dogs given to 
patients with epilepsy. 
The notion of ‘connectivity’ was introduced as another core element—composed of three 
interrelated areas, as delineated in the annual report (2006: 2): 
“Connecting with patients so that we can understand more deeply the daily 
realities of their diseases.” 
“Connecting science in new ways, notably chemistry and biology, so that we 
can leverage the potential of these two disciplines, as well as illuminate the 
biological pathways involved in severe diseases.” 
“Connecting people in new ways so that we can capitalise on and cross-fertilise 
the creativity, knowledge and entrepreneurial spirit of our global team.” 
Top management knew that the ability to connect with world-class stakeholders across the entire 
value chain would be essential to the organization. Many informants alluded, for example, to 
UCB’s size as a motivation for the increased openness to external collaboration. As nicely 
explained by one HR director, 
“Being a mid-sized pharma company, we need to be very selective about where 
our efforts are applied. We can’t grow new capabilities overnight like Big 
Pharma. I would also argue that it is a more patient-centric approach, since 
patients ultimately get a better solution.” 
The ability to connect is at the heart of the BM construct. For example, Amit and Zott (2001: 
494) state that the BM is “a unifying unit of analysis that captures the value creation arising from 
multiple sources.” Others have similarly pointed to the BM’s boundary-spanning nature, stressing 
the possibilities in having tasks for the focal organization that are outside of its immediate 
boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006; Lee and Cole, 2003; Von Hippel and Katz, 2002). The online 
community (Crohnsandme) for people with Crohn’s disease and the Canine Assistants Programme 
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are good examples of UCB’s increased openness. While the former was created in collaboration 
with patients and patient associations, the latter constituted a partnership with a supplier not 
typically associated with the pharmaceutical industry. At the time, it was rare to see pharmaceutical 
companies engaging in such collaborative problem-solving initiatives. As the vice president of 
patient solutions and alliance management, who started working for UCB in 1993, noted, 
“I remember most people got a shock when he [the CEO, Roch Doliveux] 
started bringing patients into meetings. Before that, it was all about the 
specialists and GPs [general practitioners].” 
The new partnerships enabled UCB to fill specific resource and capability gaps, permitting the 
organization to not only extend its resource and capability base, but also to capture external ideas 
and insights. The changes were also a consequence of UCB’s target market—namely, severe 
diseases (e.g., epilepsy and Crohn’s disease); those diseases are extremely complex to address, 
often affecting several parts of the body and producing a host of socially and physically devastating 
symptoms which vary from patient to patient. Such conditions therefore call for an integrated 
approach and concerted efforts on the part of multiple stakeholders; they cannot possibly be solved 
“by a single company or a single science” (Annual report, 2006: 2).     
 
New ways of organizing and managing BM change    
The introduction of new core elements, and the accompanying merger of Schwarz Pharma, could 
not have been achieved without changing the organizational blueprint. 2005-2007 was yet another 
period characterized by notable changes related to roles, processes, systems, resource allocations, 
and so on. Even though the organization had barely emerged from the previous integration of 
Celltech in 2004-2005, top management decided to undertake another merger with Schwarz 
Pharma. This was an unusual merger in many ways and significantly more complex than the 
previous one. Typically, the acquirer imposes its own culture and management systems on the 
acquired (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988). However, in this case, UCB (the acquirer) announced 
a so-called fifty-fifty merger between the two organizations. As the vice president of patient 
solutions and alliance management explained, 
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“We tried to get the best of both worlds. In fact, every key position was 
scrutinized from A to Z to figure out who was the best match [UCB or Schwarz 
Pharma] for the new organization. It was not the case that just because we 
acquired Schwarz that meant UCB employees would be safe.” 
As a consequence of the 50/50 merger, large parts of UCB’s marketing and sales organization 
remained, while areas of R&D, particularly clinical development, came to be dominated by 
Schwarz Pharma. Schwarz Pharma’s proven way of organizing R&D project teams, including 
streamlining the corporate governance structures and delegating decision rights, was adopted by 
UCB. Although superior capabilities from both sides were retained, the setup was not optimal. 
Achieving proper coordination between R&D and the sales and marketing could have proven 
difficult, as they were essentially two different companies, with their own distinct ways of doing 
things (processes). If not properly dealt with, the situation could easily have resulted in a highly 
divided organization, with little common notion of purpose, and few shared coordinating 
mechanisms. To address this issue, and to avoid developing a ‘silo mentality,’ the new top 
management team arranged a series of workshops intended to: (1) define areas of agreement and 
differences; (2) improve participants’ understanding about each other’s roles; (3) foster 
communication and interaction; and (4) get an idea of how participants would actually organize 
themselves. Despite the initial concerns, the integration process between UCB and Schwarz Pharma 
was approached in a highly collaborative manner, as one former Schwarz Pharma manager noted:  
“It was a very positive experience because you had senior leaders from both 
sides playing equally important roles. We never really had the feeling of coming 
into someone’s house or being alienated. But our core values were quite similar 
which helped tremendously.” 
As a result of this cooperation, the integration was completed successfully 18 months ahead of 
schedule and generated synergies of €380 million, well over the initial €300 million target (Annual 
report, 2008). Not only did the rapid integration prevent significant pockets of resistance from 
emerging, but it allowed for additional changes—those that were needed but postponed during 
convergent periods of relative stability—to be implemented (Miller and Frisesen, 1982). 
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Specifically, the implementation of the new core elements of patient centricity and connectivity 
simultaneously with the integration of Schwarz Pharma made possible a series of organization-wide 
changes that would otherwise have constituted a considerable transformation by themselves. 
New communication and collaborative mechanisms. Patient centricity and connectivity 
became widely embedded in the organization’s business processes. For example, patients and 
representative groups were now included in the early clinical development phase of new drugs to 
make certain that the products are attempting to solve the associated, everyday problems of people 
living with severe diseases, rather than purely scientific ones. An accompanying intranet platform, 
‘UCB Plaza,’ was launched to increase cross-functional collaboration and exchange of knowledge. 
As one senior director explained, 
“The UCB Plaza is a very effective tool for knowledge sharing and finding the 
right people. Before Plaza, I relied very much on my internal network if I had to 
do a project or somehow became involved in a project. But with Plaza, I can 
instantly go in and find the competences I need, because each user must provide 
a very detailed description of their knowledge, skills and goals. Actually I was 
quite surprised to find that we did employ people with knowledge about A, B, C 
and D … Without Plaza it would have taken a longer time to discover that.” 
One could argue that through UCB Plaza, the firm’s capabilities became more visible, 
transparent and accessible among organizational members, making several important contributions. 
First, all cross-functional projects would be registered in Plaza so as to avoid overlapping projects. 
As one senior vice president of marketing stated, 
“There have been occasions where people in, let’s say, the US, worked on 
almost similar ideas to those of Italy without even knowing it.”  
Put differently, coordination efforts improved due to the instant synchronization feature offered by 
the Plaza platform. Second, the ability to identify the right capabilities rapidly reduced the reliance 
on external consulting expertise. Finally, and most compellingly, the platform allowed multiple 
employees, middle managers, and even top executives across UCB to contribute ideas and content 
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to improve the quality of various projects. The presence of top management weeded out subpar 
comments and ideas, while providing an incentive for people to use Plaza.  
New complementary goals and rewards. To support the new formal organization, a new 
performance management system was rolled out. It was built around three basic elements: (1) 
setting clear goals, especially with regards to patient centricity; (2) prioritizing staff development by 
means of, for example, job rotation and coaching; and (3) rewarding individual contributions and 
achievements through a stronger emphasis on variable remuneration and other incentives. The new 
system was complementary in several respects. For example, the move from products to solutions 
required employees with broader skills, who could view patients in a holistic manner and generate 
insights from multiple heterogeneous sources. In addition, top management wanted to free the 
creative capacities of UCB employees by rewarding such behavior.          
2008-2010: UCB shapes the organization 
The challenging transformation from a conglomerate company comprised of unrelated businesses 
into a biopharmaceutical company, with a patient-centric BM, had been completed. However, top 
management did not intend to slow down the pace of change. Although UCB’s BM was left largely 
untouched in terms of adding or removing elements, the underlying organization was faced with the 
most difficult changes in the company’s history, including a reduction in UCB’s workforce by 
2,000 positions. This downsizing was part of the so-called ‘SHAPE Program,’ which was launched 
as an effort to shape the organization for the future. 
UCB’s BM remained relatively stable during 2008-2010, with almost no changes to its core 
elements. Instead, it was a period in which BM elements were intended to be integrated into a 
coherent whole and in which a new growth phase would be facilitated. As explained by one senior 
director, 
“You could describe in this way … we came from a period where we had 
collected all the pieces needed for the future and then it was time to really glue 
them together to maximize the value output.” 
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However, there were a few exceptions to the relatively stability. Notably the core element of 
connectivity was elaborated through radically new partnerships with companies from markedly 
different industries, and the company also exited from the primary care sector in the US.   
Opening up the value network 
The core element of connectivity had been introduced in the previous period, but with an overly 
internal locus, emphasizing cross-functional collaboration and communication along the horizontal 
dimension of the organization. However, to realize the potential of connectivity, top management 
knew that it had to be extended beyond firm boundaries, especially given the changing industry 
structure. As several informants noted: 
“Payers are looking for data or solutions that help improve patient outcomes … 
There are a lot of consumer goods companies like GE, Phillips, Wal-Mart, 
Nestlé, and P&G that are coming into that segment. All of them have different 
strategies … but they are all data-driven and try to create solutions that are 
tailored to specific patient segments.” (Senior vice president of marketing)    
“No, they [GE, Phillips, Wal-Mart, etc.] are not a threat at all … It’s part of a 
continued evolution of what we are providing to patients. You know, we’ve got a 
piece but there are other pieces that patients are needing and so we come 
together in that and that’s why we have a pretty open network and look at 
partnering with companies to find common solutions.” (Vice president of patient 
solutions and alliance management) 
UCB entered two partnerships, one with OXO and another with PatientsLikeMe, not only to 
collaborate, but also, and more importantly, to learn about customer orientation (relinking and 
repartitioning). OXO was specialized in developing and designing user-centered consumer products 
for a broad spectrum of users, including those with limited dexterity. For example, self-injection 
presents a considerable dexterity challenge for most people with rheumatoid arthritis. Therefore, top 
management decided to enter a partnership with OXO in order to develop a more patient-friendly 
syringe. Design and engineering teams from both companies co-created, along with rheumatoid 
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arthritis patients, a prototype of the new syringe. Input from the patients led to various iterations of 
syringe features, such as an extended flange to support different grip styles and strengths; a larger, 
soft plunger-thumb pad; a magnified barrel for easy reading; and easy-to-open packaging. In the 
end, the syringe received the Ease-of-Use Commendation from the American Arthritis 
FoundationTM. In 2010, UCB also formed a unique partnership with PatientsLikeMe, the leading 
online community for people with life-impacting diseases. With the intention of learning from 
patients’ real-life experiences, a free online community for people living with epilepsy in the US 
was created. The platform allowed members to create individualized profiles so that they could 
record and share knowledge about treatments and symptoms, as well as about the type, frequency 
and severity of their seizures. As the Chief Medical Officer explained30, 
“As a patient-centered company, we are constantly seeking innovative ways to 
enhance and adjust our approaches to meet patient needs. We believe this 
community will be a source of information that will allow us to better 
understand people living with epilepsy and may help us design clinical 
programs that incorporate real-world patient needs and experiences in a 
measurable way.” 
Although pharmaceutical companies had become generally more open to external 
collaboration, it was mainly related to the possibilities of (1) reducing the risk and uncertainty 
associated with drug development by sharing it with other partner(s), (2) reducing time-to-market 
by outsourcing tasks to research and manufacturing contractors in order to avoid bottlenecks, and/or 
(3) reducing development costs by outsourcing stages of the clinical trial process to regions such as 
India and China (Cf. Quinn, 2000; Howells, Gagliardi and Malik, 2008). In addition, pharma firms 
would typically partner with companies that were accustomed to handling the requirements of 
pharmaceutical regulatory standards. However, UCB’s the new partnerships with OXO and 
PatientsLikeMe were radically different in many respects. First, the partnerships were used as 
means to improve the value proposition by offering new services. While the online community 
provided an opportunity to meet and share experiences with like-minded individuals, the patient-
                                                 
30 Retrieved March 2016 from https://www.patientslikeme.com/partners/9-ucb  
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friendly syringe provided greater convenience for people living with rheumatoid arthritis. In 
contrast, traditional pharmaceutical partnerships put emphasis on traditional value chain activities, 
e.g. improving the effectiveness and efficiency of drug development. Second, the partnerships were 
focused on addressing patients’ psychosocial and lifestyle issues rather than physical ones. Third, 
and relatedly, the services were an outcome of a co-creation process in which patients, UCB, OXO 
and PatientsLikeMe played a key role and where value was socially constructed. Finally, both of 
UCB’s new partners operated in industries that allowed high levels of direct customer interaction; 
they therefore excelled at customer orientation, unlike pharmaceutical companies, which 
traditionally focused on products and the prescribing physician.  
The removal of primary care 
In 2010, top management made the decision to withdraw from the primary care market in the US. 
This move was notable because most pharmaceutical firms did appear to be undertaking efforts 
toward primary care when it came to marketing their products and building brand loyalty. However, 
UCB was not reliant on the primary care market to the same extent as others, because its focus on 
severe diseases required a focus on specialists. This also meant that UCB could operate with a 
relatively small sales force compared to those operating in the primary care segment. Niles (2005) 
estimated that the average sales force expenditure for pharmaceutical companies is $875 million 
annually. As one vice president put it, 
“We have a smaller sales force than other pharma companies due to the smaller 
population of specialists. Moreover, targeting primary care is becoming 
increasingly harder due to a loss of power of the prescribing GP. Therefore, we 
decided that it’s not worth it from an economic perspective to have a primary 
care sales force. Does that mean that we don’t care about them anymore? No, 
but instead we to want help GPs and patients through web-based solutions such 
as the Parkinson’s Well-Being MapTM, Crohnsandme, and so on.” 
The change made it possible for top management to channel resources previously reserved for 
primary care into R&D, and particularly into cooperative programs focusing on solutions beyond 
the product. More specifically, the decision resulted from an assessment of potential 
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complementarities, in the sense that UCB would not only focus on severe diseases, but its new BM 
changes would enable the organization to target the primary care segment in a more economically 
viable way.    
Organizational restructuring 
After nearly a decade of change (including substantial mergers and divestments) that repositioned 
UCB as a biopharmaceutical company, it was time to restructure the organization to accommodate 
the new BM. Therefore, in 2008, top management launched “SHAPE,” a major organizational 
change program aimed at (1) re-allocating resources toward growth drivers and core assets (i.e. 
CNS and immunology); (2) simplifying the organization, including flattening the hierarchy and 
consolidating core functions into core areas; (3) developing core capabilities for the future; and (4) 
increasing the use of outsourcing for non-core activities. Most notably, the program reduced UCB’s 
workforce by 2,000 positions across the organization, constituting an approximately 17% reduction 
in the total workforce. According to top management, the layoffs were necessary due to the expiries 
of major product patents (Keppra® and Zyrtec®) and, more importantly, to create new capabilities. 
As summarized by the CEO, 
“Patent expiries are challenging times … The time is now to take action to 
shape UCB for the future and become a specialist company focused on 
successfully delivering our new medicines to patients … Our priority will be to 
look for solutions that lead to a new future.” 
The layoff process involved making 2,400 positions redundant and creating approximately 
400 new positions, as well as re-deploying around 300 positions to the organization’s core sites. As 
one HR vice president explained, 
“It was really a mix of different people, ranging from sales reps [and] 
marketers, to researchers. So in that way it was quite different from other 
pharma companies who mainly reduce the salesforce. Despite the mix, there 
were a few common denominators. First, I would characterize most of the 
positions as non-core, i.e., not part UCB’s future scope. Second, people with 
high resistance to change … in fact many of them were already on their way out 
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because they didn’t see a fit with the direction UCB was going. Finally, the 
traditional pharma salesforce was reduced because we wanted to focus on our 
newer, higher-margin products.” 
Implementing radical change through layoffs. Layoffs are traditionally associated with cost 
cutting, and they can also play a prominent role in adjusting workforce competencies (McKinley, 
Zhao, and Rust, 2000; Ostermann, 2000). As argued by Zatzick and Iverson (2006: 999), “layoffs 
increase a firm’s flexibility over the transition process; firms can quickly and efficiently remove 
employees whose skills no longer fit the firms’ strategies or add to their market value.” Such 
flexibility was probably needed in order for UCB to pursue its radical and architectural BMI, as 
nicely explained by the senior vice president of marketing: 
“When your goal is to transform or radically change something … then it 
naturally implies that you have to remove something and replace it with 
something else. Otherwise, it’s incremental or an evolution of the existing 
business model. However, in the past 10 years the pharma environment has 
changed to an extent that requires a drastic departure from the conventional 
model.” 
Although the layoffs represented a significant reduction of the total workforce and  
undoubtedly contributed to a competence drain, this was perhaps less of an issue due to the 
fundamental nature of the change; irrespective of the old competencies’ initial value, they would 
eventually become obsolete in a fundamentally different configuration. Moreover, the speed and 
scale at which the layoffs were conducted may have reduced uncertainty for the remaining 
workforce. As explained by one HR vice president, 
“I know it looks massive to make 2,000 positions redundant, and it is. But you 
also have companies that lay off people each year, and then rehire the same 
people the following year. I think that creates a constant flow of uncertainty … 
and illustrates a lack of strategic direction. We made a huge change to the 
organization, but everybody knows the direction of the company.” 
UCB: BM Transformation 
147 
 
Nevertheless, several informants also described the change process as “network destroying,” 
“too fast,” and resulting in “a tough reputation,” suggesting the existence of managerial tradeoffs 
between implementation and degree of change. For example, implementing a new BM can prove 
difficult if the informal networks are destroyed due to layoffs. On the other hand, implementation 
might be less relevant if, for example, the intention is to radically change the BM but the actual 
outcome is instead a slightly modified BM because the supposed change agents resist the change. It 
might also prove increasingly hard to attract new employees due to the negative impact of layoffs at 
that magnitude. However, such a drastic move might serve as useful self-selection mechanism, as 
the vice president of new patient solutions, and alliance and portfolio management summarized: 
“We move and change things fast at UCB, and it is not a tempo that is suitable 
for all … Those people will quickly find another place to work. However, we 
want people who like this dynamic and entrepreneurial environment, and who 
are adaptable. I also think UCB has that reputation in the industry … Not many 
have changed as much as UCB in the past ten years.” 
Toward a project-based structure. The SHAPE program was accompanied by the 
introduction of “patient solution teams”—called so to emphasize value-creating activities that go 
beyond the drug itself. In particular, the teams represented a new organizational structure that 
facilitated agility in bringing together and integrating diverse areas of knowledge or skills so that 
unmet patient needs related to, for example, psychosocial well-being could be addressed in 
potentially novel ways (Rasmussen and Foss, 2015). Each team was granted decision rights to self-
organize—that is, they could create their own processes for almost everything that needed to be 
done with regards to developing and implementing patient solutions—resembling the flexibility and 
entrepreneurial spirit embodied in the design of start-up firms. As the senior vice president of 
marketing described it, 
“The idea was to put a person there and give him or her enough power to create 
as much value as possible for patients. We thought, instead of having little 
projects that are seen as an annoyance by the functions … the project had to be 
the most important dimension of the organization, because it’s about bringing 
solutions to patients.” 
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One vice president of HR elaborated, 
“We asked these guys to think about their goals, organization, processes … and 
you know what happened? They said ‘Great, I need three medical, five 
regulatory, two marketing [personnel],’ and so they designed a small old UCB. 
But that was never the intention—we don’t care if you’re regulatory, marketing 
or medical. What we care about is brining superior and sustainable value for 
patients … so organize yourselves around these dimensions. Then we started to 
see something interesting happening, especially with the PST [patient solution 
team] for Neupro®, which is all Parkinson’s and restless leg syndrome. It was 
organized completely differently. Basically, they were structured around 
different patient segments, each with its own distinct mission. For example, they 
would take care of the young Parkinson’s patient and the elderly patient who 
can’t swallow pills.” 
Although the new structure seemed radical, it merely extended the scope of earlier BM and 
organizational changes. It did so by drawing on knowledge and experience gained from (1) working 
with centers of excellence and multidisciplinary teams, (2) organizing R&D project teams, and (3) 
making services a central part of the value proposition. Thus, the patient solution teams could be 
understood as the culmination of organizational and BM dynamics set in motion as a result of 
earlier decisions. Moreover, they also represented the first unit dedicated to systematically dealing 
with the value proposition’s increasing service content. Top management recognized that services 
should not merely be considered as add-ons to the products, particularly if the aim is to become a 
customer centric organization. Customers are not interested in products or devices per se, but rather 
in the benefits to their day-to-day activities and concerns (Erl, 2005). The new organizational 
structure was also radical in the sense that budget responsibility was transferred from the functions 
to the patient solution teams. As the senior vice president of marketing noted, 
“Before we got the PSTs [patient solution teams] project owners had to beg line 
management for resources and people … So many projects got stifled because 
they never received any attention. However, we have turned that hundred and 
eighty degrees … so now budgets are in the domain of the PSTs and line 
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management [the functions], or the practices, as we call them, have to serve 
them. It was a really good decision, but it has also created a lot of tension, 
because you suddenly take power away from one part of the organization and 
put it another place.” 
The new structure consequently altered the power structure for the formerly less powerful project 
organization and functions. This not only indicated a shift toward a greater influence of generalists 
as opposed to specialists, but also a shift in the BM toward value creation derived from a variety of 
internal and external sources (cf. Amit and Zott, 2001).    
2011-2013: In search of new territories while creating stability 
This period of 2011-2013 came after more than a decade of fundamental BM and structural 
changes. It was a time of adjusting, learning and building new intra- and inter-organizational 
relationships to test the variability of the new model and its accompanying organization design. But, 
perhaps more importantly, the period was a time of stability, with no mergers and acquisition 
activities or organizational restructuring, as described by one R&D director: 
“There were still a lot things happening at UCB … the new journey board, 
training program and new partnerships … but it was nothing like the scale of, 
let’s say, SHAPE or the PSTs. It was very important for us to figure out the new 
organization … experiment with what works and what doesn’t without being 
interrupted by another restructuring program.” 
A small, agile and exploratory team  
While the employees of UCB were getting used to new ways of working, top management 
assembled the “New Journey Board,” which was made up of the most talented individuals 
throughout the organization. The team consisted of eight members—small enough to allow for the 
necessary agility to experiment with a variety of external conditions. Some of these conditions were 
commonly known and some extended the understanding of the role of a pharmaceutical company. 
The team comprised a diverse group of individuals with different skills, experience, and formal as 
well as informal power—allowing for significant breadth in the unit’s exploratory search activities. 
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The team’s small size was compensated for by extensive support from top management in terms of 
attention and budget. As noted by one member, 
“You could call it a corporate playground … For a year we could do just about 
everything due to the support from executive management. We visited many 
different companies in different industries. For example, we worked with 
architecture and design firms, where we created small miniatures of the future. 
We were allowed to test different things in the organization.” 
The role of the board was threefold: (1) to sketch out the landscape of the pharmaceutical industry 
in 2020, and more importantly, to identify potential future BMs for UCB; (2) to create new 
capabilities through building new partnerships and developing a firm-specific training program; and 
(3) to serve as crucial change agents.              
2014-2015: From BMI to implementation 
At the end of 2014, Roch Doliveux stepped down as CEO after successfully transforming UCB 
from a diversified chemical company into a customer-oriented biopharmaceutical company over the 
preceding decade. UCB’s Board of Directors conferred on Doliveux the titles of Honorary Member 
of the Board and Honorary Chairman of the Executive Committee, as a tribute to his transcendental 
contributions to the organization. At the start of 2015, the Board of Directors appointed Jean-
Christophe Tellier as the new CEO of UCB. Although Roch Doliveux had successfully transformed 
UCB, his succession did not come as a surprise, as described in a UCB newsletter:31 
“This change is the result of a long and well thought through succession plan to 
ensure necessary experience and knowledge transfer. It creates the best 
conditions for the company’s future growth, allowing it, together with its 8500 
colleagues, to deliver on UCB’s commitment to patients.” 
                                                 
31 Retrieved March 2017 from http://www.ucb.com/presscenter/News//article/UCB-announces-CEO-succession-plan-
in-anticipation-of-next-wave-of-product-launches 
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While Doliveux had successfully navigated UCB through several transformations (e.g., the 
acquisitions of Celltech and Schwarz Pharma, and the implementation of SHAPE), the patent 
expiries of former blockbuster products (Keppra®), the launch three new core products (Cimzia®, 
Vimpat® and Neupro®), and most importantly, the incorporation of a customer dimension into the 
BM (e.g., by offering a range of solutions addressing unmet needs), it was now time to grow the 
business and focus on implementation rather than impeding it with another series of fundamental 
changes. As nice summarized by the vice president of new patient solutions and alliance and 
portfolio management, 
“We have in phase three, the late stage pipeline, products that have the 
potential to be between 50% and two times the size of UCB today. If that 
happens then we have to completely change the organization again and prepare 
it for that level of growth.” 
From patient solution teams to patient value units. Besides having played an instrumental 
role in establishing UCB’s patient-centric strategy, Jean-Christophe Tellier also had significant 
expertise and career achievements in “Big Pharma”—specifically Novartis—which would be useful 
in implementing the organization’s new growth strategy. Tellier did not hesitate to exercise his 
newly gained authority. First, the top management team was expanded to include three new 
members. Second, based on the learnings of the New Journey Board and the Patient Solution Team 
structure, most organizational units changed names and scope to reflect changes in their strategic 
importance. More specifically, the top management team was restructured into the following four 
areas: (1) Patient Value Units (encompassing new medicines, neurology, immunology and bone 
disorders); (2) Patient Value Practices (encompassing strategic marketing, development and 
medical); (3) Patient Value Operations (encompassing geographic operations, established brands, 
technical operations and business development); and (4) Patient Value Functions (encompassing 
finance, talent, company reputation and legal). As nicely explained by the senior vice president of 
marketing, 
“We started changing what we were doing by experimenting with new things … 
Then we developed a new structure and now we are looking into the processes. 
Some are still set up in the old way of doing things. But we are going back and 
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looking at processes and beginning to modify them to better reflect all the new 
people coming into the organization.” 
The new structure indicated that the BM worked. Therefore, the time seemed ripe to put a 
structure around it, so as to realize the full benefits of the new model. In particular, the benefits 
revolved around customer orientation, which is inherently more complex than producing drugs for 
specific therapy areas. To cope with that level of complexity, it was necessary to expand the top 
management team. Thompson (1967) suggests that the size of the top management team can affect 
information-processing demands, noting that the number and complexity of decisions faced by 
CEOs often exceeds their comprehension. To alleviate this, the size of the top management team 
can be increased, thereby reducing the number of decisions that must be made and monitored by the 
CEO. Most notable were the introduction of the Patient Value Units and making Strategic 
Marketing part of top management. This new way of organizing represented the final evolutionary 
stage of a series of changes ranging from centers of excellence and multidisciplinary teams to 
patient solution teams and finally patient value units. Interestingly, they became small firms or BMs 
in their own right, each headed by a member of the top management group and each with its own 
distinctive patient mission, strategies, tasks, processes, and so on. The common denominator was 
‘connectivity’ in the sense that each would take an outside-in approach, as nicely summarized by 
the CEO:32 
“People need to get outside to understand what is changing, who is influencing 
who, who is making the key decisions, how the value chain is working, and I 
think it’s a really significant shift.”  
Since the “who is influencing who” and the configuration of the value chain differ from therapy 
area to therapy area, it was necessary to create distinctive firms or BMs in order to adequately 
address the diverse set of unmet needs within each segment. Moreover, the CEO recognized the 
increasingly central role of marketing, and particularly market access. This was alluded to by many 
informants: 
                                                 
32 Retrieved April 2016 https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-perspectives-life-sciences-inspired-by-patients 
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“Market access has become so much tougher because power has shifted toward 
patients and payers” (Market access manager). 
“Products that would have received reimbursement 2-5 years ago are receiving 
negative reimbursement decisions [rejected]” (Direct of market access). 
“We are really good at market access and reimbursement. I think, if you look at 
it, we’ve brought three new products to the market in the last four or five years 
and managed to get pretty good reimbursement across geographies. In fact, it 
was the market access challenge that really triggered all the changes” (Senior 
vice president of marketing). 
Marketing thus became part of the top management team in 2015 to better reflect the growing 
influence of health care payers and patients. In sum, UCB’s one-and-a-half decade of BM and 
organizational design changes led to an entirely new configuration of integrated care, differentiated 
solutions, and patient and stakeholder involvement that would set the company up to increase its 
future “return on patient value creation, [which then would result] in a higher return for UCB and 
its shareholders” (Annual report, 2015: 15).   
Summary of findings 
UCB’s BMI process unfolded over six separate but related stages (see Figure 7.1). The first stage 
represented the gradual dissolution of the firm’s conglomerate model with the consolidation of its 
chemical and film divisions. In the second stage, top management completely abandoned the 
conglomerate BM by replacing it with a new and more limited focus on the firm’s promising 
pharmaceutical business. More specifically, the divestment of the film and chemical businesses 
freed up resources that could be used to broaden the scope of the pharmaceutical value proposition. 
For example, UCB moved into primary care, while the inclusion of small molecules enabled the 
company to offer a more differentiated value proposition. The third stage was perhaps one of the 
most critical stages in UCB’s BMI process. Most notably, patient centricity became the most 
important component of UCB’s BM activities. A range of new services were launched, with the 
intention of making UCB an integrated solution provider. That is, rather than only offering 
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pharmaceutical products to treat the physical ailment, a combination of products and services was 
offered to engage patients during various stages in their disease journey. During the fourth stage, 
another set of fundamental changes (new radical partnerships and the exit from primary care) were 
made to improve the implementation of previous BM decisions, particularly the aspects of patient 
centricity and connectivity. The fifth stage served as a learning and assessment period in which 
stability was allowed in order to investigate and test the viability of the new BM. The final stage 
represented the culmination of several years of painstaking organizational efforts to transform the 
incumbent BM. The efforts paid off, and as a result, the new UCB management team decided to 
restructure the entire organization around the new BM (i.e., the patient value units) in order to 
realize the full benefits of patient value creation. 
What makes this case remarkable is that it clearly demonstrates the inextricably interwoven 
relationship between BMI and organizational design. On the one hand, UCB’s organizational design 
served multiple purposes in the BMI process, either as a barrier or as a facilitator. For example, 
while the multidivisional and functional structures blocked the transition to a solution-based model 
during the early stages of BMI, new design mechanisms (in the form of new communication 
channels and cross-functional teams) were set up to facilitate coordination and convergence across 
the horizontal dimension of the organization, so as to gain a more holistic view of the patient. On 
the other hand, toward the end of UCB’s BMI process, the designable parts of the organization 
became almost an embodiment of the firm’s BMI activities—as exemplified first in the patient 
solution team structure, and later in the introduction of patient value units. As such, UCB’s BMI 
efforts were heavily influenced by top management’s ability to identify appropriate organizational 
designs that would not only guide and facilitate the implementation of BM changes, but would 
combine them in order to realize value-enhancing effects across the new BM configuration. 
  
 
8  
LEO Pharma: When BMI is Stuck in The Middle 
The stuck-in-the-middle approach to BMI aims to exploit incumbent BM elements while 
simultaneously exploring fundamentally new BM opportunities. It not only requires innovation 
efforts along several dimensions of the BM (ranging from incremental to radical change), but also 
the ability to solve a host of managerial problems arising from the contradictory requirements of 
incremental and radical change. In short, stuck-in-the-middle companies must learn how to achieve 
and preserve an equilibrium between conflicting demands for BM flexibility and BM stability (cf. 
Miles and Snow, 1978). In particular, such companies employ modular structures that help them 
separate old and new BM activities. For example, new BM units are usually set up outside the 
existing management and planning systems and have their own dedicated resources, processes and 
structures, yet with linkages to the established organization through the management hierarchy 
(Stieglitz and Foss, 2015). Such a setup can potentially enable the firm to experiment with radical 
value propositions while avoiding harmful side effects to the incumbent ways of creating and 
appropriating value. 
The case of LEO Pharma A/S (LEO) exemplifies the challenges that arise when the BMI 
process is stuck in the middle. LEO Pharma was founded in 1908 in Denmark by two pharmacists, 
August Kongsted and Anton Antons. In 1925, the company’s insulin production was transferred to 
the independent Nordisk Insulin Foundation, and LEO redirected its focus toward hormone 
products. It was not until much later, however, with LEO’s launch of Daivonex®/Dovonex® and 
Innohep®, that the company gained international recognition, especially for the treatment of 
psoriasis. Both of those products are still the most renowned medical innovations in the company’s 
history. Currently, LEO is headquartered in Denmark as a global, independent, research-based 
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pharmaceutical company that specializes in drug development for dermatologic and thrombotic 
patients residing in more than 100 countries. It employs around 5,000 people worldwide and has 
sales and marketing subsidiaries in 61 countries. In 2016, LEO recorded revenues of 9.8 billion 
DKK, of which 64% and 26% were created by the dermatologic and thrombotic businesses, 
respectively. In the following subsections, I will describe in detail LEO’s attempts to deal with the 
stuck-in-the-middle approach to BMI during the period from 2000 to 2015 (Figure 8.1).               
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Figure 8.1 LEO’s BMI process 
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2000-2003: LEO’s Traditional BM 
In the early 2000s, LEO operated with the traditional pharmaceutical BM. Specifically, it focused 
on the development and commercialization of small molecule drugs—focusing particularly on the 
areas of dermatology and critical care. As noted by the executive vice president of sales and 
marketing, 
“It is very traditional. Even though it has been modified over the past fifty years 
… it has not changed much. We are still very science-based, focusing on R&D, 
production and operations, and [we have] a large field force.” 
In many ways, the organization was still following the path laid down a decade earlier. LEO had 
launched Innohep® (critical care), and Daivonex®/Dovonex® (dermatology) in 1991. Together, 
these two drugs are recognized as the main drivers behind the organization’s strategic priorities. 
This was mentioned by several informants: 
“We have not been so successful in coming out with new drugs. The last time we 
really came out with something was in the early 90s, with Calcipotriol 
[Daivonex® and Dovonex®].” (Senior Director) 
“It has been a while since we discovered a viable new chemical entity, but 
fortunately we have been really good at formulation.” (Executive Director) 
As a consequence of LEO’s inability to come up with new successful medical products, the 
company became increasingly proficient at pharmaceutical formulation, particularly with regard to 
existing LEO drugs. New formulation is a process in which various chemical substances, including 
the active ingredient, are recombined to produce a new version of the old drug that is easier and 
more convenient for the patient to use. In 2001, LEO launched Daivobet®/Dovobet® as a new 
formulation for the treatment of psoriasis.         
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BM origins 
One could ask, ‘Why did LEO choose to adopt a BM that focuses primarily on dermatology and to 
a lesser extent on critical care?’ This BM seems to have been emergent rather than deliberately 
planned and designed, as explained by one senior director of marketing: 
“You could say that in many ways it’s a coincidence that we are in dermatology 
… It can largely be ascribed to the fact that we found Calcipotriol. If we had 
found something else, we could potentially have been in another therapeutic 
area with a different kind of set up.” 
Although LEO’s BM was traditional, with an emphasis on R&D, patented-protected prescription 
drugs, a sales force, and so on, there were notable distinctions between therapy areas with respect to 
who the important stakeholders are, regulation, reimbursement and competition. Thus, while the 
company’s main value proposition was discovered almost by accident, the other constituent BM 
parts were largely formed on the basis of contextual factors related to the specific therapy area.      
2004-2007: Toward a More Focused BM 
LEO experienced a significant setback in 2004, when it halted work on the much-anticipated HL 
10, which was developed for the purpose of treating ARDS/ALI, or acute respiratory distress 
syndrome/acute lung injury. HL 10 was a very expensive treatment, and therefore needed to be 
markedly better than existing treatment options in order to be commercially viable. A number of 
phase II studies showed promising results, but the final phase III study did not show a statistically 
significant improvement compared to the existing treatment regimen. As summarized by the CEO 
at the time, Ernst Lunding, 
“Having to close down HL 10 is a depressing announcement … It is very 
disappointing to the people who have worked intensely with HL 10 and who 
have all made an incredibly good and firm effort. The depressing result is not in 
any way related to the preparation of the project or to the scientific rationale. 
Rather, the reason lies with the statistics, which have played a trick on us by 
indicating incredibly good results in both phase II studies.”  
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The HL 10 failure led top management to rethink and redefine its goals and overall ambitions. 
More specifically, they decided to abandon their so-called 2010 vision of including a third value 
proposition alongside the organization’s dermatology and critical care businesses. Instead, LEO 
would now focus on its core BM elements, particularly leveraging its strength within dermatology. 
This involved the divestment of its animal health subsidiary in 2005 and the launch of Taclonex®, a 
topical treatment for patients with mild psoriasis, in the US in 2005. Despite the failure of HL 10, 
LEO still managed to record impressive numbers in 2006, including, among others, 15% growth 
and a 49% profit margin.    
BM refinement and risk aversion 
The 2004-2007 period arguably represents a defining moment in LEO’s History. Not only was it 
Ernst Lunding’s last years as CEO after having held the position since 1995, but the BM choices, in 
many ways, set the direction for the future. 
Reactivating by removing. To avoid further losses and improve short-term value creation and 
appropriation, it seemed reasonable to divest non-value-adding activities (such as HL 10 and the 
animal health subsidiary) and focus on core activities (such as dermatology and critical care). As 
Lunding explained in an interview with finans.dk33, 
“Our pipeline … is looking a little thin. For that reason, we will therefore be 
more selective and provide an even stricter prioritization of our development 
projects. Rather, [we will] bet on fewer projects, which can be accelerated 
instead of many projects that only progress slowly.” 
Reluctance to explore new BM opportunities. A number of the accelerated projects 
mentioned by Lunding were not new drug development. Taclonex®, for example, was developed 
based on “reformulation”—that is “the development of different formulations for the same 
pharmaceutical drug” (Murteira, Ghezaiel, Karray, and Lamure, 2013: 2). Resorting to 
“reformulation” is an attempt to reduce both the cost and the risk associated with de novo drug 
development. As noted by a senior director of marketing, 
                                                 
33 Retrieved April 2016 from http://finans.dk/artikel/ECE4225281/Leo-Pharma-ramt-af-ny-milliard-fiasko/  
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“If you think the organization is conservative now and resisting change, that is 
nothing compared to the days with Ernst Lunding. Although we had a little 
bump on the road with HL 10, LEO and the foundation were still generating, 
and loaded with, an abundant amount of cash. I think we even had the highest 
profit margin of any company in Denmark, but still you had to almost beg for 
money to do anything. In hindsight, it would have been the perfect time to 
change LEO because we had the necessary resources and our products were not 
at the brink of losing exclusivity.” 
It seems that after the failure of HL 10, the focus was on protecting or strengthening the old 
BM, especially those activities at which the organization excelled, such as reformulating existing 
drugs within the area of dermatology. LEO Pharma’s top management team did not make any 
deliberate attempts to set a new direction for the company or its underlying BM. Conversely, the 
decision to focus on the core and not explore new and more risky opportunities discouraged 
organizational members from trying new things, even though LEO Pharma was in a good position 
to do so in terms of resources and credibility. 
Failures are a natural outcome of BM change or experimentation (Chesbrough, 2010). 
However, it is the ability to learn from such failures and distinguish them from mistakes that 
enables firms to discover viable new BM elements (Chesbrough, 2010). However, in order to do 
that, an organization might need to have the appropriate structures and processes in place to learn 
from failures. Arguably, this was not the case for LEO Pharma, which instead became an even more 
risk averse organization after HL 10.     
2008-2009: Generation Shift, a New Strategy and the Acquisition of Peplin  
Coming off a disappointing year in 2007, with only a 2% growth in sales, the time seemed right for 
a generation shift at LEO. After having established the foundation for the Danish pharmaceutical 
industry and holding the leading position for decades, LEO had now been overtaken by peers like 
Novo Nordisk and Lundbeck. A 41-year-old female, Gitte Aabo, was to take over as CEO in 2008, 
while the resigning CEO, Ernst Lunding, would take on a new role as Chairman of the Board. Gitte 
Aabo had been part of LEO since 1992. She first worked as a personal executive advisor to Ernst 
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Lunding for a couple of years before assuming responsibility for the organization’s finance and IT 
department. So, she was indeed a protégé of the former CEO, as noted by several informants. For 
example, one director stated, 
“The announcement of Gitte did not come as a surprise. In many ways I think it 
speaks to the power of Ernst Lunding, as he is still very much in control of the 
company.” 
One vice president of project management elaborated, 
“She is a true LEO … for better or for worse. She knows the company and its 
culture extremely well, but she is also part of its corporate DNA ... Having 
worked with the former CEO for many years ... undoubtedly makes it very hard 
to turn things around.” 
Nevertheless, it was now up to the new CEO to implement strategic actions that would lead the 
century-old pharmaceutical company toward new growth and global expansion. As a result, the so-
called “Going for Gold – step by step” strategy was launched with the stated goal of growing the 
company and reaching double-digit sales growth. This was to be accomplished through (1) 
establishing a presence in the US and other key markets; (2) vigilantly scanning for potential 
acquisition candidates; and (3) fostering a customer-oriented mindset.  
Preparing for internationalization with incremental BM improvements and neglecting customer 
orientation   
Reactivating by adding. While 2008 was all about formulating the new “Going for Gold – 
step by step” strategy, the following year was dedicated to realizing it. The first step involved the 
acquisition of Peplin, Inc. in 2009. A US firm with operations in Australia, Peplin specialized in 
treatment of the pre-cancerous skin lesion actinic keratosis—a so-called “non-melanoma skin 
cancer.” With the acquisition, LEO intended to expand its dermatology portfolio to help patients 
with actinic keratosis. As one senior director of marketing explained, 
“At the time, the notion of integrated care was becoming increasingly popular 
among health care providers … and this was no different at LEO. Management 
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was firmly committed to making LEO a one-stop shop for dermatology 
patients.”   
The acquisition also had the potential to bring forth a number of strategic complementarities. First 
of all, LEO had a very solid reputation among leading dermatologists. This was critical, because 
key opinion leaders often dictate the prescribing behavior of other physicians. Secondly, LEO 
already had a very strong dermatology sales force in place to promote the new product. In sum, not 
only would LEO be able to serve new patients within the dermatology segment, but they would be 
creating more value for dermatologists by arming them with a broader treatment regimen. In 
addition, sales force productivity could potentially be increased by promoting additional products to 
the individual dermatologists. 
Relinking by regoverning. Shortly after the Peplin acquisition, top management initiated the 
second step by repurchasing the company’s rights to its psoriasis portfolio and dermatological 
pipeline in the US from Warner Chilcott. This was considered a stepping stone for LEO’s 
internationalization process, and more importantly, it allowed the company to gain a share of the 
lucrative US market. The President and CEO of the US division commented in an interview with 
FirstWordPharma34, 
“It is our intention to now establish LEO as a leading company within the 
American Dermatology market. Armed with one of the strongest pipelines within 
dermatology, the US presence will create a platform allowing LEO to bring all 
future products to markets through our own affiliate, including the products 
coming out of our Peplin acquisition.” 
In 2009, LEO generated most of its sales from the European market, while many other 
pharmaceutical companies generated the majority of theirs from the US market. However, because 
the European market was facing pricing pressures from health care payers as well as increasing 
regulatory requirements from regulators (cf. Garnier, 2008), it became important to gain a place in 
the US market. 
                                                 
34 Retrieved November 2015 from https://www.firstwordpharma.com/node/377635?tsid=17.  
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Interestingly, top management opted to not implement the third planned step—namely, the 
transition toward a more customer-oriented BM and organization. As evidenced above, the changes 
made to LEO Pharma’s BM during this period were of an incremental nature (i.e., improvements 
were made to the traditional operating model), rather than, for example, adding products or services 
that are unusual for the archetypical pharmaceutical BM (such as adding a new service dimension 
or pursuing new radical partnerships). As the CEO commented in an interview with 
FirstWorldPharma (September, 2009), 
“We have, over the last decade, focused our strategy on our core 
pharmaceutical business within dermatology and critical care. This strategy has 
placed us in a very attractive financial and organizational position to actively 
pursue opportunities that fit with our strategy.” 
Thus, it seems that the main objective of BMI was centered on the first two strategic 
priorities, as opposed to radically reforming the existing model. The organizational design changes 
were also indicative of this choice, as no new units or resource allocations were made for customer 
orientation purposes. Instead, resources were funneled toward establishing LEO Pharma in the US 
and toward the Peplin acquisition. As noted by a senior strategy manager, 
“Senior management was fixated on the US, and especially Picato® [Peplin, 
Inc.’s promising phase three candidate for actinic keratosis]. In fact, many 
believed that Picato® could possibly turn into a blockbuster. The idea about 
patient centricity and new services was merely considered a last resort if 
Picato® failed.”             
2010-2011: Implementation, or the Lack Thereof 
In spite of the implementation efforts during the previous period (2008-2009), top management was 
not entirely satisfied with the progress made. Therefore, they decided to revise the new strategy in 
2010-2011. Among other things, this led to new mission (“We help people achieve healthy skin”) 
and vision (“We are the preferred dermatology care partner improving people’s lives around the 
world”) statements that more clearly reflected LEO’s commitment to people suffering from skin 
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conditions. But, perhaps more importantly, the revised strategy (known as “The LEO powerhouse”) 
included a range of organizational design changes (the so-called “corporate Must-Win Battles”) 
intended to speed up and ensure more effective implementation of the refined BM. As stated in the 
annual report (2011:11), 
“The five corporate Must-Win Battles ensure that we optimise our prioritization 
of the Group’s resources in efforts to achieve our overall growth targets.” 
The five corporate Must-Win Battles (cMWBs) consisted of the following: (1) “Growing 
People, Growing LEO”; (2) “Innohep® - Full speed ahead”; (3) “Dermatology – Expanding our 
footprint”; (4) “USA – Yes we will”; and (5) “New markets – Future opportunities.” The first 
cMWB was intended to develop new capabilities and improve knowledge sharing by launching a 
new leadership program in collaboration with IMD in Switzerland, and a new communication 
platform (known as “The global intranet Pulse”) to improve lateral communication. The second 
cMWB focused on LEO Pharma’s critical care business by creating a clearer strategy for Innohep®. 
The third cMWB was primarily about securing the marketing authorization for Picato®, but it also 
included a number of new initiatives to ensure patient-centered care. The fourth cMWB was 
dedicated to setting up the US organization (e.g., increasing the number of employees from 33 in 
2010 to 194 in 2011), and preparing to file the marketing authorization with the FDA. The fifth 
cMWB was meant to secure marketing authorization in Brazil and set up an independent function 
focusing on business development in China.      
The role of contextuality   
The most important aspect of the revised strategy was related to the cMWBs, which were intended 
to drive implementation through changes to the underlying organizational design. This occurred 
largely through the reallocation of resources, as noted by a director of marketing: 
“To be a corporate Must-Win Battle, that means that you get access to the big 
budget instead of being trapped in the limited budgets of line management. For 
example, you have larger budgets for consultants, external vendors, headcounts, 
etc. And then you have a champion from the top leadership team who can push 
the agenda and who acts as a problem solver to help overcome barriers.” 
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In other words, it seemed that top management believed that increased managerial attention coupled 
with more resources would be sufficient to drive implementation, rather than assigning new tasks 
and responsibilities, or a new incentive system and performance measures. Several informants 
noted: 
“Sometimes LEO is like the Wild West … If you want to get things done you 
need to know the right people [the informal organizational channels]. This 
works for some people, while others hate it and they go to work for companies 
like Novo Nordisk with more formal procedures.” (Vice President) 
“For the last decade or so we have been structured in much the same way.” 
(Senior Director) 
“There are certain ways of doing things at LEO.” (HR Partner)  
Or as explained by the executive vice president of global sales and marketing, 
“I don’t believe that you can organize change or drive it through internal 
reorganizations. Instead, it is people, the history of the company and its culture 
that over time move people toward a new target.” 
These are all valid and interesting reasons for top management’s choice not to include additional 
organizational design elements as part of the interventions to deal with the implementation of the 
new strategy. Thus, it seems that contextuality plays a fundamental role in determining how things 
get done in an organization. It could also be argued that since the main objective was not to 
radically transform LEO’s operating model, the option to, for example, change tasks and 
responsibilities, did not seem too relevant at the time.  
Organizational design as a barrier to initial BMI efforts  
The third cMWB of “Dermatology – Expanding our footprint” was partly set up to explore new so-
called “patient-centred care” initiatives or BM innovations. While the current BM focused on 
developing and selling medical treatments (products), the “patient-centred care” initiatives were 
dedicated to developing and selling solutions that make life easier for people living with skin 
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conditions. In other words, while the first model targeted all the physical symptoms of skin 
diseases, the second model was aimed at addressing the emotional and psychosocial wellbeing of 
people living with skin diseases. This represented a fundamentally different BM, as explained by 
the executive vice president of global sales and marketing: 
“It requires a complete shift in mindset, recognizing that patients are the most 
important customers, and it is not enough just to have a large sales force that 
pushes products to the physicians.” 
At the beginning of 2010, top management sent out a directive ordering all subsidiaries to 
launch at least one “patient-centered care” initiative by the end of the year. This was LEO Pharma’s 
initial step toward adopting a new customer-oriented BM. More specifically, the directive 
encouraged subsidiaries to launch a series of BM pilots for experimental purposes, as explained by 
the general manager of LEO Pharma Spain: 
“The main objective was to learn about patient-centered care—identifying 
drivers and barriers to such initiatives—and hopefully develop a sort of 
catalogue that would allow individual affiliates to select different initiatives that 
have already been tested and proven to work in a similar environment. 
However, most of the projects did not really amount to anything new and there 
was considerable resistance toward the adoption.” 
One of the senior directors of marketing added, 
“When we examined the initiatives in more detail, most of them reflected 
business-as-usual projects, rather than specifically incorporating patient 
centricity. Interestingly, they had just changed the name [of the initiative] to 
something about patient centricity.” 
Despite the good intentions, the BM pilots largely failed due to a lack of commitment, 
resources, capabilities, processes and structures. Although the directive came from top 
management, subsidiaries were not held formally accountable for the success of such projects. 
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Instead, subsidiaries were held accountable for sales volumes in their respective regions, as opposed 
to the quality of their BM experimentation efforts. As one of the regional vice presidents explained, 
“Of course we try to implement the things from Ballerup [headquarters] as well 
as patient centricity, but at the end of the day we are here to generate sales and 
contribute to the profitability of LEO. Sometimes headquarters forgets that. 
Ideally we would like to come up with innovative solutions to help patients, but 
we are also expected to deliver on sales. In my opinion, as long as affiliates 
manage to deliver good sales numbers, I can easily tolerate less successful 
innovation projects.” 
It was also apparent from reviewing a series of internal documents (from the period of 2008 
until 2011) that the element of “patient-centered care” was merely treated as an afterthought or 
footnote at the time of the revised strategy’s introduction. The “patient-centred care” initiatives 
were merely one bullet point and served as the last strategic priority of the “Dermatology – 
Expanding our Footprint” cMWB. This was further confirmed by a number of informants at the 
middle and lower management levels: 
“All eyes were on the US and the Peplin team.” (Manager) 
“There were many good intentions with Going for Gold. However, there were 
probably too many strategic priorities … and then you had senior management 
who was almost obsessively focused on Peplin and getting access to the US 
market.” (Senior Director) 
In an external newsletter dated 12 November 2009, the CEO stated, 
“We are very pleased that the merger is now completed and look forward to 
focusing our energy on developing PEP005 [Picato®] as quickly as possible for 
the benefit of patients.”  
Evidently, the key priorities were on expanding the current value proposition within dermatology 
by acquiring Peplin, Inc., so as to address the market of people living with actinic keratosis, and on 
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gaining access to the US market—rather than changing the BM per se. Thus, the combination of 
organizational resistance, too many strategic priorities, and perhaps too few organizational design 
changes made it increasingly difficult to succeed with the first business pilots.       
2012-2013: Striking a Balance between New and Old BM Dimensions 
In spite of the unsuccessful BM pilots, 2010-2011 served as a learning period in which 
organizational members became familiarized with BMI and top management could determine 
whether the chosen organizational structure was appropriate for such activities. A series of secret 
meetings were held for the purpose of deciding whether LEO should make a serious commitment to 
a more customer-oriented BM. As one senior strategy manager noted, 
“The results from the first pilots showed that concerted efforts were needed to 
make patient centricity a part of the LEO DNA. However, there was substantial 
disagreement on the direction that LEO should take … One group wanted to 
preserve the traditional research-based pharma model, while the other group 
believed that patient-centricity and co-creating solutions with patients was the 
best direction for the future of LEO.”   
Since the CEO favored patient-centricity, the outcome of those meetings was that LEO should 
take the necessary steps to implement it. The previous period showed the need for increased 
organizational governance and accountability in order to drive the more radical BM changes (i.e., 
the “patient-centred care” initiatives). In 2012, top management introduced a new department called 
“Global Patient Engagement” (GPE) to support that need. GPE was tasked with extending LEO’s 
incumbent model to include a service dimension, along with serving as an active and credible 
integrator of BMI activities across the organization (Rasmussen and Foss, 2015). A new global 
organization structure was also created “with the aim of bringing LEO Pharma closer to patients so 
that it [would be] in a better position to develop and supply innovative new therapies that meet 
patients’ needs” (Annual report, 2012: 10). The organization was divided into five geographical 
regions: USA, Lamea (Latin America, Africa and the Middle East), EU5+ (Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and the United Kingdom), ZOE (covering the 
remaining Eastern European countries), and Asia. In addition, top management selected nine key 
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markets (USA, the UK, France, Germany, Brazil, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea) that 
would receive additional attention from global headquarters. 
An important milestone was reached in January 2012, when LEO won its first approval for 
Picato®; the product was subsequently launched in April. In 2013, Picato® was launched in a 
number of European markets (including Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark), as well as in 
Brazil, Canada and Australia. Unfortunately, the first sales figures were disappointing to many, as 
explained by a senior marketing director: 
“All markets were selling very few units of Picato®. In some markets [sales 
were] lower than 100 units per month, which isn’t a lot despite the high price of 
the product. The problem was that dermatologists preferred treating AK [actinic 
keratosis] with cryo-treatment because they ultimately made more money out of 
that.” 
A senior manager from finance added, 
“The sales figures clearly indicated that Picato® had no chance of becoming a 
blockbuster. People started questioning whether it was a failed investment or 
not, and whether management had perhaps overcommitted resources toward 
something that would never amount to anything from a financial perspective.” 
To make matters worse, LEO Pharma lost patent protection on one of its core products, Dovonex® 
(for the treatment of plaque psoriasis) in 2013. The new organization in the US also struggled to 
find a footing in the complex market, as noted by a market access manager: 
“Even after three years there were still very basic things that did not work well. 
The sales force productivity was surprisingly low … It was as if there was a lack 
of commitment or direction. Although the US market is very complex, it should 
be possible to produce better results with that set up.” 
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Servitization as a means of salvaging the old BM 
Overall, the period of 2012-2013 represented a challenging time for LEO Pharma. Not only was the 
traditional model showing considerable weaknesses, but the organization was also experiencing 
considerable changes with the rise of patient centricity. Since the incumbent BM was under 
pressure (due to the disappointing Picato® launch and loss of exclusivity on Dovonex®), increased 
attention was directed toward the new GPE department, and especially its new patient support 
service QualityCareTM.      
Reactivating by adding new radical BM elements. In many ways, the bedrock of the “Going 
for Gold” and “LEO powerhouse” strategies was crumbling. Thus, top management decided to put 
more emphasis on patient centricity, which moved from being a non-core activity to a core activity. 
This was exemplified by the roll out of the QualityCareTM program in 2012. The program 
comprised a range of services targeted at patients and their families. The aim of QualityCareTM was 
to expand LEO’s value proposition beyond drugs in order to help patients during all stages of their 
disease journey. In particular, the program included an online platform with a considerable amount 
of content that could be customized to meet different patients’ needs, as well as expert advice from 
specially trained nurses. The program was designed for both psoriasis and actinic keratosis patients, 
and was offered for free in several markets. As one senior director of marketing explained, 
“Most people at LEO are quite skeptical toward QualityCareTM because its 
business model is quite different from the traditional pharma business case. I 
always get the question, ‘How are we going to generate money when it’s free?’ 
First of all, by offering free and value-adding support, we hope to increase 
customer loyalty and thereby ensure better customer retention. Secondly, the 
tailored disease-related information should enable patients to better comply 
with medication. That means we’ll probably be selling more products, because 
often patients do not even pick up their prescriptions, or they skip doses. 
Thirdly, we’ll be generating huge amounts of data that can be used for new 
innovative solutions. Lastly, such a platform allows us to explore various cross-
selling opportunities. Despite the immediate lack of revenues, I firmly believe 
QualityCareTM will be profitable in the long run.” 
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Not only did QualityCareTM offer a novel way to help patients during the different stages of 
their disease, but it also had the potential of adding value to the traditional value proposition. This 
was LEO’s initial step toward offering bundles of products, services, information, support and self-
service features (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988) that could potentially offer more value to patients. 
To support this step, LEO launched the so-called “Columbus” project, which was essentially a 
coordinated way of managing BM experimentation. The idea was to instill innovative thinking at 
the subsidiary level in order to come up with new solutions that could potentially be implemented 
across several markets. For example, the Dutch subsidiary experimented with a direct-to-consumer 
delivery model, while Germany looked into partnerships with payers. In 2013, LEO took another 
step toward servitization by launching the so-called “Psoriasis Frontiers” project aimed at allowing 
closer collaboration with end users (relinking and repartitioning). As the project manager explained, 
“Pharma is highly regulated and in most cases you aren’t allowed to 
communicate directly with the end users. However, Psoriasis Frontiers was 
created in collaboration with the National Psoriasis Foundation in the US and a 
third party vendor. That means we can talk to select patients as long as the 
process is facilitated by the vendor and the National Psoriasis Foundation. So 
for the first time, it’s actually possible to receive feedback from patients. 
This period marked the transition from the traditional product-based model toward an 
emerging service-based model. Due to the failed Picato® launch, top management realized that the 
traditional model was perhaps not as viable as it had once been. As nicely summarized by a senior 
market access manager, 
“Skin diseases are not as sexy as diabetes. That means it’s getting increasingly 
difficult to get proper reimbursement for our products … And I believe it’s just a 
matter of time before we risk losing reimbursement completely. This is why we 
are launching programs such as QualityCareTM—to create value in different 
ways and hopefully come up with ways to monetize it.”   
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Organizational design as a double-edged sword 
The organizational design played several roles during LEO’s transition toward a more service-based 
BM. It served as an important driver of BMI. Although top management encouraged the 
organization to experiment with BMs in 2010, it was only with the introduction of GPE in 2012 that 
notable BMI efforts occurred.  
Structural modularization. Even though GPE resided in the global sales and marketing 
department, it had much more autonomy than other units. As noted by the senior director of GPE, 
“We decided to make GPE a part of global sales and marketing because we 
want to be closer to patients in order to co-create with them. However, we have 
more freedom than the product teams to experiment with more radical ideas. 
This kind of freedom is needed. Otherwise, many of the projects would be 
immediately killed or stalled by all the bureaucracy.” 
Unlike most other units at LEO, GPE was not held accountable for revenues or costs. Rather, they 
were created for the purpose of promoting an innovative organization by setting up processes, 
structures, and capabilities for BMI. This was confirmed by several informants. A senior strategy 
manager of GPE stated: 
“Basically, the survival of our unit rests on the launch of QualityCareTM.” 
A senior marketing director expressed his frustration with the lack of accountability: 
“I have a hard time understanding the business rationale behind GPE … They 
have tons of resources and FTEs [full time employees], but they have yet to 
prove their ability to make money.”    
Cross-functional and cross-boundary integration. GPE also served as a facilitator of BMI 
efforts. The unit represented a cross-functional and cross-boundary interface by bringing together 
various sources of internal and external knowledge. For example, the development of 
QualityCareTM included, among others, people from subsidiaries, compliance, legal, IT, and 
medical affairs, as well as consultants from digital agencies. As one manager of legal affairs 
explained, 
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“Building QualityCareTM is so different from launching a new drug. Therefore it 
was crucial to gather different types of expertise in order to arrive at a workable 
design for the program. The process has been very valuable in the sense that we 
have created new knowledge, particularly about services, online platforms, data 
protection, etc., which we can leverage for future patient-centric solutions.” 
This type of cross-functional coordination helped employees rethink the systemic nature of 
existing activities. First, although GPE members possessed a basic understanding of services, they 
needed to know whether QualityCareTM was feasible from a legal and compliance standpoint. 
Second, the early involvement of adjacent functions and subsidiaries revealed important gaps in 
knowledge and processes that needed to be addressed if the organization was to succeed with its 
transition toward services. 
Formalizing BMI. Besides establishing a dedicated unit for BMI activities, top management 
also changed the names of all the existing functions to stress LEO’s commitment to patient 
centricity. For example, market access was renamed “patient access” and the product teams were 
renamed “patient solution teams.” Many informants called the name changes “stupid,” “pointless,” 
and “confusing.” However, these types of changes may have served to increase formalization. 
Given that many of the projects that GPE was working on (such as QualityCareTM) were radically 
different from drug development, it was likely that they would be constrained by their lack of 
legitimacy with important external stakeholders (such as patients, payers, and physicians). 
Formalization can help increase legitimacy by signaling management experience and know-how. 
Lack organizational design and BMI fit. Finally, the existing organization also proved to be 
a considerable barrier to LEO’s BMI efforts. Although the names of existing functions were 
changed and GPE was established, the basic incentive systems and performance measures remained 
unchanged. This made it increasingly difficult for GPE to drive and facilitate BMI activities, as 
expressed by several informants. The senior director of GPE stated: 
“The implementation of QualityCareTM has taken much longer than I 
anticipated because people are more concerned with the conventional business, 
and especially getting Picato® back on track. This means that QualityCareTM 
and Columbus are not really prioritized in terms of resources and staffing.” 
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A patient engagement manager elaborated: 
“Last year we compiled a launch excellence list in collaboration with the 
affiliates about different things they needed to do in order to launch 
QualityCareTM, but many of them are still far behind the milestones on that 
list.” 
One general manager expressed this situation as follows: 
“I definitely believe in QualityCareTM, but the problem is that budgets are 
shrinking and our success as an affiliate is based on the number of drugs sold. 
So what happens is that GMs [general managers] tend to allocate a half a FTE 
[full time employee] or less to those activities, but ideally, one to two FTEs are 
probably needed to implement a program of that magnitude. In addition, you 
need to have people with the right skills, which are difficult to come by, 
especially when you are not allowed to increase headcounts.” 
Headquarters also relinquished considerable decision rights to the subsidiaries as part of the 
new regional based organizational structure. It was thus increasingly difficult for GPE to drive and 
facilitate BMI activities, since some regional vice presidents did not share the same enthusiasm for 
QualityCareTM, Columbus, patient centricity, and so on. Similarly, in 2012, GPE’s projects were not 
included in the company’s short- and mid-term business plans, which essentially meant that the 
other functions and subsidiaries were not going prioritize those projects. As summarized by one of 
the regional vice presidents, 
“Most of what gets done at LEO is based on the bi-annual and annual business 
plans … If your project is not part of that, then people will not prioritize it 
because there are already a million other targets.” 
It could be argued that top management perhaps underestimated the systemic nature of BMI. 
Although they introduced a dedicated unit to handle these activities, that unit was incapable of 
producing the necessary change in the existing organization. As noted by the executive vice 
president of global sales and marketing, 
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“Our current business model is not fit for the new environment. The problem is 
that there are many internal forces who want to keep [the incumbent model] 
alive, especially the ones who are still working in it. So they have no interest in 
trying new things. It’s like becoming fat and then changing your lifestyle and 
going on a diet.” 
Furthermore, even though GPE had considerable autonomy, they lacked hierarchical 
authority, and more importantly, organizational legitimacy. The head of GPE was a senior 
director—several levels below the higher management circles. As noted above, many organizational 
members had a hard time understanding the business rationale and organizational relevance behind 
GPE, and especially QualityCareTM. The combination of limited hierarchical authority and 
organizational legitimacy made it increasingly challenging for the newly established unit to drive 
and facilitate BMI. Although the intention was to shield GPE from the day-to-day bureaucracy of 
the existing organization, GPE ended up becoming alienated or disconnected from the existing 
functions, processes and systems.  
Relinking by regoverning and value network failures 
The idea behind QualityCareTM stemmed from one of the earlier BM experiments from 2010-2011. 
At that time, the original vendor for the online service, Atlantis Healthcare, was unable to deliver a 
user-oriented platform that could be customized to different patient needs. Thus, in conjunction 
with the introduction of GPE in 2012, it was decided to terminate the partnership with Atlantis 
Healthcare. It was important to find a new supplier, because not only did LEO lack the capabilities 
to undertake the development of an online health care service, but they were also hindered by legal 
regulations. As noted by a senior manager in legal affairs, 
“We own all the data generated by QualityCareTM, but it must be stored by a 
third-party vendor, and we only have access to the data in an aggregated format 
… even though it would be amazing to have access to individual-level patient 
data.” 
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GPE was responsible for finding the new vendor. The choice was made to go with Vertic (a 
global digital ad agency) for the following reasons: (1) they had experience with user-oriented 
platforms; (2) they were somewhat cheaper than Atlantis Healthcare; and (3) they gave the 
impression that anything was possible from a customization perspective. During the initial stages of 
the development of QualityCareTM, no issues arose. Instead, many—especially those in the 
subsidiaries—were excited about the possibilities for customizing country-specific modules for the 
program. Unfortunately, developing an online health care platform proved more difficult than 
hitherto anticipated by Vertic. In other words, it would take longer time with significantly higher 
cost and lower reliability than a more generic version. In the end, GPE settled for the generic 
version, much to the disappointment of many subsidiaries, who had been led to believe that they 
could receive program customized to their specific market needs. As expressed by one project 
manager, 
“There was poor alignment of expectations. In the beginning we were told it 
was possible to get a customized patient support program, but now it’s like ‘You 
can have every color, as long as it’s black.’” 
In late 2013, the first version of QualityCareTM was finally launched—but only after a five months’ 
delay. Almost immediately following the launch, the first subsidiaries started reporting a range of 
technical issues with the main site. There were numerous bugs or errors that caused the program to 
behave in unintended ways, as stated by a patient engagement manager from GPE: 
“To be frank, it was nearing a catastrophe. Let me say it like this: There were 
instances where the FDA or EMA could potentially have shut down the site.” 
Due to the problems, the remaining launches were postponed another two to three so that the most 
severe technical difficulties could be addressed. In this case, the importance of the value network 
cannot be understated, particularly during the development of more radical BMI, since the 
capabilities of business partners are a critical component of the successful implementation of such 
BM changes. Taking into account all the issues that LEO had faced with their previous vendor, it 
was probably a mistake to rush the decision to partner up with Vertic. The partnership ended up 
costing LEO a great deal of money for a subpar platform with numerous technical issues that 
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remained unresolved. Unfortunately, the problems with Vertic exacerbated the skepticism toward 
GPE and BMI. As one senior director of marketing stated, 
“It is not looking too good for Global Patient Engagement and QualityCareTM. 
Many people are gradually losing faith, and I also think top management is 
starting to be impatient.” 
2014-2015: A Failure or a Success Waiting to Happen?  
The previous period brought fundamental changes to LEO’s BM, including the launch of a new 
service, new partnerships, as well as project to test BM experimentation. However, due to problems 
with the new vendor and resistance to change, it proved more difficult than hoped to provide 
services to patients. On the other hand, LEO was able to convert the initial failures into important 
learnings that guided the subsequent set of changes. As summarized by the executive vice president 
of global sales and marketing, 
“It can take years transforming an organization, and we have only been 
experimenting with new business models and patient centricity for about two to 
three years. If I recall it right, it took Coloplast roughly a decade to implement 
the innovation culture that we see today. But we have learned a lot during the 
past years.” 
Based on the learnings gained, top management set out a new strategic direction for the 
company. The new strategy was known as “Helping Sarah – LEO toward 2020,” and it was called 
so to address the people behind the disease. While patient centricity was also part of “Going for 
Gold” and the “LEO powerhouse” strategies, it became the central pillar in the new strategy. As the 
CEO explained on the first ever conference for patient leaders in Vancouver, Canada in 2015, 
“Helping SARAH gives a name to the individual patients we serve, and guides 
our entire organization around the patient. Patients like SARAH need better 
care, as living with a serious skin disease has a profound impact on everyday 
life. At LEO Pharma, we will continue our efforts to meet the needs of the 
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individual patients with skin diseases—even when there is no immediate 
commercial gain.”35 
As a result of this new direction, a series of changes were carried out during the 2014-2015 period, 
including new strategic partnerships, the launch of two new devices, a change of leadership in the 
US organization and, perhaps most importantly, the establishment of the LEO Innovation Lab.  
The first co-creation outcomes and new strategic partnerships 
While most of GPE’s BMI efforts (such as QualityCareTM and Columbus) seemed to have failed, 
the Psoriasis Frontiers initiative, through which LEO co-created solutions with patients, proved to 
be extremely effective. LEO launched its first medical device in 2015, namely the Daivobet® gel 
Applicator. This applicator enabled people to apply Daivobet® gel on difficult-to-reach areas of the 
body. In addition, another new solution called Enstilar® Foam was approved by the FDA in 2015 
and was expected to be launched in the US in 2016. The solution was also co-created with patients, 
and is the first-ever topical spray treatment for psoriasis patients suffering from itching. Such 
patients may have difficulties falling asleep or may be woken up repeatedly as a consequence of 
itching, significantly influencing their perceived quality of life (Annual Report, 2015). Furthermore, 
Enstilar®’s foam formulation makes the treatment less greasy than other gel or moisturizer 
treatments. Most importantly, LEO managed to achieve a favorable reimbursement level for the 
applicator, which means that it is more likely to be purchased by patients. The two new solutions 
not only demonstrate some positive outcomes of LEO’s BMI efforts, but also show the company’s 
commitment toward its end customer. Aside from being more convenient and easier to use, the new 
solutions allow patients to choose from a broader array of products, based on their individual 
preferences. This breaks with the traditional pharmaceutical value proposition by going beyond the 
current “one drug fits all” approach. LEO’s patient-centric approach has also been recognized by 
patients and patient associations: 
                                                 
35 Retrieved August 2016 from http://www.leo-pharma.com/Home/LEO-Pharma/Media-centre/News/News-2015/First-
ever-global-conference-for-patient-leaders-in-dermatology.aspx  
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“It’s great that there’s a company that wants to hear directly from patients 
rather than doctors or researchers. What they’re doing empowers the patient.”36  
The reason that the Psoriasis Frontiers project enjoyed more success than the other GPE 
projects is likely because it was less radical and had a more solid business case. Although LEO had 
never been in the device business, they had the capabilities and organizational willingness to try. As 
stated by a senior director of new product development, 
“Devices are not that different from drugs. In many cases you need less clinical 
evidence because the environment is less regulated for the time being. We also 
have many people who have worked in medical device companies, and we have 
been looking into the field for a while.” 
Moreover, Psoriasis Frontiers was not solely driven by GPE, in contrast to QualityCareTM and 
Columbus; new product development was a co-owner of the project. In fact, GPE was only 
responsible for facilitating the co-creation workshops, while new product development incorporated 
all the feedback received from patients into the initial device development phases. As a result, it 
was much easier to implement the project because it was not beyond current capabilities, and there 
was more support from the wider organization. 
During this period, LEO also developed new partnerships to strengthen its portfolio of digital 
solutions (such as QualityCareTM). First of all, the contract with Vertic was terminated, as they had 
failed to deliver on their promises. Instead, LEO formed a new partnership with DigitasLBI, which 
had more experience with the underlying system software of QualityCareTM (known as “Sitecore”). 
Additionally, they had higher capacity and better digital infrastructure than Vertic to effectively run 
a global online heath care platform. As stated by the head of QualityCareTM, 
“Sadly, the relationship with Vertic has not been as fruitful as we anticipated. 
The QualityCareTM site is simply too unstable. Many of the bugs and errors 
seem to be due to poor coding, and a general lack of knowledge about the basic 
features of Sitecore. Therefore we have decided to go with DigitasLBI instead. 
                                                 
36 Retrieved August 2016 from https://www.psoriasis.org/advance/features/psoriasis-patients-help-with-product-
research 
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The first meetings with DigitasLBI have been promising. In fact, there are 
features within the Sitecore platform that we haven’t unlocked yet. 
This change seemed to be an important step for the success of QualityCareTM. Besides adding 
more stability to the platform, DigitasLBI could help LEO Pharma unlock new features. This was 
critical, because although QualityCareTM had been launched in a number of countries with decent 
enrollment numbers, engagement was relatively low. A new senior project manager expressed the 
following concerns: 
“The problem is that we get fairly many new visitors, but the conversion rate is 
terrible. This means that either we are attracting the wrong customers or the 
site does not offer the right solution to our customers. I think the main problem 
is that the flow of the site is too slow. Basically you have to click through too 
many pages to find the information or service that you need. So currently we are 
working with DigitasLBI to improve the flow and add more interesting content.” 
Top management also decided to invest in the privately owned SkinVision, a dermatology-
focused mobile app company located in the Netherlands. In 2014, GPE tested MyPso 
QualityCareTM, an app designed to track the various symptoms, triggers and trends of patients 
suffering from psoriasis. In addition, the app provides practical advice on, among other things, 
nutrition and stress, so that the patients can make small changes that can have a significant impact 
on their skin. The partnership with SkinVision is aimed at strengthening LEO’s position within the 
digital health care space, as argued by the senior director of GPE: 
“The potential of apps and digitalization in general is incredible. It provides 
new ways to communicate with our most important stakeholders … We can 
make digital solutions that make life easier and more enjoyable for patients, 
while gathering significant amounts of data which can be used for new 
innovative solutions or clinical trials. Currently, health care is on the brink of a 
digital revolution.” 
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While the potential of digital solutions such as QualityCareTM and the MyPso app seem 
endless, there is a notable downside. Patients are already online on peer-to-peer platforms such as 
Facebook and Instagram, where they also share disease-related content. There are also virtual 
communities like PatientsLikeMe, which is solely devoted to discussing disease-related topics. In 
contrast, QualityCareTM is not a peer-to-peer platform on which patients can communicate with 
each other directly. From a pharmaceutical company’s point of view, allowing peer-to-peer 
communication would simply be too dangerous and time consuming. As noted by a senior manager 
of pharmacovigilance, 
“There is high likelihood that patients will be taking about our products, and 
whenever someone experiences a problem with our products and mentions it … 
even if it’s just for fun, then we have to submit an adverse event report to the 
FDA … and investigate the issue further. If we had such a platform, then 
pharmacovigilance would have to monitor every single 24/7.” 
However, not allowing for peer-to-peer interaction perhaps makes QualityCareTM less 
desirable than other already-existing platforms. This might explain why QualityCareTM has such a 
low conversion rate. In other words, in exploring the digital space, LEO should be prepared to 
compete with the likes of Facebook, Google Health Care, Apple Health, and Philips Healthcare—
all from companies that have much more experience with digitalization, and that are less 
constrained from a legal and compliance perspective.            
BM spin-off and a new governance structure 
After three years of GPE efforts, it was time to evaluate the outcomes of LEO’s BMI efforts. First, 
as mentioned earlier, QualityCareTM was not performing as expected. Although it had been 
launched in several countries and DigitasLBI had managed to remove serious errors, it still suffered 
from a poor conversion rate. Second, Columbus had not amounted to much, aside from a few 
successful BM pilots such as a direct-to-customer model in the Netherlands, and Spain’s e-detailing 
model (i.e., using digital technology for physician marketing, promotional and communication 
activities). And even so, the scalability of those pilots was severely restricted due to market 
heterogeneity, as one senior director of marketing explained: 
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“Columbus would probably be quite successful if it was possible to launch the 
pilots in several markets. Unfortunately, there are so many differences between 
countries, regions, and even locally … that it isn’t feasible. 
Third, the Psoriasis Frontiers project had turned out to be successful in the sense that it contributed 
to the development of LEO’s first medical devices.  
From a revenue-growth strategy perspective, LEO’s BMI efforts were not successful. With 
regards to implementation, GPE did not manage to get the necessary organizational commitment to 
drive and facilitate BMI. However, this was partly top management’s fault in the sense they 
neglected the systemic nature of BMI. In particular, by not making BMI-specific goals, incentive 
systems and performance measures, the existing organization seldom recognized the importance of 
GPE’s BMI efforts. Instead, top management hoped that GPE could serve as an important change 
agent. Although LEO did change significantly in terms of the development of new capabilities and 
embracing a patient-centric mindset, most of the business were still operating within the confines of 
the traditional BM. As summarized by a director of finance, 
“LEO Pharma has experienced a lot of change in recent years, but I reckon that 
90% of the resources are still allocated toward traditional drug development.” 
For these reasons, top management decided to spin off the more radical BM activities by 
establishing the so-called “LEO Innovation Lab,” a separate business unit operating independently 
outside the traditional BM. The three years of GPE efforts showed that alternative means are 
required to drive and facilitate more radical BMI activities. The new Innovation Lab consisted of a 
CEO and a CFO. However, it was backed by considerable resources that could be used not only to 
expand the team, but also for potential investments into promising startups. More specifically, the 
LEO Innovation Lab has received 60 million euros in funding the LEO foundation for the next three 
years (2017-2020). The unit “focuses on all aspects of everyday life that can affect people living 
with psoriasis—and develops and integrates solutions and services to meet their needs.”37 It is 
small, and based on an agile organization and high performance team structure, where innovation 
can flourish and solutions can be brought to patients and tested more quickly (Annual Report, 
                                                 
37 Retrieved September 2016 from http://www.leo-pharma.com/Home/LEO-Pharma/LEO-Innovation-Lab.aspx 
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2015). In contrast, most of GPE’s projects were restricted in many ways by the existing 
organizational structure of LEO. While it was never entirely clear what the success criteria of GPE 
were, the LEO Innovation Lab was created for the purpose of helping people achieve healthy skin, 
with no immediate profit requirements. This indicated a strong commitment toward patients in an 
industry that has been considered notorious for profit seeking.  
However, the introduction of new independent unit also led to increased uncertainty at LEO, 
and particularly within GPE. Basically, the LEO Innovation Lab would be doing similar activities 
(i.e., developing and testing digital solutions and services). As noted by a senior strategy manager, 
“It seems strange that top management didn’t decide to either consolidate the 
units into one or just simply remove GPE. Currently, people are anxious about 
what is going to happen and whether they will keep their jobs.” 
The decision not to remove or replace existing activities, units, processes, etc., seems to be a 
general trend at LEO. Top management have often decided to overlay new changes on top of the 
old ones. This has given rise to added uncertainty and organizational complexity, making 
coordination of BMI efforts increasingly difficult. One senior director of marketing expressed the 
following: 
“This is typical LEO. We have too many strategic priorities, and new things are 
often introduced without considering the impact on the existing ones.”   
The new strategy was also accompanied by a new organizational structure. More specifically, 
the company’s previous six regions were consolidated into three—namely, Region EUROPE+, 
Region INTERNATIONAL and Region US. In addition, the regional heads became part of the top 
management team. The goal was to ensure that decisions would be made more closely to patients 
and markets.  
Although LEO has made several changes to its BM and underlying organizational design over 
the past five years, the progress toward a customer-oriented BM has been remarkably slow. The aim 
of balancing old and new BM activities has largely failed due to top management’s neglect of the 
systemic nature of BMI. On the other hand, the last five years have contributed significantly to 
LEO Pharma: When BMI is Stuck in The Middle 
185 
 
organizational learning, which is essential to BMI. Perhaps based on these learnings, LEO may be 
able to reap the benefits of BMI in the future.    
Summary of findings 
LEO’s BMI process can be defined by six consecutive stages (see Figure 8.1). During the first two 
stages, no fundamental or radical attempts were made to change LEO’s science-based BM. Rather, 
efforts were directed toward incrementally improving the BM through a greater focus on the 
company’s most promising therapy areas (dermatology and thrombosis) and pharmaceutical 
formulations. In the third stage, the new CEO aimed to expand LEO’s two-decade-strong foothold 
in dermatology by acquiring Peplin, Inc. In addition to that, the rights to the company’s psoriasis 
portfolio and dermatological pipeline in the US were repurchased to strengthen the 
internationalization process. As such, the first half of LEO’s BMI process can be considered a 
period in which the incumbent BM was refined and improved so as to provide a solid foundation 
upon which more radical BM changes could be introduced. The fourth stage brought the first wave 
of radical changes to LEO’s incumbent model. In particular, the element of patient centricity was 
introduced for the first time in the form of a series of BM experiments. However, these attempts 
never amounted to much, due to the lack of corresponding organizational design changes. The fifth 
stage built upon the previous one—most notably by adding a service dimension (e.g. QualityCareTM 
and Columbus) to the company’s science- and product-based BM. To realize this change, LEO 
formed new boundary-spanning relationships, including relationships based on co-creation (e.g. 
Psoriasis Frontiers) with the end customers. The final stage represented both the end of and a new 
beginning for LEO’s BMI process. Top management decided to continue all of the incremental 
improvements, while spinning off the more radical BM opportunities into a separate entity, the LEO 
Innovation Lab. 
This case of LEO is interesting because it not only illustrates the challenges involved in BMI, 
but it also demonstrates the implications of not getting the organizational design right. Although top 
management introduced a new, dedicated organizational unit, that unit’s influence never penetrated 
very deeply into the wider organization. The fundamental problem was that although GPE was set 
up in a modular way (i.e., operating beyond the existing management and control systems), it still 
relied heavily on the existing organizational capacity to acquire enough resources and capabilities to 
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get the job done. However, the existing organizational units (e.g. global marketing and sales, and 
the subsidiaries) were under considerable pressure from top management to improve sales at the 
same time as their budgets were declining and key products were coming off patents. This, 
combined with the lack of organizational design changes, particularly with regards to incentive and 
performance measurement systems, meant that the existing organization largely ignored or even 
decried GPE’s BMI efforts. In other words, it seemed as if LEO’s management team did not fully 
recognize the role of organizational design in realizing the holistic potential of BMI. Because of 
these challenges, top management learned that BMI requires substantial organizational support in 
the form of top management commitment, motivation, targets, resources, personnel, clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities, and accountability. As a result, LEO established a new configuration in 
the form of a completely independent entity (LEO Innovation Lab), which would be able to grow 
and evolve in directions that were never possible within the LEO organization.    
  
 
9  
A Cross-case Comparison: Key Findings 
This thesis has explored the context of BMI and how such innovation has unfolded within three 
selected players in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly focusing on the role of organizational 
design during BMI. The analysis of the individual cases has not only revealed different 
manifestations of BMI and organizational design, but has also illuminated important similarities 
across the cases. In this chapter, I will discuss the findings on the basis of a cross-case comparison.       
Toward a New BMI Process Framework 
Based on the analysis that will be presented in the following subsections, I have developed a 
process framework that not only shows the distinct stages of BMI, but also take the different 
organizational designs and BM dimensions into consideration. Figure 9.1 illustrates the new BMI 
process framework, which is based on the emerging second-order constructs and overarching 
dimensions from Figure 4.2 (see Chapter 4). More specifically, it indicates the influence of three 
external driving forces on the innovation of established pharmaceutical BMs: structural change, 
technological change, and regulatory change. As a consequence of these forces, the focal firm’s BM 
either experiences a fit or a misfit with the changing environment. Depending on the perceived level 
of fit or misfit (as perceived by top management), the company may be motivated take steps to 
change specific BM element(s) in order to improve the environmental fit. Such steps might involve 
simultaneous or overlapping changes to the firm’s organizational structure, task environment, 
communication channels, roles and responsibilities, etc.—all of which are reflected in the firm’s 
organizational design. This in turn creates a new layer of complexity in terms of the fit (or misfit) 
between the intended BM changes and organizational design changes. Ultimately, this process 
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either leads to realized BMI that fits the contextuality of the firm, or a misfit that motivates another 
iteration process. The framework thus reveals three critical stages of BMI: (1) motivation for the 
BMI; (2) implementation; and (3) outcomes. Moreover, even though the three companies went 
through the same three stages, the decisions they made, as well as the issues they faced within each 
stage differed considerably. Each stage, as well as the relationships between stages, will be 
discussed below. 
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Figure 9.1 The different stages of the BMI process 
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Stage 1: Motivation for BMI 
Drivers of BMI in the pharmaceutical industry 
As described above, the core drivers of BMI in the pharmaceutical industry include structural, 
technological and regulatory change (for a more detailed discussion on drivers see Chapter 5). In 
general, these drivers were present in all the cases, although at varying degrees and at different 
points in time. In the early 2000s, all the companies started removing non-core activities from their 
BMs, while redirecting efforts and resources toward core activities. For example, Novo Nordisk 
divested its enzymes business, while UCB divested its chemical and film divisions. Aside from the 
strategic considerations, this was a response to declining R&D output. Most of the “low hanging 
fruits” had already been harvested, and as a result, the companies had to devote more resources to 
come up with new drug innovations. In addition, R&D costs have risen sharply since the early 
2000s, while the number of drugs receiving marketing authorization and regulatory approval has 
been steadily decreasing (cf. Holland and Bátiz-Lazo, 2004). 
Over time, a number of health care payers have imposed stricter pricing controls on new 
drugs. In other words, it is no longer possible to receive proper reimbursement and pricing for 
minor drug innovations. This was evident in all of the three cases. UCB and Novo Nordisk received 
negative reimbursement decisions on key products, and LEO might be unable to obtain 
reimbursement for dermatological therapies in the future. As a consequence, all three companies 
have made more or less drastic changes to their BMs to mitigate the growing pricing pressure from 
health care payers. Relatedly, payers and regulatory authorities are increasingly requesting data on 
quality of life and comparative effectiveness studies, in addition to the requirement of monitoring 
and collecting clinical trial data—thereby adding significant challenges to the companies’ market 
access process.     
The diffusion of new technologies, especially within ICT and Internet, has not only made it 
possible to gather data and develop new solutions, but has also led to more empowered and 
demanding end customers (i.e., patients). During the late 2000s, LEO and UCB invested heavily in 
such technologies, while Novo Nordisk was more hesitant. Instead, Novo Nordisk committed 
considerable resources toward HCP education and disease awareness, which helped satisfy the more 
demanding stakeholders. 
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Overall, the conglomeration of such drivers has motivated Novo Nordisk, UCB and LEO to 
reevaluate and, as necessary, modify or completely change their BMs to be consistent with the 
changing market conditions.   
The original BM 
Within companies, top management must assess the viability of the incumbent BM vis-à-vis the 
changing market conditions. I will briefly discuss each company’s incumbent model by highlighting 
common features and differences, and how each was affected by industry dynamics. Aside from 
being located in different therapy areas, evidence from the cases shows that Novo Nordisk, UCB 
and LEO all converged on the same overarching BM elements in the early 2000s: (1) the value 
proposition focused on the development of new drug innovations (What); (2) which were then 
marketed to the prescribing physician (Who); (3) value appropriation was secured by means of 
favorable pricing and reimbursement conditions, and patent protection (How much); and (4) all this 
was realized through vertically integrated structures and the use of a few strategic R&D 
partnerships, while divesting non-core assets (How). This has been referred to as the “blockbuster 
model,” with its emphasis on a high-volume, “one drug fits all” approach, facilitated by mainly 
internal and very substantial R&D input, as well as by economies of scale in R&D, production, 
marketing and sales (Gilbert et al., 2003; Mattke et al., 2012). 
Although Novo Nordisk, UCB and LEO had all adopted the blockbuster model (to a greater 
or lesser extent), the outcomes differed significantly between the three companies. While it seemed 
that Novo Nordisk had a steady flow of new and superior drugs and devices within diabetes care, 
UCB, and especially LEO’s R&D pipeline, seemed stagnant or almost non-existent in some areas. 
In other words, Novo Nordisk was simply better at leveraging the blockbuster model than the 
others. This may be partly attributable to the company’s long standing research interest in diabetes, 
and partly to a much narrower spectrum of therapies. For example, while LEO and UCB focused on 
multiple diseases, Novo Nordisk’s main focus was on diabetes care in the early 2000s. This allowed 
Novo Nordisk to funnel more resources and expertise into a single therapy area, which led to 
several successful product launches. Thus, in spite of the changing external conditions, Novo 
Nordisk’s incumbent BM still remained viable in the early 2000s. In contrast, UCB’s and LEO’s 
blockbuster models were under more pressure due to their declining or absent R&D output. 
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Moreover, Novo Nordisk specialized in large molecule drugs (biologics), while LEO and UCB 
focused on small molecule drugs (i.e., chemically manufactured active-substance molecules). Given 
that biologics are produced in “living organisms, including plants, animals, and microorganisms 
such as yeast and bacteria” (Revers and Furczon, 2010: 184), they are more difficult to copy than 
conventional small molecule drugs. Thus, even when they go off patent, it may take longer for 
competitors to introduce biosimilar products.            
Stage 2: Implementation 
BM changes 
A BM change refers to any change to the focal firm’s BM. In the following, I discuss in detail the 
dimensions of each company’s BM changes by specifying the different and similar characteristics 
among them.   
Reactivating. It was evident that all three companies were primarily preoccupied with 
changes related to the reactivation of the value proposition. For example, Novo Nordisk removed its 
enzyme and small molecule businesses, and added increased service content to its value offering by, 
among other things, expanding its disease awareness activities through the DAWN program. 
Similarly, but to a larger extent, UCB removed its film and chemical division and transformed itself 
into a biopharmaceutical company (i.e., focusing on both small and large molecule drugs). Then, 
top management added an impressive service dimension through patient support programs such as 
“Canine Assistance,” “Crohn’s and MeTM,” and “Parkinson’s Well-Being MapTM.” Next, UCB 
made the decision to withdraw from the primary care market in the US. In similar fashion, LEO 
divested non value-adding activities (such as HL 10 and the animal health unit), while expanding its 
dermatology offering by acquiring Peplin, Inc. Next, top management put considerable efforts into 
servitization by launching new devices (e.g., Daivobet® gel Applicator and Enstilar®) and patient 
support activities (e.g. QualityCareTM and Psoriasis Frontiers).  
Interestingly, while Novo Nordisk and UCB removed or discontinued very strategic BM 
activities (such as withdrawing from small molecules and primary care), LEO kept its incumbent 
model intact while adding several other features. This meant that resources and managerial attention 
were distributed over a wider range of activities, which in the end hindered LEO’s BMI efforts. 
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Given the distribution of activities at LEO, the allocation of resources and responsibilities; the 
identification of activities; and the measurement and evaluation, and more importantly, the 
coordination, of activities, became a non-trivial task. As a consequence, top management decided to 
spin off the more radical BM activities. Conversely, UCB and Novo Nordisk were able to 
concentrate their resources, expertise and managerial attention on more clearly distinguished 
strategic priorities, which allowed them to progress beyond the initial experimentation stages of 
BMI.  
Relinking. Likewise, relinking was used to a great extent in all three cases. It was usually 
carried out by either changing the governance of transactions between the market, hierarchy, and 
hybrid forms (i.e., regoverning), or by changing the order in which organizational units perform 
certain activities, as well as shifting the interdependence among organizational units and BM 
activities (i.e., resequencing) (Santos et al., 2015). The most extreme case of relinking was that of 
UCB, which not only initiated a range of strategic partnerships with non-traditional stakeholders 
(e.g., OXO and PatientsLikeMe), but also fundamentally altered the sequence and interdependence 
of BM activities occurring due to their change efforts. Essentially, the company underwent four 
massive restructurings within ten years (e.g., the acquisitions of Celltech and Schwarz Pharma, the 
SHAPE project, etc.), with the purpose of arranging BM activities and organizational tasks to fit the 
customer-oriented BM. LEO also relied heavily on relinking BM activities, for example, by 
introducing new organizational units responsible for BMI (e.g., GPE and LEO Innovation Lab) or 
by changing the allocation of resources and responsibilities (e.g., cMWBs and a new governance 
structure). However, LEO’s relinking efforts were dwarfed in comparison to UCB’s massive 
organizational changes. Meanwhile, Novo Nordisk refrained from massive restructuring, nor did 
they engage in notable strategic partnerships. Instead, they mainly refined and extended their 
incumbent BM activities by, for example, changing roles and responsibilities within the existing 
organizational hierarchy (e.g., Global Marketing and Medical Affairs became part of top 
management). In addition, top management introduced a new management and performance system 
(“The Triple Bottom Line”), which aided in integrating features of social and environmental 
responsibility into the existing BM activities. 
Repartitioning. In contrast to reactivating and relinking, repartitioning was used to a lesser 
degree within the three companies. This type of change involves outsourcing or insourcing specific 
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BM activities. LEO and UCB attempted to outsource some of their innovation tasks by opening up 
to external knowledge. For example, the Psoriasis Frontiers project allowed end users to contribute 
to the design of LEO’s new devices, while UCB outsourced parts of its market research activities to 
IBM and PatientsLikeMe—particularly those related to data mining and customer insights. In 
contrast, Novo Nordisk did not utilize any repartitioning as part of their BM change efforts. The 
reason for this was twofold. Firstly, Novo Nordisk was focused on improving and sustaining the 
incumbent BM rather than radically changing it. Therefore, it could be argued that Novo Nordisk 
was not reliant on external expertise to develop new and innovative solutions, as was the case with 
UCB and LEO. Secondly, the performance of Novo Nordisk’s supply and value chain management 
served as benchmarks for the industry. In other words, there was little incentive to outsource 
important activities to subpar suppliers or contract manufacturers. This is an interesting finding 
because Novo Nordisk’s objective was to improve and preserve the incumbent BM, and one of the 
ways in which large and successful companies optimize their BMs is through short-term cost 
cutting by means of outsourcing. 
Relocating. BM changes related to off-shoring and/or on-shoring were seldom or not at all 
used in the cases. Novo Nordisk did establish an R&D center in Beijing in 2001 to bridge the 
scientific communities in Europe and China. However, LEO and UCB did not rely on relocating 
BM-specific activities. Usually, the primary motivation for offshoring to obtain cost savings. UCB 
and LEO were instead focused on bringing about more radical solutions and building up internal 
BMI capabilities. Recently, firms have also started to offshore more advanced tasks or innovative 
activities (Farrell, 2005) in order to, for example, tap into global talent pools. This is very much 
what Novo Nordisk was doing. On the other hand, offshoring such activities can be a daunting task 
(Larsen, Manning, and Pedersen, 2013). According to Jensen and Pedersen (2010: 6) “offshoring 
advanced tasks involves the creation, distribution, and sharing of knowledge in a dynamic process 
with many feedback loops. This process must be managed and integrated between the locations to 
be effective. This requires a deep understanding of the interdependencies between the different 
tasks.” This type of offshoring makes sense for Novo Nordisk because they have a deep 
understanding of their R&D activities, while UCB and especially LEO have yet to develop such an 
understanding of their more radical BM elements. It is also arguable whether it makes sense for 
LEO and UCB to offshore activities to differentiate their offering in order to obtain competitive 
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advantage. At worst, such efforts can degenerate into a “learning race,” where foreign partners try 
maximize the knowledge they gain while minimizing knowledge sharing (Khanna, Gulati and 
Nohria, 1998). 
Which part of the BM is being innovated? The evidence from the cases indicates that 
changes to the value proposition (reactivating) and the architecture of the BM (relinking) are the 
most commonly used types of changes, while repartitioning and relocating are used to a lesser 
extent. I suggest that reason for this may be that changing the value proposition and architecture of 
the BM has greater implications for value creation and appropriation vis-à-vis offshoring/on-
shoring or outsourcing/insourcing select activities. First of all, the value proposition refers to the 
bundle of products and services that a firm offers to create value for one or several customer 
segment(s). For example, adding a new service may attract new customers and make existing 
customers buy more. Thus, value creation is improved because not only is the firm creating 
additional value for its existing customer segment(s), but it is also bringing value to new customer 
segments. Similarly, value appropriation is improved as the new service allows for new sources of 
revenue. More specifically, services can complement the sale of products by, for example, helping 
end users achieve the desired functionality. LEO’s and UCB’s patient support programs were 
designed to empower people to take control over their disease, as well as improve their adherence to 
drug treatments. Moreover, removing non-value-adding activities frees up resources for more 
productive purposes. As such, the value proposition may be regarded as a major BMI driver in its 
own right. Further, the introduction of new products or services may also trigger additional changes 
in neighboring BM elements. At UCB, for example, the provision of services was supported by 
subsequent changes to the value network. 
With regard to second locus of BM change, Teece (2010) argues that the “architecture” of the 
firm’s value creation and appropriation mechanisms is the essence of a BM. Foss and Saebi 
(2015:3) elaborate on this point further, noting that the “architecture is the organizational structure 
and control that supports the activities that allow the company to make its value proposition to the 
marketplace and embed the human and social capital that, with other resources, add value to those 
activities.” Not only does the BM architecture make the value proposition available to customers 
(e.g., by linking factors of production with intermediate inputs and outputs to final outcomes), but it 
may also contribute significantly to value creation and appropriation by unlocking important 
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complementarities between different BM elements and the organization of the firm. For example, 
UCB implemented a new communication platform alongside a new performance management 
system, which, among other things, led to improved coordination, knowledge sharing and 
incentives for people to work toward patient centricity. In contrast, despite LEO’s emphasis on 
patient centricity, top management did not change the reward and performance measure systems to 
reflect the increased service content and importance of the end customer, and thus failed to facilitate 
sustained value creation. Besides realizing complementarities, relinking allows firms to open up 
their organizational boundaries and tap into important sources of knowledge. LEO, for example, 
would have been unable (both legally and technically) to develop and launch its global patient 
support program without third-party participation. 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that changes related to reactivating and relinking 
contribute more to value creation and appropriation than repartitioning and relocating. These parts 
of the BM are harder to imitate because, as Simon (1962: 468) reminds us, they “interact in a non-
simple way.” In particular, it is more difficult to replicate the value proposition when its 
development relies on a complex set of interrelated (complementary) processes, structures and 
resources. By contrast, it is very straightforward to offshore or outsource similar activities, which 
would arguably lead to less differentiation in relation to the value proposition.         
Type, extent and degree of BM changes. The evidence analyzed across the cases suggests 
that all three companies were leaning toward an increasingly service- or customer-oriented BM 
(commonly referred to as patient centricity). More specifically, the companies augmented their 
incumbent models by adding a range of services (such as patient support programs and training of 
HCPs)—with the aim of improving differentiation and building stronger customer relationships. 
Aside from the value proposition, this trend was also evident in other parts of the BM. LEO and 
particularly UCB designed many parts of the organization around the end customer and 
servitization. For example, LEO’s Innovation Lab was introduced for the sole purpose of 
developing and testing digital solutions and services. In other words, the types of BM changes 
reflected the increasing importance of servitization. 
An interesting finding was that BM change appeared to be systemic in all the cases examined. 
In other words, a change in one part of the BM usually needed to be accompanied by appropriate 
changes elsewhere. Novo Nordisk’s dedication toward patients, HCPs and sustainability (e.g., 
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through offering a wide product portfolio and the DAWN program) was accompanied by a new 
organizational unit (Global Stakeholder Engagement), and a new management and performance 
model (Triple Bottom Line). LEO’s patient support program (QualityCareTM) would never have 
been completed without changes to the value network (e.g., partnering up with digital agencies) and 
BM architecture (e.g., the establishment of GPE). Similarly, UCB’s transformation into a 
biopharmaceutical company and later development into a solution provider could not have been 
achieved without changes to the value proposition (e.g., divesture of the film and chemical 
division), BM architecture (e.g., centers of excellence and multidisciplinary teams) and value 
network (e.g., partnering up with OXO and PatientsLikeMe). Although some of the BMI literature 
(e.g., Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Schneider and Spieth, 2014) argues that an individual change to a 
particular BM element can constitute BMI, in practice, such a change will set in motion a sequence 
of changes to adjacent BM elements. However, in the cases, the way in which the sequence of 
changes was arranged differed markedly. In some instances it was architectural, including 
establishing design rules so that certain sub-elements would form a coherent whole, while in others 
it was more modular, where elements were partitioned rather than changed according to a 
monolithic structure. For instance, the extent of LEO’s BM changes resembled that of a modular 
form. Although LEO’s BMI unit (GPE) resided in the global sales and marketing department, it had 
its own distinct goals, structures, processes and capabilities. In other words, the unit was not 
designed to fit into the existing organization or vice versa. Later, the LEO Innovation Lab was 
implemented in a similar manner, so as not to interfere with the value creating and appropriating 
mechanisms of the incumbent BM. Novo Nordisk and especially UCB opted for more architectural 
features, such as integrating new organizational units into existing management and organizational 
practices, and vice versa, by implementing new management and performance measures that 
complemented the new strategic orientation of the companies.  
The reason for these differences may be due in part to the varying degrees of innovation 
desired. Novo Nordisk focused on incremental improvements and modifications to their incumbent 
BM. Thus, most of the changes were implemented with the intent of increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness across the company’s entire range of operations. Accordingly, it made sense to 
incorporate elements with architectural features that would contribute to the entire system design. 
Similarly, but within a different context, UCB also went for changes with architectural features. 
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Given that UCB was attempting to fundamentally transform its incumbent BM, top management 
was tasked with changing the overall architecture of the company by re-wiring several elements of 
the BM. Meanwhile, the top management team at LEO favored an “in-between” configuration, 
where incumbent elements (such as the overall architecture) were largely preserved, while newer 
and more radical elements were added. Due to the radical nature of these elements, and the lack of 
changes to the existing architecture, top management resorted to more modular and autonomous 
changes confined to specific areas within the organization. Looking at the level of novelty, it is fair 
to say that none of the companies produced BMI that was new to the world. In fact, companies such 
as Rolls-Royce, Xerox, Coca-Cola, IBM, and the banking industry in general were already focusing 
on servitization in the ‘90s. That said, introducing patient support services (such as QualityCareTM 
and Parkinson’s Well-Being MapTM) and restructuring the entire organization around the patient (as 
was done at UCB) was indeed new to the pharmaceutical industry. Although Novo Nordisk was one 
of the first companies to adopt patient centricity, they are still to a large extent leveraging the 
advantages of the traditional “blockbuster” model, but to a degree far greater than many other 
pharmaceutical companies.  
Organizational design changes 
The purpose of redesign efforts is to improve organizational efficiency and effectiveness, problem 
solving, as well as the ability to cope with organizational and environmental change. In the 
following I discuss the changes made to each company’s organizational design with regard to 
structure, coordination needs, information processing requirements, performance measures and 
complementarities.  
Organizational structure. While the role of organizational structure and hierarchy in shaping 
BMI efforts has received surprisingly little attention in the extant BMI literature, the cases have 
demonstrated that they are indeed intimately linked. By far the most extreme example is that of 
UCB. Top management decided to dissolve the company’s functional and product division structure 
because, although it was ideally configured to deal with the large-scale production of stable 
products, deficiencies emerged in environments demanding innovation (particularly integrated 
solutions) and change. As argued by Zenger (2002), the low-powered incentives, rules, guidelines, 
and proscribed behaviors offered by traditional hierarchies tend to discourage innovation and 
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flexibility. Instead, top management introduced the “patient solution teams”—called so in order to 
stress the company’s aim of providing integrated solutions that go beyond the drug. The team-based 
structure not only facilitated speedy integration between various bodies of knowledge so that more 
complex customer needs could potentially be met, but it also infused market-like controls. In 
particular, each team was granted decision rights to self-organize, including its own processes 
through which to fulfill its new patient-centered mission. In other words, the teams were 
responsible for their complete output, processes and activities (Peters, 1992; Hammer and Champy, 
1993; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995). This resembled the high-powered, flexible and 
entrepreneurial spirit found in start-up firms. Without this team-based structure, UCB would have 
been unable to transform from a product provider into a full-blown solution provider.  
The redesign efforts at Novo Nordisk differed in several respects from those at UCB. In 
contrast to UCB and LEO, Novo Nordisk focused on exploiting its existing capabilities and 
dominant market position in drug development and sales, as opposed to creating new services for 
the end customers. In that sense, the value proposition has remained relatively unchanged over the 
past decade, and for that reason, the traditional functional configuration sufficed. Strictly speaking, 
when a new drug candidate has been identified, it goes through the same sequence of stages and is 
evaluated using existing criteria, maximizing the repetition of tasks. This structure enables the 
development of functional expertise in performing tasks and allows for the development of explicit 
rules and procedures to guide behavior (Scott, 1981). As a result, Novo Nordisk is able to mass 
produce a stable set of high quality products. This is not to say that Novo Nordisk does not work 
cross-functionally, but, unlike UCB, they have not structured their entire organization for that 
specific purpose. 
While UCB and Novo Nordisk each emerged at the extreme ends of the continuum, LEO’s 
redesign choices resulted in a hybrid configuration with a mix of both market-like and hierarchical 
features. Much like UCB, LEO made efforts to become a solution provider, with products and 
services developed to meet more complex customer needs. Initially, GPE was introduced for that 
specific development purpose, and featured a highly autonomous and informal structure. However, 
similarly to Novo Nordisk, top management wanted to keep the functional hierarchy relatively 
intact to maintain stable production and delivery of products. As a consequence, GPE and the 
previously existing functions were never properly integrated, even though GPE relied heavily on 
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the other functions and subsidiaries. Thus, unlike UCB’s “solution teams,” GPE never had complete 
control over the process nor output. As noted by Zenger (2002: 90), “significant changes to a core 
element of hierarchy unleash complementary pressures to either alter other elements or to abandon 
the original change.” As a result of the suboptimal hybrid structure, top management decided to 
spin off of those activities that could not be effectively dealt with within the existing functional 
configuration. However, of the three cases examined in this thesis, LEO was the only one to attempt 
to create a dedicated department and unit with an explicit focus on BMI.  
The implication of these findings is that organizational structure may exert powerful 
influences on the implementation of BM changes, and on the extent to which the structure itself is 
established, redesigned, or replaced as BM changes unfold. Thus, depending on the type, scope and 
degree of BMI, the structural modes can vary in their applicability. For example, a service-based 
BM consisting of radical and architectural features calls for a different structure than a product-
based BM consisting of incremental and architectural features.    
Coordination needs in a changing task environment. Turbulent environments usually force 
companies to make substantial changes to their internal task structure (Tushman, 1979) in order to 
enhance the ability to create and capture value in the marketplace. This in turn leads to new 
coordination challenges and capability needs. Despite significant changes occurring in the 
pharmaceutical industry, Novo Nordisk only made minor adjustments to its internal task structure. 
In contrast to many other firms, Novo Nordisk’s traditional BM still seemed to work well enough. 
Aside from the divestment of its enzyme business, the organization did not face coordination 
problems to the degree encountered by LEO and UCB. Unlike UCB’s and LEO’s novel BM 
activities, Novo Nordisk’s core activities constituted routine tasks that were easily coordinated by 
means of supervisory control, reliance on formalization, and centralized communication. However, 
the ease of coordination was partly achieved by the implementation of The Triple Bottom Line. In 
general, it can be argued that, rather than replacing or adding new tasks, Novo Nordisk shifted the 
focus within its existing task structure. For example, marketing-related tasks (particularly market 
access) became more important than others. Therefore, in addition to the new management and 
performance systems, rearrangements in the top management hierarchy were made to reflect the 
growing importance of marketing.  
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Meanwhile, LEO made substantial changes to its internal task structure. Specifically, a new 
disease area was included (actinic keratosis, Picato®), while expanding the current value 
proposition to include services (QualityCareTM and Columbus) and devices (Daivobet® gel 
Applicator and Enstilar® Foam). This led to a number of non-routine tasks involving both a high 
level of task variety and a low level of task analyzability. While high variety implies that 
organizational members cannot usually predict problems or activities in advance, the lack of 
analyzability implies that organizational members do not know exactly how to respond (Daft and 
Macintosh, 1981). For example, in the development of QualityCareTM, LEO did not expect to face 
that many technical and partner-related issues. When such a situation is coupled with the 
complexity associated with such a service, and a general lack of experience, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to respond in a timely and appropriate manner. Moreover, top management failed to take 
into account the interdependencies between the new non-routine tasks and the existing routine 
tasks, resulting in further internal coordination issues. However, such interdependencies may not 
seem readily apparent when the task characteristics are difficult to analyze ex ante and vary 
considerably. Despite these issues, LEO managed to build new capabilities by combining various 
organizational design mechanisms. The modular implementation of GPE (and, later the LEO 
Innovation Lab) provided the necessary room and resources for capabilities to grow. In addition, the 
formalization of patient centricity or BMI helped attract people with experience and skills in 
services.  
In a similar fashion, UCB extended its current value proposition beyond products to include 
services. But, in contrast to LEO, UCB managed to mitigate many of the coordination difficulties 
associated with a changing task environment. More specifically, top management was able to 
recognize the deeply embedded interdependencies between the old and new tasks. This allowed 
them to identify potential complementarities and subsequently redesign the organization to create 
the conditions under which such complementarities could arise. For example, there was an explicit 
logic of complementarity in the development of the patient solution team structure. The teams 
consisted of people from the most important functions, such as market access, new product 
development, compliance, pricing, etc. This allowed UCB to not only speed up the time to market 
but also to address emerging needs from the most important stakeholders (patients, payers and 
physicians). Part of the reason why UCB managed to limit coordination costs and get the 
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complementarities right was that they viewed the change process from a total organizational 
perspective rather than a subunit perspective, as was the case with LEO. In other words, while LEO 
wanted to keep its existing functional structure intact, everything was up for grabs at UCB.  
Another reason relates to the numerous restructuring efforts at UCB, which made the organization 
more accustomed to change, while LEO was hesitant and risk averse. Overall, even though UCB’s 
task structure was fundamentally changed several times, they always seemed to limit coordination 
issues and avoid irreversible commitments by “getting the complementarities right.” 
Despite these differences, the cases share important characteristics in that they all seemed to 
undertake coordination efforts that moved decision-making closer to the customer. This was not 
only illustrated by the increased number of services, but also by the strengthened focus on the 
marketing organization. Put differently, all three companies attempted to increase the value added 
by reversing (i.e., changing the internal task structure of) the traditional value chain from upstream 
to downstream activities.           
Information processing requirements. As noted above, BMI often involves undertaking new 
tasks and/or enhancing the functionality of current ones. This results in new coordination needs, 
which in turn lead to different information processing requirements. To address the growing 
processing requirements, UCB adopted a number of integrating mechanisms that increased its 
information processing capabilities. With the addition of new products and (particularly) services, 
an increasing number of decisions were referred upward. However, one notable limitation of 
hierarchy is its finite and relatively restricted capacity for processing information (Daft, 2006). As a 
result, the top management team of UCB experienced information overload. To deal with this 
problem, top management delegated extensive decision rights to the “patient solution teams.” Not 
only did this preserve top managers’ scarce mental resources, but it also led to more effective 
resource utilization, because decision rights were granted to those who held the relevant local 
knowledge to guide the decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  
In conjunction with the success of the “patient solution teams,” the projects grew in scale and 
scope to the extent that the again required intervention from top management. To cope with the 
increasing complexity, it was found necessary to increase the size of the top management team. 
Thus, the “patient solution teams” transformed into the so-called “patient value units,” with each 
unit head included in the top management team. In addition, strategic marketing also became part of 
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top management. As a result, the top management team increased both in size and diversity, which 
enhanced its problem-solving capabilities. This was done by (1) increasing the amount of 
knowledge and information that could be absorbed and recalled, (2) increasing the number of 
critical judgments available to correct errors in decision-making, (3) increasing the number of 
potential solution strategies, and (4) increasing the variety of perspectives brought to bear on 
specific problems (Harrison, 1975; Hoffman and Maier, 1961; Shull, Delbecq, and Cummings, 
1970). Moreover, to further strengthen information processing capabilities, UCB introduced another 
complementary practice. The ability to source and process important customer data and transform it 
into insights (i.e., useful and meaningful pieces of digested information), which could then be 
incorporated into new services, products, or activities, required that UCB improve its internal 
communication flows, particularly along the horizontal dimension. All of this was achieved with the 
implementation of a new web-based intranet platform (UCB Plaza). In addition to allowing multiple 
organizational members to contribute ideas, the platform improved the identification of knowledge 
resources within the organization. An equally important feature of the UCB Plaza is its ability to 
aggregate information and knowledge from dispersed individuals, which could lead to improved 
organizational decision making under uncertainty (cf. Deutsch and Madow, 1961). As argued by 
Felin and Zenger (2011: 4), “even naive and biased information aggregation can do better than 
expert or managerial judgment.”  
In contrast, although LEO also made substantial changes to its internal task structure, it 
seemed to place less emphasis on the relationship between information processing and the new task 
activities. Top management were convinced that by delegating decision rights to GPE, they would 
be able to economize on the vertical knowledge transfer costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1992) 
resulting from the increased service content. However, due to limited hierarchical authority, GPE 
was largely unable to exercise those rights. As a consequence, problems and conflicts were 
commonly escalated to the top management level and forced project delays and increased 
coordination costs. Information processing was further hampered by the lack of liaison positions. 
As mentioned earlier, GPE relied on participation and input from other functional areas, but there 
was rarely a common point of contact, which resulted in additional coordination problems. In spite 
of these accumulated difficulties, the delegated decision-making power enabled GPE to judge, 
absorb, and pass on the relevant input from the end customers. Similarly to UCB’s Plaza, LEO 
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introduced an intranet platform (Pulse) with the aim of improving horizontal knowledge flow within 
the organization. The platform had limited success, however, partly because of low user-
friendliness and partly due to organizational members’ preference for informal communication 
channels. As an additional knowledge sharing practice, GPE hosted a range of workshops for 
employees involved in Columbus and QualityCareTM. These were somewhat useful in identifying 
synergies across the different projects. Concurrently with the launch of QualityCareTM, GPE 
designed a launch excellence framework for the subsidiaries, highlighting the (generic) steps and 
challenges associated with the implementation of QualityCareTM. Nevertheless, despite these efforts 
to improve the company’s information processing capabilities, considerable coordination costs were 
still incurred. One could even argue that the efforts were counterproductive, in the sense that they 
exacerbated information overload. The reason for this, I suggest, is that LEO treated information 
processing from a unit perspective rather than an organizational perspective, as UCB did. In the 
end, as a consequence of the escalating information processing burden, it was decided to enlarge the 
size of the top management team. 
Throughout the fifteen years studied, Novo Nordisk’s task environment remained relatively 
stable, with low uncertainty and high predictability. Accordingly, the organization did not face 
fundamentally different information processing requirements. Put differently, new problems did not 
emerge at a sufficient frequency to require a significant increase in information processing 
capabilities (Daft and Lengel, 1986). Rather, most issues were well understood, which meant that 
lengthy discussions were rarely needed to resolve them. Instead, coordination and information 
exchange were sought by means of formalization and standardization efforts, including the reliance 
on rules, standards, procedures, policies and precedents. These practices represented information 
filters that would allow the organization to immediately identify the most crucial pieces of 
information in the information stream (Arrow, 1974; Daft and Weick, 1984). The Triple Bottom 
Line and the accompanying balanced scorecard system were implemented for that specific purpose 
of disseminating and sourcing the right pieces of information pertaining to Novo Nordisk’s strategic 
priorities. Like many other companies at the time, Novo Nordisk was being constantly bombarded 
with information about digitalization and patient support programs. However, the filters ensured 
that efforts and information activities would be directed toward refining and reinforcing the existing 
BM, rather than radically altering the way Novo Nordisk did business. Occasionally, however, the 
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organization did suffer problems and coordination breakdowns. The way that Novo Nordisk 
identified and responded to such issues was through a unique organizational practice—namely, the 
actions of so-called “facilitators.” Each year, the group of facilitators would visit a select number of 
strategically important departments and subsidiaries to ensure that inefficiencies and 
implementation errors were being kept to a minimum. If errors were identified, or if processes 
appeared to be inadequate or incompletely described, the facilitators would help implement 
corrective actions. If the focal unit or subsidiary then neglected to take the corrective actions, the 
problem would be escalated to the top management level. Besides serving as a control mechanism, 
the facilitators were instrumental in the sharing of best practices. Although UCB and LEO faced far 
greater information processing requirements than Novo Nordisk, the recent FDA rejection of 
Tresiba® led top management to reconsider some aspects of its information processing orientation. 
As a result, global marketing and medical affairs became part of the top management team to ensure 
that effective interventions could be made in advance of potential future rejections.  
An interesting finding from all three cases was that the size and/or composition of the top 
management team changed markedly during the fifteen years under study, and that these changes 
were made to improve information processing. This, I suggest, is due in large part to the inherently 
systemic nature of BMI. As noted by Stieglitz and Foss (2015: 105), “it is well known from the 
literature on coordination in complex systems that system elements may stand in different relations 
of specificity and complementarity to each other (Lachmann, 1956; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 
Williamson, 1996; Levinthal, 1997).” However, the lower levels of the hierarchy are rarely in a 
position to identify such relations. Instead, due to their global perspective, the top management 
team is better positioned to take actions according to those relations. Perhaps not surprisingly, it 
was also evident that, depending on the type and scope of BM changes, the companies faced 
different information processing requirements.   
Performance measures. As shown in previous sections, the implementation of BMI rests on 
the firm’s ability to align or match its structures, tasks, and information processing to its intended 
BM change(s). Performance measurement systems play a critical role in this regard because they 
are used to control and influence behavior in the organization and guide the strategic reorientation 
process (Wouters, 2009). Such systems usually consist of a balance between internal and external 
measures, and between quantitative and qualitative measures (Keegan, Eiler, and Jones, 1989). In 
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general, all three firms seemed to stick with the performance measures traditionally associated with 
pharmaceutical firms—notably, measurement related to number of unit sales, number of physician 
visits, and time to market. Since the vast majority of pharmaceutical revenues are still generated 
from drug sales, this is hardly surprising. 
In the case of LEO, despite the increasing service content and coordination failures, top 
management were reluctant to incorporate new KPIs, as they would interfere with the day-to-day 
running of LEO. Although the new BMI unit (GPE) had new task-specific KPIs (such as customer 
satisfaction and number of enrolled customers), it did not matter much, since the existing 
organization was strongly preoccupied with reaching sales and budget targets. As succinctly 
explained by Kindström and Kowalkowski (2015: 202), “despite the common opinion that ‘what 
gets measured gets done,’ to the frustration of service managers, incentive systems and metrics are 
frequently still product-centric.” This lack of alignment was problematic due to the interdependent 
relationship between GPE and the other organizational units. Interestingly, while top management’s 
intention was to minimize coordination failures and conflicts of interest, the reluctance to include 
service objectives as part of the overall performance measurement system ended up causing even 
more coordination failures and conflicts of interest. 
In contrast, while Novo Nordisk also relied greatly on its existing product-centric 
performance measures, the new Triple Bottom Line reporting system took into account the new 
strategic priorities. A list of 19 performance targets was compiled to reflect various aspects of social 
and environmental responsibility. For example, one target included the implementation of 
sustainable BMs in developing countries, measured by (1) the number of least developed countries 
in which Novo Nordisk is operating, and (2) the number of least developed countries that have 
chosen to buy insulin under the best possible pricing scheme. While the former constituted a proxy 
for access to essential medicines, the latter addressed the expected affordability of essential 
medicines. Since the new performance measures represented an extension of the firm’s current 
operations (rather than a radical departure from established practices), they resulted in positive 
spillover, as the extent to which fulfillment of one target enhances the quality or achievement of 
other targets. 
Meanwhile, UCB also rolled out new performance measures, but they were designed 
specifically for the more radical step of developing and delivering customer-tailored solutions. In 
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particular, organizational units were measured on their ability to prioritize capability renewal by 
means of, for example, job rotation and coaching. In a similar study, Rasmussen and Foss (2015: 
260) found that, UCB’s sales and marketing subsidiaries “had to submit regular reports about their 
budget allocation, [where the objective function was to spend] at least 30 percent of the budget [on] 
non-traditional marketing activities.” Besides that, individual contributions and achievements were 
encouraged by new, high-powered incentives such as variable remuneration. In other words, UCB’s 
new measures were intended to promote the risk-taking and entrepreneurial behavior that is 
associated with more radical BMI efforts. In contrast to LEO, the top management team at UCB 
viewed BM change in terms of a monolithic process, or as an organization-wide phenomenon. For 
that reason, they recognized the importance of incorporating the BMI into the overall performance 
measurement system. Even though UCB’s organizational units were also measured based on 
product-centric performance indicators, the autonomy enjoyed by the “patient solution teams” 
allowed them to effectively balance concurrent and dissimilar tasks. 
One interesting finding here is that all three companies seemed to add new measures to 
existing ones, rather than removing or replacing the existing ones. As argued by Gunasekaran, 
Patel, and McGaughey (2004: 335), many firms “fail to realise that performance assessment can be 
better addressed using a trivial few—they are not really trivial, but instead those few areas are most 
critical to success.” Neves, Carole, James, Wolf, and Benton (1986: 141) conclude that “managers 
lack time or simply find it too difficult to try to identify good signals from the mass of numbers.” 
Thus, the proliferation of performance measures may have slowed down the BM change process 
(somewhat) in all three cases. Why then, one might ask, are top managers reluctant to remove or 
replace existing performance measures? Besides the obvious reason that the vast majority of 
revenues are still generated from drug sales, I speculate that performance measures are particularly 
sensitive to organizational resistance. While changes in the organizational structure do not directly 
force organizational units or individuals to change their behavior or develop new skills, appropriate 
performance measures are more indicative of how of much effort they have exerted. Moreover, top 
managers’ compensation packages are usually tied to short-term performance variables, such as 
profitability, market share, productivity, patents and firm growth. In other words, managers are 
more inclined to preserve performance measures that are favorable for them but not necessarily for 
the long-term outcome.    
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Complementarities. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) broadly define complementarities as 
existing among organizational elements if the benefits from doing organizational activities jointly 
are higher than the sum of the benefits gained from doing the activities separately. Thus, as argued 
by Stieglitz and Foss (2015: 110), “if the changes involve design decision relating to fixing the 
levels of a set of variables (say, x and y), complementarity is obtained when choosing a higher level 
of x raises the returns of choosing a higher level of y, and vice versa.” On the one hand, due to the 
synergistic feature of complementarities, they might enable managers to realize additional value 
creation from their BMI efforts. On the other hand, complementarities are by no means readily 
apparent to the decision maker; instead, they are usually revealed through deliberate search 
processes (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Stieglitz and Hein, 2007). However, such 
a search may reveal that some organizational elements are inconsistent with the complementarity 
logic and therefore create misfits (Siggelkow, 2002). The problem is that 
different change initiatives are often crafted by different groups of employees and managers. 
Compensation initiatives may stem from human resource department, re-engineering from 
line management, and quality initiatives from a separate quality function. The separation of 
these decisions increases the probability that non-complementary design choices will be 
selected (Zenger, 2002: 91-92). 
The findings from the cases in this study show that the complementarity logic (or lack 
thereof) plays a critical role in redesigning the organization for BMI. This logic is perhaps best 
illustrated by the case of UCB. UCB’s process of BMI from 2000 to 2015 exhibited several stages 
in which complementarity dynamics arose. The acquisition of Schwarz Pharma, for example, 
enabled UCB to address unmet patient needs within the CNS segment, while significantly 
improving the BM of neurologists by supplying them with a wider set of treatment options. This 
might in in turn influence sales force productivity, as additional products can be marketed to the 
individual neurologists. In addition, with Schwarz Pharma, UCB gained access to new markets in 
Eastern Europe and China, where Schwarz Pharma was already operating very productively. This 
meant that UCB would be able to market their other products without first setting up subsidiaries. 
The change in the rights structure of UCB was such that decision rights changed in a way that was 
complementary to the change in strategy; specifically, delegating extensive decision rights to the 
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“patient solution teams” (and later “patient value units”) enabled UCB to get closer to the 
customers, where decisions can be made based upon the latest detailed information. The delegation 
of decision rights was accompanied by variable remuneration, which increased the power of the pay 
incentive. The UCB Plaza was complementary to rights delegation in terms of sourcing and 
building knowledge because it helped foster the knowledge exchange that gave rise to new ideas for 
patient solutions. Top management’s strong emphasis on redesigning the entire organization around 
the “patient value unit” structure and specific patient missions created unity and homogeneity that 
in turn mitigated some of the coordination issues associated with delegation. The complementary 
aspects of these organizational elements and activities also explain the speed and decisiveness with 
which top management orchestrated the BM transformation. 
Conversely, LEO’s process of BMI revealed a number of “anti-complementarities” or misfits 
between organizational elements. Most notably, several strategic changes were introduced between 
2009 and 2015 to support patient centricity. However, these changes were not followed by 
corresponding changes in the overall organizational design. For example, except for the new BMI 
unit, all the existing units were still guided by product-centric incentives and performance 
requirements, which were not complementary to LEO’s new strategic orientation. Moreover, even 
though the new unit was given extensive design rights, the new regional structure conferred even 
more powerful decision authority to the product-oriented regional heads.  Consequently, as noted by 
Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013: 4), “when there is a large number of complementarities among 
practices within an existing system, but [there are] conflicts between practices from the old system 
and practices from the new system, then it is likely that the transition will be difficult,” particularly 
when goals are not aligned and decision-making is decentralized. Thus, due to the “anti-
complementary” nature of changing only one organizational element or a small subset of elements, 
overall implementation efforts are likely to be less successful. LEO’s top management should have 
instead changed all of the elements in the system simultaneously or not introduced new elements in 
a piecemeal fashion. This is because, consistent with the literature on complementarities, significant 
changes to a core organizational element will set in motion complementary pressures to either 
change other elements or to abandon the original change (Zenger, 2002). As a result, LEO decided 
to somewhat abandon its original strategy by spinning off the “anti-complementary” activities into a 
new, independent unit (LEO Innovation Lab). The reason that LEO did not manage to “get the 
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complementarities right” is partly due to top management’s misperception of the “interaction 
effects among choices that interact with each other in different ways” (Siggelkow, 2002: 900). 
Moreover, LEO also had to deal with significant organizational resistance, while having scarce 
resources and capabilities. In other words, they may have lacked the needed capacity to do 
everything at once, instead opting for a seemingly less risky piecemeal approach. 
Given that Novo Nordisk adopted an incremental approach to BMI, they were not confronted 
with the same level of internal inconsistencies as LEO and UCB. In other words, Novo Nordisk’s 
organization already constituted a complementary system of organizational elements. Thus, 
decisions with regard to organizational design were made to reinforce existing complementarities 
across the organization without violating the internal fit among existing choices. For example, the 
new Global Stakeholder Engagement unit allowed Novo Nordisk to extend its capabilities beyond 
its original scope. More specifically, the unit enabled the company to enter the bottom-of-the-
pyramid markets, which synergized well with the company’s growing insulin portfolio. 
Furthermore, the training and education of HCPs could potentially lead to increased prescribing 
rates and brand loyalty for Novo Nordisk products. This was also supported by new performance 
measures that ensured alignment with existing organizational units. These changes were 
implemented with relative ease because they were made to fit the existing complementary logic.  
At the same time, however, top management’s emphasis on such a tight fit made Novo 
Nordisk more vulnerable to environmental change. As mentioned earlier, the FDA’s rejection of 
Tresiba® was surprising to many in the company. It is likely that the tight coupling between 
activities filtered out important external information that would have been fit destroying. 
Nevertheless, to cope with the increasing pressures from payers and regulators, top management 
shifted their focus toward the marketing organization by, for example, making them part of the top 
management team. In hindsight, I speculate whether this action was sufficient, because tight 
coupling usually requires a firm to change many organizational elements simultaneously (Nadler, 
Shaw, and Walton, 1995). Yet, as exemplified in the case of LEO, doing so is an inherently difficult 
task. 
Complementarities seemed to play a significant role in all three companies’ BMI 
implementation process. Interestingly, while both LEO and UCB made similar changes to their 
BMs in terms of increasing the service content, the implementation process varied considerably due 
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to the perception (or misperception) of complementarities. This shows that even if 
complementarities are obtained among BM elements, underestimating the interaction effects among 
the underlying organizational elements can lead to poor implementation or inadequacies in 
decision-making.              
Stage 3: Outcomes 
Realized BMI 
All three companies made changes to their BMs and organizational design; however, UCB went 
much further than the other companies in this regard. UCB underwent a dramatic transformation, in 
which the underlying logic of the change was a shift in emphasis from products to services, while 
opening up to new and unusual external partners to make firm boundaries more permeable. 
However, the most remarkable aspect of this transformation relates to the scope and speed with 
which UCB managed to redesign the formal organization to accommodate the new BM.  
The changes at Novo Nordisk seem less dramatic, as the objective was to refine and reinforce 
existing BM activities rather than radically transform them. Although customer centricity was a 
central component of Novo Nordisk’s BM, this focus did not materialize into new and radical 
service offerings, as in the cases of UCB and LEO. Instead, top management was convinced that 
customer centricity could be better achieved by improving the quality and availability of drugs. 
Thus, in contrast to many other pharmaceutical companies, Novo Nordisk has managed to mitigate 
external pressures to an extent that its traditional BM has remained viable. Part of the explanation 
for this may lie in the fact that Novo Nordisk operates within a very narrow therapeutic range, and 
is therefore able to devote more resources and attention, rather than spreading them thin across 
several therapy areas. As a result, it is likely that Novo Nordisk’s concerted efforts paid off because 
more refined and reliable structures and processes were in place—which allowed the firm to 
leverage its existing BM activities more efficiently and effectively than other pharmaceutical firms. 
In sum, UCB and Novo Nordisk resided at opposite ends of the BMI continuum. Between 
these two extremes, LEO adopted an “in-between” configuration, with the objective of shifting 
toward more radical BM activities while introducing minimum distortion to the existing ones. This 
approach seems appealing in its attempt to reconcile the benefits of both extremes, and is therefore 
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easy to sell to top management. However, as illustrated in the LEO case, it is possibly the most 
challenging form of BMI to implement because decision makers will face difficulties in 
differentiating the organizational design to accommodate both stable and dynamic areas of BM 
change. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly difficult to “get the complementarities right.”    
The Multiple Roles of Organizational Design 
In the next subsections I analyze the different roles played by the firm’s organizational design in the 
process of BMI (see Figure 9.2). As shown in the previous section, all three companies went 
through different yet similar stages of organizational redesign to support the BMI process. In 
particular, I attempt to specify and discuss the possible causal linkages between the firms’ 
organizational designs and BM changes.        
 
 
Figure 9.2 Proposed research model 
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Organizational Design as a Driver of BMI 
The evidence from the cases seems to suggest that the choice of organizational design is an 
important driver of the scope and degree of BMI. With regard to scope, centralized decision making 
is likely to trigger system-wide BM changes with architectural characteristics. In particular, 
centralized decision makers are uniquely positioned to (1) integrate diverse bodies of knowledge, 
(2) assess complementarities, or the lack thereof, and (3) make simultaneous changes to the system. 
Therefore, firms that initially rely on centralized coordination are more likely to engage in 
architectural BM change. In the case of UCB, several BM and organizational elements were 
changed in a coherent fashion (e.g., the acquisitions of Celltech and Schwarz Pharma, and SHAPE) 
each time top management altered the strategic direction of the company. The magnitude, speed and 
coherence with which UCB transformed its BM would not have been possible without centralized 
direction. On the other hand, firms that initially rely on decentralized decision making are more 
likely to engage in modular BM change. Specifically, although decentralization allows use of what 
Hayek (1945: 519) called “knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place,” it impedes 
coordination, resource redistribution, communication and accountability. For that reason, the nature 
of BM changes are more likely to be isolated and confined to specific areas of the organization, 
rather than contributing to a coherent and internally consistent whole. For example, the majority of 
LEO’s BM changes were largely driven by the new BMI unit (GPE), while other parts of the 
organization remained unchanged. However, as mentioned in the previous section, the existing 
organization was somewhat affected by GPE and vice versa. This may be attributed to the way top 
management perceives (or misperceives) interaction effects among new and old elements. In the 
case of LEO, top management misperceived the interaction effects, which led them to implement 
BM changes in a modular fashion despite their architectural properties. Thus, whether firms engage 
in modular or architectural BM change, they need to develop architectural knowledge so that the 
appropriate decisions can be taken to support the chosen approach. 
Meanwhile, organizational design choices are also likely to influence the degree of BMI 
undertaken. UCB introduced performance and reward structures that encouraged risk-taking and 
innovation, while Novo Nordisk relied more heavily on “hard” performance criteria such as sales 
and productivity. Not surprisingly, this led Novo Nordisk to institute short-term and incremental 
BM changes, while UCB implemented radical changes by exploring fundamentally different 
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opportunities. Similarly, the level of delegation can also influence the degree of BMI. For example, 
LEO’s new BMI unit (GPE) had extensive decision rights, which enabled them to cooperate more 
closely with the end customers. Not only did this allow LEO to better sense the need for changes in 
the BM, but it also provided access to potential lead users who could be a crucial source of new 
radical ideas with commercial benefits (e.g., Matthing, Kristensson, Gustafsson, and Parasuraman, 
2006; Luthje, Herstatt, and Von Hippel, 2005). As noted by Von Hippel (1986: 791), “lead users 
[are those] whose present strong needs will become general in a market place months or years in the 
future. Since lead users are familiar with conditions which lie in the future for most others, they can 
serve as a need-forecasting laboratory for marketing research.” 
BMI Challenges resulting from Organizational Design 
While organizational design may be an important driver of BMI, it may also significantly limit or 
hinder such efforts. Among other things, the organizational design determines the allocation of 
resources and decision rights, the types of people recruited, and the kinds of behaviors that are 
rewarded. Thus, existing organizational members have a strong incentive to maintain the status quo, 
since changes may render some capabilities less valuable than they were previously and, at the 
same time, shift the power structure within the organization. As illustrated in the case of LEO, the 
existing organization design greatly slowed down the progress on BMI and reduced the impact of 
the new BMI unit (GPE). Relatedly, before UCB restructured the organization in 2008, the line 
management functions had considerable power in terms of resources and decision-making 
authority. As a consequence, project managers were forced to beg for resources and attention in 
order for their projects to progress. Moreover, firms that engage in either architectural or radical 
BMI, or both, are more likely to face challenges arising from the existing design. This is because 
such types of BMI not only influence many parts of the organization but may also require 
fundamentally different organizational design features. 
The main advantage of BMI comes from its highly systemic features that promote the value-
enhancing effect across a system of interdependent activities (i.e., complementarities). However, 
although BMI may appear systemic on paper, this is rarely the case in the real world, where diverse 
interests, cultures, structures, processes, and so on, compete for the power to shape the BM. In order 
to solve such coordination problems, managers may resort to principles of organizational design. 
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Nevertheless, changing or not changing organizational design may present its own unique 
challenges with regard to complementarities. For example, the strong forces of inertia at Novo 
Nordisk caused by the existing set of complementary organizational design and BM elements led 
management to disregard external factors, such as the increasing price pressure from health care 
payers and regulators. UCB’s complete BM transformation meant that the organization had to break 
up existing complementarities while establishing an entirely new system of complementary 
activities. Due to the inherent complexity of having several interacting elements and activities, it 
becomes challenging to discern ex ante the true performance implications of internal changes 
(Rivkin, 2000). For that reason, although many simultaneous changes were made each time UCB’s 
BM changed, it had to undergo several major transformations before assuming its current form. 
This challenge was compounded by the radical nature of UCB’s value proposition. In particular, 
radical changes are usually associated with a sharp departure from what is known about the BM, 
taking the designer into new and unexplored territory (Levinthal and March, 1993). As part of the 
“SHAPE Program,” top management at UCB decided to reduce the total workforce by 2,000 
positions.        
Organizational Design Facilitators of BMI 
BMI poses considerable managerial challenges, as indicated above and in the previous section. Due 
to the systemic nature of BMs, such challenges are usually ubiquitous—they arise between 
headquarters and subsidiaries, and within and across units and departments. Moreover, different 
types of BMI are associated with different challenges and thus require different organizational 
designs to achieve success. To deal with these challenges, each case company developed its own set 
of organizational design facilitators to enhance the effect of the drivers discussed earlier. In the case 
of Novo Nordisk, while the hard and quantifiable performance measures led the organization to 
focus on short-term and incremental improvements, it was the use of a functional structure with 
formal rules and procedures that facilitated the incremental addition of new products and the 
refinement of old marketing and pricing practices (e.g., DAWN and the differential pricing policy). 
Zollo and Winter (2002) argue that such design choices facilitate the development of proposals for 
improving existing routines. In contrast, UCB’s use of autonomous cross-functional teams (patient 
solution teams), with an emphasis on digital collaborative learning (UCB Plaza), facilitated the 
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development of completely new ways to work. For example, instead of organizing work around 
short-term and quantifiable performance measures, each patient solution team aimed to fulfill 
specific patient missions, such as improving the life of young people suffering from epilepsy. 
Although LEO was less successful than UCB and Novo Nordisk in regard to BMI implementation, 
they were the only company that introduced a dedicated BMI unit (GPE). Besides being 
instrumental in the development of an entirely new value proposition, GPE facilitated 
experimentation and learning that later let to the LEO Innovation Lab spin-off.  
The Role of Time 
An interesting finding with respect to BMI and the accompanying organizational design changes 
was the role of time or temporal shifts. For example, during the early stages of the BMI process at 
UCB, centralized decision making proved useful in triggering the organization-wide changes that 
were needed. These temporal shifts not only served to reconnect disparate organizational units and 
create a synchronized readiness for change, but also ensured faster integration between UCB and 
Celltech employees, along with reducing the time spent in a suboptimal configuration. Conversely, 
LEO adopted a decentralized decision structure during the implementation of the new BM. As a 
result, LEO was unable to foster the same level of synchronized readiness for BM change. Instead, 
the decentralized decision process served as barrier to rallying organizational members around the 
new strategic priorities. In the mid-to-late stages of UCB’s BMI process, extensive decision-making 
power was delegated to the patient solution teams. Based on the evidence, time appears to be an 
important factor that can either positively or negatively affect the impact of organizational design 
choices during BMI. All three companies went through periods of stability and continuity, which 
allowed time for the change to better manifest itself and mesh together with the larger organization. 
This was particularly important because BMI complementarities are rarely apparent at the time of a 
new BM’s introduction. Rather, identifying complementarities requires a deliberate search and 
experimentation, which take time to carry out.     
The Locus of BMI 
The question of where in the firm BMI is carried out is important because having the answer 
represents a first step toward understanding the sources of BMI and the mechanisms by which it is 
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brought forth (or implemented). While technological innovations are usually carried out by the 
internal R&D unit or New Product Development, the locus of BMI within the company is more 
ambiguous. The reason for this, I suggest, is that, technological innovations are largely comprised 
of discrete knowledge bundles that can be made explicit, since they consist of some tangible 
elements and can therefore be located more easily within a distinct unit. BMI, on the other hand, is 
more holistic and tacit in nature and is therefore more likely to be an organization-wide and 
boundary spanning activity. In the cases of Novo Nordisk and UCB, the location of BMI activities 
was distributed across several organizational units. In LEO’s case, BMI was carried out by the 
newly established BMI unit (GPE), but after a few years it became apparent that the BMI must be 
either anchored within the larger organization or spun off. This is not say that a dedicated BMI unit 
is not important, but rather that it must be linked in a coherent manner to the existing organization. 
Of all three companies, UCB was the most successful at accommodating the tacit dimension of 
BMI. More specifically, designing the entire organization around the team-based structure provided 
the colocation of expertise needed to deal with high levels of tacit process knowledge. 
Although BMI appeared to be an organization-wide process in the cases, it tended to cluster 
around downstream activities such as marketing, sales and corporate communication. For example, 
the majority of Novo Nordisk’s BM improvements were driven by the newly established Global 
Stakeholder Engagement unit, while LEO’s new BMI unit (GPE) resided within the Global Sales 
and Marketing department. The basic reason BMI’s downstream locus is that it a customer-oriented 
process that includes all the activities needed to create additional customer value. Thus, BMI 
activities are more likely to be structured around units with more ready access to pertinent customer 
information. This was reflected in the type of strategic partnerships and value propositions that each 
firm engaged in.   
  
 
10  
Concluding Discussion 
Guided by the overarching research question—What is the role of organizational design in the 
process of business model innovation?—this thesis has not only examined how BMI activity 
unfold, but has looked at the different roles played by the organizational designer, as well as at the 
locus of the activity itself. To do so, a multiple-case study of three select players in the 
pharmaceutical industry over the course of fifteen years (from 2000 to 2015) was conducted. An 
overarching theme of the thesis is that BMs are complex systems of elements and activities that 
may relate to one another with different levels of specificity, interdependence, and 
complementarity. Any changes to such a system (i.e., BMI) are likely to cascade in ways that are 
difficult to predict ex ante, especially when human actions are involved. Consequently, BMI is a 
complex and uncertain process that shifts over time and requires the coordination and integration of 
new and old system elements into a coherent whole. This directs attention toward organizational 
design, which determines the “sum of the total ways in which a firm divides its labor into distinct 
tasks and then achieves coordination among them” (Mintzberg, 1979: 2). Unless the complexity of 
coordinating BMI efforts is properly managed and designed, the firm’s ability to change its BM 
become attenuated and the likelihood of poor implementation increases. For these reasons, BMI is 
conceptualized as the reconfiguration of the designable parts of an organization. By affecting the 
ability to coordinate and synchronize activities, information, and tasks between organizational 
members and units, organizational design is likely to have an impact on the firm’s ability to 
dynamically adjust to, and take advantage of, BM opportunities that are central to firm survival and 
growth in the presence of environmental change.  
This thesis contributes to the recent debate in the literature regarding the nature of BMI and 
its causal mechanisms (with a focus on organizational design), as well as to research on 
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organizational complementarities. In this regard, I developed a new framework that encompasses 
the processes through which BMI comes about and have shed light on the multiple roles of 
organizational design. Moreover, the thesis also supplies much needed detail on how organizational 
complementarities are created or lost in the process of finding the right fit.          
Theoretical Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the literature by (1) conceptualizing BMI as an organizational redesign 
process; (2) explicating the possible causal linkages between the firm’s organizational design and 
BM change; and (3) advancing our understanding of organizational complementarities by providing 
ample detail on how the search for value-enhancing effects can either promote or hinder BMI 
efforts. 
Conceptualizing BMI. The conceptualization of BMI through an organizational design lens 
shows that design choices related to structure, information processing, performance measures, and 
tasks and responsibilities are an integral part of conducting BM change. Such design elements 
therefore need to be recognized and incorporated into the analysis of BMI. Without concurrent or 
subsequent change(s) made to the underlying organizational design, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to effectuate the proposed BM change(s). This is because the organizational design 
represents a formal means of implementation, since managers can operationalize BMI by altering 
the allocation of resources and decision-making competencies. In this way, BMI is transformed into 
something that can be acted upon. While the extant research has contributed immensely to a general 
understanding of what BMI is (e.g., Santos et al., 2009; Teece, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2012), why 
firms engage in it (e.g., De Reuver, Bouwman, and MacInnes, 2009; Lee et al., 2012; Miller et al., 
2014; Sabatier, Craig-Kennard, and Mangematin, 2012; Wirtz et al., 2010), and what its 
characteristics are (e.g., Velamuri et al., 2015; Frankenberger et al., 2013; Dunford et al., 2010; 
McGrath, 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Sosna et al., 2010) and its performance implications (e.g., Amit 
and Zott, 2007; Bock et al., 2012; Giesen et al., 2007), relatively little attention has been devoted to 
the organizational design of BMI. One notable exception is Foss and Saebi’s (2015) Business Model 
Innovation: The Organizational Dimension. The book encompasses different contributions from 
leading scholars within the field that specifically deal with the organizational dimension of BMI, 
including organizational design considerations. This thesis adds to the debate by proposing a 
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framework that sheds new light on the BMI process and organizational design choices needed to 
coordinate different types of BMI efforts. In particular, the framework points toward the importance 
and challenges of managing fit between BM elements (new and old ones), with regard to value 
creation, value appropriation, value chain organization, the value network, and the array of 
organizational design choices available to managers. For example, at UCB, the BMI was 
architectural and led to specific design rules for subsequent BM changes in order to form a coherent 
system, while in the case of LEO, the BMI was modular and changes were partitioned rather than 
combined into an overarching system. UCB relied heavily on centralized decision making in order 
integrate the various functional activities and obtain the necessary complementarities to drive the 
value-enhancing effects, whereas LEO placed a high value on decentralized decision making in 
order to confine BM changes to specific areas of the organization so as to avoid interfering with the 
day-to-day operations. 
More generally, it was evident that all three companies made organizational design changes to 
support BMI regardless of the type, scope and degree of BM changes. For example, even though 
Novo Nordisk adopted the least radical form of BMI, the company still introduced new 
performance measures, a new unit, and changed the roles and responsibilities of the top 
management team. Hence, by studying the transition from an “old” BM to a new model in three 
related but different companies, the findings of this thesis may contribute to research on 
organizational design in complex systems (Fleming, 2001; Levinthal, 1997; Nadler and Tushman, 
1997; Simon, 1962). Most notably, the thesis argues that the process of BMI may challenge the 
ability of traditional organizational designs to facilitate and implement BM change. BMI is more 
systemic than more conventional types of innovation (e.g., product and process innovation), and 
therefore requires fundamentally different coordination mechanisms to accommodate for the added 
complexity involved in managing such innovations. More specifically, BMI is not just about what 
firms do (e.g., the bundle of products and services they offer to satisfy specific market segments), 
but also about how they do it (e.g., how they link factor and product markets to produce and deliver 
their bundle at a profit) (cf. Santos et al., 2009). As such, BMI requires a complex set of interactions 
involving multiple organizational units and levels, and often spanning firm boundaries. Due to these 
complex interactions, competitors may have a hard time identifying and replicating them within 
their own organizational context, which in turn helps differentiate the innovating firm’s offering 
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and ultimately leads to a competitive advantage. As such, I argue that BMI may serve as valuable 
empirical research context in which to investigate larger organizational questions relating to 
organizational change, design, integration, and survival. In the case of UCB, for example, the 
change brought through BMI forced the company to undertake multiple rounds of organizational 
restructuring in order to accommodate the new BM. 
Extending the causal relation between BMI and organizational design. The findings of this 
thesis contribute to our understanding of the causal web in which BMI is embedded. Given the 
nascent stage of BMI research, the causal mechanisms are still poorly understood and largely 
speculative. Nevertheless, recent studies have pointed to the roles of dynamic capabilities (Leih et 
al., 2015), the corporate center (Santos et al., 2015; Casadesus-Masanell, Ricart, and Tarjizán, 
2015), the top management team (Stieglitz and Foss, 2015), and organizational design (Colombo, 
Mohammadi, and Rossi-Lamastra, 2015; Kindström and Kowalkowski, 2015) in explaining BMI. 
Although those contributions provide valuable insight into the underlying causal structure of BMI, 
they remain largely anecdotal and conceptual rather than empirical. The findings presented in this 
thesis thus contribute to the research by theoretically and empirically showing how organizational 
design can act as either a driver or barrier, or as an important facilitator of BMI, and how these roles 
may shift over time. For example, the formation of new organizational units and the removal of old 
ones seemed to drive a significant part of the BM changes in all three companies. To illustrate, 
Novo Nordisk’s new Global Stakeholder Engagement unit used its influencing power to establish 
important partnerships that extended Novo Nordisk’s capabilities well beyond its original scope, 
thereby paving the way for the DAWN program and the differential pricing policy. With regard to 
challenges, LEO’s existing organizational design proved to be a significant hindrance to the 
progress of BMI, and ultimately led to the spin-off of the more radical BM activities. At the same 
time, organizational design was shown to be a crucial facilitator of BMI implementation. This was 
perhaps best exemplified by the case of UCB, in which the entire organization was frequently 
redesigned to fit the planned or emergent BM changes. Specifically, the use of autonomous cross-
functional teams and an emphasis on digital collaborative learning facilitated the development of 
completely new ways to work (i.e., relinking). For example, instead of structuring tasks around 
short-term and hard performance measures, each team developed its own distinct patient mission. 
This thesis argues for the importance of organizational design in the BMI process. Since BMI 
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implies changes to the formal organization, firms need to develop architectural knowledge on how 
on such changes affect the interdependencies and complementarities in the organizational system in 
order to make appropriate design decisions. Thus, in addition to developing capabilities related to 
experimentation, agility, and leadership (Achtenhagen et al., 2013; Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Demil 
and Lecqoc, 2010; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010) in order to change the BM, the findings 
suggest that firms also need to accumulate knowledge about the overall organizational design in 
order to avoid misfits between organizational design and BM elements.       
Another important finding related to BMI and organizational design was the role of time or 
temporal shifts. Despite the dynamic nature of BMI, previous research seems to have disregarded 
the temporal dimension of BMI, instead focusing on other characteristics, such as type, scope and 
degree of change (e.g., Santos et al., 2009; Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Demil and Lecocq, 2010; 
Stieglitz and Foss, 2015). However, the findings presented here suggest that time may be an 
important factor in explaining the interaction between organizational design choices and BM 
changes during different periods. For example, highly centralized decision-making structures that 
can reconnect diverse organizational units and foster a synchronized readiness for change are likely 
to be important in the early stages of BMI. But as time goes by and the hierarchy becomes 
increasingly overloaded with information, decentralization may be needed to improve the 
organization’s information processing capabilities. In addition, to unlock the value-enhancing 
effects of BMI, top managers must allow for periods of stability and continuity so that the preceding 
change can better manifest itself and mesh together within the wider organization. I particularly 
emphasize that BMI complementarities are seldom apparent at the time of the creation of a new 
BM. Instead, complementarities are achieved through deliberate search and experimentation, which 
takes time to carry out. For these reasons, it is difficult to map out the causal web of BMI, as some 
mechanisms may prove effective at one point in time during BMI, but less so at another. 
Where in the firm does BMI activity mainly takes place? Another interesting finding of this 
thesis relates to the locus of BMI. The extant research is not clear about where BMI occurs within 
the organization. Specifically, there is little clarity about whether it is located at the organizational 
level (or BM level), as most studies suggest (e.g.. George and Bock, 2011; Zott and Amit, 2008), or 
at lower levels, particularly at the managerial level, as some recent work has indicated (e.g., 
Chesbrough, 2010; Stieglitz and Foss, 2015). This thesis similarly shows that the locus of BMI is at 
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the organizational and managerial levels. The evidence also indicates that BMI is located at the 
strategic business unit level, particularly within the marketing organization. For example, many of 
Novo Nordisk’s BM refinements were driven by the newly established Global Stakeholder 
Engagement unit, while LEO’s new BMI unit (GPE) resided within the Global Sales and Marketing 
department. Meanwhile, UCB structured their activities around the patient solution teams. The 
reasons for this, I suggest, is that BMI is a customer-oriented process that encompasses all the 
activities required to create additional customer value. Thus, BMI activities are more likely to be 
situated within units having closer access to the end customers.      
Improving the understanding of complementarities. This research contributes to the ongoing 
research on organizational complementarities (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Levinthal, 1997; 
Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). As noted by Ennen and Richter (2010: 12) in their extensive review 
of empirical papers in this field, most extant studies “take a cross-sectional perspective on 
complementarities, using static measures of performance (e.g., productivity) or performance 
changes over relatively short periods of time.” As a consequence, there is little evidence on the role 
of complementarities in the cases of organizational change and transformation. Such a lack has also 
inhibited scholars from providing sufficient detail on how organization-specific factors (e.g., 
industry, strategy and BM) influence the role of complementarities. However, a notable exception is 
Siggelkow’s (2001) qualitative study of Liz Claiborne, which offers great detail on how factors 
such as as product design, marketing, production , distribution, etc., relate to one another, without 
neglecting the overall organizational configuration of the firm at two different periods in time. The 
findings presented in this thesis follow this example by providing ample detail on how 
organizational complementarities emerge, disappear, and re-emerge in the process of innovating 
incumbent BMs. For example, the case of UCB illustrates several of such complementarity 
dynamics. With the acquisition of Schwarz Pharma, UCB was able address new patient needs 
within the CNS segment, while creating more value for the neurologists (who are an important part 
of the firm’s value network) by supplying them with a more diverse range of treatments. In effect, 
such added value may increase sales force productivity, since more products can be marketed to the 
individual neurologists. The Schwarz Pharma acquisition also allowed UCB to access new markets 
in Eastern Europe and China that hitherto had been overlooked. Through this move, UCB would be 
able market its existing product portfolio without first setting up fully fledged sales and marketing 
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subsidiaries. Prior to 2008, although UCB worked cross-functionally, the line management 
functions still had significant power in terms of resource allocations and decision-making authority. 
As a consequence, projects were often slowed or halted, since project managers had constantly beg 
for resources and attention in order for their projects to move projects. With the formation of the 
“patient solution teams,” top management made a change in the rights structure of the organization 
such that decision-making authority was changed in a way that was complementary to the change in 
strategy; particularly by delegating extensive decision rights to the “patient solution teams” (and 
later, the “patient value units”), permitting UCB to get closer to the end customers. The added 
responsibility and independence was complemented by making incentives more high powered 
through variable remuneration. The company’s new internal communication platform (UCB Plaza) 
was complementary to rights delegation with regard to sourcing and developing knowledge because 
it supported the knowledge exchange that gave rise to new ideas for patient solutions. Perhaps most 
importantly, top management’s emphasis on structuring the entire organization around the team, as 
well as around specific customer missions, led to added unity and homogeneity, which in turn 
alleviated some of the coordination issues associated with autonomous organizational structures. 
Top management’s understanding of the complementary aspects of BMI was further exemplified by 
the speed and decisiveness with which they orchestrated the company’s BM transformation.          
Managerial Implications 
Together, these findings have important managerial implications for firms that decide to engage in 
BMI. The argument outlined in this thesis suggests that organizational design plays multiple roles in 
the process of BMI, and can therefore affect the firm’s ability to change its BM in a variety of ways. 
For example, in some situations, a centralized decision-making structure with formal rules and 
procedures and functional specialization may be needed, while in others, flatter and more 
autonomous structures accompanied by specific customer missions may be more appropriate. Thus, 
managers need to base their choice of BM change on a number of contingencies, such as the 
dimensions and features of the existing organizational design, BM elements, strategy and 
environmental conditions. Based on these contingencies, I specify broad roles (e.g., drivers, barriers 
and facilitators) of organizational design that arise during the coordination and integration of 
different types of BMI, as it relates to mobilizing structures, processes, organizational resources and 
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capabilities when a BM change takes place. Specifically, the insights can help managers determine 
the optimal organizational design configuration for a given BMI, and how different organizational 
design variables may act during different stages of the BMI process. Armed with such insights, 
managers will have a greater chance of succeeding with their BMI implementation efforts. 
Moreover, in contrast to the extant literature (e.g., Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Demil and Lecqoc, 
2010; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010), the findings imply that firms may not need to directly 
develop BMI-specific capabilities. Rather, firms may indirectly influence and build such 
capabilities by introducing specific organizational design mechanisms to elicit certain behaviors 
among employees (cf. Foss et al., 2011). For example, UCB and LEO designed their organizations 
to increase the receptivity to knowledge and ideas coming from beyond their organizational 
boundaries.     
In addition to pinpointing the role of organizational design during BMI (see Figure 9.2), I 
believe that the insights can provide a helpful perspective on organizational complementarities. 
While managers usually point to the importance of change agents in bringing about organizational 
change, this thesis argues for the critical role of complementarities. Without sufficient knowledge 
about how to interpret complementarities, decision makers might be unable to realize the value-
enhancing effects associated with BMI. For instance, the choice of a new BM is usually tied to 
many other choices than merely ensuring alignment between the various BM elements. In the case 
of LEO, a number of BM changes were proposed to support a more customer-oriented approach. 
However, even though changes were made to the value proposition, value network, and value chain, 
they were not accompanied by corresponding changes to the overall organizational design. As a 
consequence, the firm experienced greater misfits and tensions between the new BM elements and 
the established organization. Thus, despite the efforts made by several change agents, LEO had to 
abandon its original strategy by spinning off the “anti-complementary” BM activities into a new 
independent business unit (LEO Innovation Lab). This could potentially have been avoided if 
decision makers understood more about the complexities of organizational complementarities.  
More generally, it is hoped that the framework (Figure 9.1) presented herein can help 
managers better understand and manage the BMI process. Notably, the framework outlines three 
critical stages of the BMI process: (1) motivation; (2) implementation; and (3) outcome. In contrast 
to other BMI frameworks (e.g., Cavalcante et al., 2011; Frankenberger et al., 2013), this one 
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incorporates a complementarity logic by illustrating potential areas of fit or misfit. Such a logic can 
help managers anticipate some of the complex interrelationships surrounding BM change, and thus 
make choices that better reflect the holistic nature of BMI. Further, to my knowledge, this is the 
first framework to shed light on the organizational redesign process of BMI. As such, it may help 
managers think of organizational design in a proactive way, rather than seeing it more reactively—
as either a barrier to or necessary facilitator of BMI (cf. Foss et al., 2012). The framework also 
points to important areas in the BM from which BMI may begin. For instance, the findings from the 
cases show that changes to the value proposition (reactivating) and the architecture (relinking) of 
the BM are the most common types of BMI adopted, while repartitioning and relocating are used to 
a lesser extent in the BMI process. The reason for this, I suggest, is that the former types of BMI 
may have greater overall implications for value creation and appropriation vis-à-vis offshoring/on-
shoring or outsourcing/insourcing selected BM activities. Thus, the framework offers practical 
guidance for managers seeking to embark on BMI by providing a useful starting point from which 
an incumbent BM can be innovated. Similarly, the thesis improves our understanding of the role of 
time and where BMI is located within the larger organization. Equipped with such insights, 
managers and decision makers are in better position to knowledgably engage in BMI, and use time 
to their advantage to modify (or remove) BM elements in a synchronized manner.     
Limitations and Future Research 
The goal of this thesis was to outline a new framework that could shed light on the processes 
underlying BMI, including, most notably, the role of organizational design, using an in-depth 
multiple-case analysis for illustration. Since this thesis relied on qualitative research methods to 
investigate the role of organizational design in the process of BMI, it is not suitable for addressing 
the questions of size, extent, performance, effectiveness, efficiency, or cost, as they relate to BMI, 
or for establishing whether a specific cause results in a pre-specified effect. Future studies could 
therefore use quantitative research designs to study the effects of various BM and organizational 
design configurations on performance. Relatedly, it is a limitation of this thesis that the 
performance implications of BMI were not studied. Ostensibly, BMI is undertaken for its adaptive 
or disruptive value, thus implying that increased firm survival rates and performance can be 
expected from such innovation. For example, while Zott and Amit (2007) found that novelty-
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centered BMs coupled with specific product market strategies can improve firm performance, Brea-
Solís, Casadesus-Masanell, and Grifell-Tatjé (2015) used micro-founded methods to quantify BM 
performance during three distinct stages in the evolution of Wal-Mart. Apart from these studies, 
however, the beneficial outcomes of BMI remain underdeveloped in the literature. In a highly 
conceptual manner, BMI may be understood as finding novel ways to create and capture value in 
concert with a plethora of different stakeholders. This can include new ways of bundling products 
and services together to generate more value (e.g., Kastalli and Van Looy, 2013), new ways of 
reorganizing activities to reduce transaction costs (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2012), new ways of 
collaborating and coordinating across firm boundaries (e.g., Tsvetkova, Gustafsson and Wikström, 
2014), new ways of organizing (e.g., Foss and Saebi, 2015), new ways of retaining business 
stakeholders such as customers (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2012), new ways of managing open innovation 
(e.g., Saebi and Foss, 2015), and so on. Arguably, a number of beneficial effects may be derived 
from such forms of BMI, including positive complementarities, increased innovativeness, improved 
cost-effectiveness and reduced coordination costs. Even when BMI fails to generate and appropriate 
adequate value, it may still be ‘symbolic[ally] efficient’; “An [organizational design] that makes an 
organization appear innovative or ethical, for instance, may help it either to raise capital from other 
organizations or to attract customers” (Abrahamson, 1991: 608). Beyond this highly conceptual 
level, our knowledge about the performance consequences of BMI remains rudimentary. Thus, 
future research could endeavor to develop a systematic mapping of the various performance 
outcomes that are likely to stem from different types of BMI. In addition, future work could 
investigate the relative contribution to competitive advantage of BMI versus other types of 
innovation. 
The findings of this thesis generally point to the role of organizational design in BM choices. 
However, I have also uncovered some implicit evidence that seems to stress the importance of 
managerial intentionality and power (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, and Volberda, 2007; Pfeffer, 
1992). For example, LEO’s BMI process was partly slowed by the new BMI unit’s (GPE’s) 
inability to gain the required commitment from the existing organization. As nicely put by Pfeffer 
(1992: 38), “when interdependence exists, our ability to get things done requires us to develop 
power and the capacity to influence those on whom we depend.” Furthermore, over the years, the 
marketing organization appeared to play an increasingly significant role in all three companies. 
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Although it seems logical to assume that BMI would naturally gravitate toward marketing due to 
marketing’s customer focus, the relationship is perhaps more nuanced than that. More specifically, 
while R&D was king in the past, the ability to gain patient outcome data, negotiate with payers to 
secure reasonable payments, and influence prescriber and patient behaviors are probably more 
important in the current health care context. As a consequence, the marketing organization is in an 
ideal position to accumulate power that could in turn influence BM choices. As such, the 
complexity and interdependence entailed in BMI might result in added uncertainty, opening up for 
political processes in decision making. Under such circumstances, organizational members may 
seek to exert influence by emphasizing decisions that serve their own interests while discounting 
the significance of others (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). In addition, the characteristics of BMI 
may also influence the power positions within the organization. Specifically, BMI that is more 
radical and broad in scope is more likely to alter the internal power structure than BMI with the 
opposite characteristics (Pfeffer and Fong, 2005). Thus, it would be worthwhile for future studies to 
look into how intentionality and power evolve, influence, facilitate or even redirect the BMI 
process. For instance, is there evidence that decision makers intentionally reject some BM choices 
while accepting others? What challenges and opportunities does this pose for the organizational 
designer? 
Although the thesis provides some evidence for why particular areas of the BM are more open 
to innovation than others, I believe an attention-based view would be useful in gaining a deeper 
understanding of why this is the case. As a consequence of the complex and systemic nature of 
BMIs, managers are subjected to a considerable number of choices regarding, for example, the type 
and extent of BMI; resource, capability and information requirements; integration between new and 
established BM elements; the scope of available alternatives; and so on. However, due to their 
limited capacity to process information, decision makers can only devote attention to a limited 
number of choices and issues (Simon, 1945; Ocasio, 1997). Future research should therefore 
investigate more specifically how key elements of attention-based theory contribute to the 
formulation and implementation of BMI. For example, it was clear that the radical and modular 
characteristics of LEO’s BMI required more managerial attention than Novo Nordisk’s incremental 
and architectural BMI. Meanwhile, UCB’s radical and architectural BMI also demanded 
considerable managerial attention. Therefore, future studies should explore in greater depth how 
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different types of BMI may affect managerial attention. Moreover, by taking an attention-based 
view of the post-BMI process, scholars would be able to distinguish between the stated intentions of 
engaging in BMI and what managers actually pay attention to in the BMI implementation process. 
Such insights could enable the organizational designer to set up structures and processes to ensure 
that attention is paid to the most appropriate and relevant BM choices and issues. 
The main focus of the thesis was an investigation of the role of organizational design in the 
process of BMI, thus leaving out an important discussion on leadership. As noted by Stieglitz and 
Foss (2015: 104),  
BMIs are far from homogenous. Some may involve relatively minor connected changes in, 
for example, the customer segments that are addressed and the revenue model in a business 
unit. Other BMIs may be massive corporate-wide processes that involve basically all 
employees and all processes and activities.  
For example, at UCB, four massive restructurings accompanied their new BM, while Novo Nordisk 
for the most part made minor adjustments and continued what appeared to be a fine-tuning of their 
existing BM. Such differences are likely to pose fundamentally different leadership challenges, and 
therefore require different leadership competencies. Stieglitz and Foss (2015) have developed a 
useful typology that combines the key dimensions of BMI with the role of top management. 
However, it has not been tested empirically. Hence, future empirical studies are needed to 
determine the extent to which different leadership styles directly o indirectly influence specific 
forms of BMI. Furthermore, all three companies initiated the BMI process after appointing a new 
CEO. In other words, it seems that CEO succession may be a fundamental lever that triggers BM 
change—it would therefore constitute an interesting topic for future research on BMI.   
Final Remarks 
 
 
Final Remarks 
Throughout the thesis, I have argued that the relatively new and underdeveloped field of BMI can 
increase the importance of its holistic approach by seeking cross-fertilization with the more 
established and decades-old field of organizational design. Doing so would not only enrich our 
understanding of the BMI process and where it takes place, but would also give us a better sense of 
how organizational complementarities are obtained or dissolved. As such, there is much to learn 
from combining insights from both fields in new and previously underappreciated ways. This thesis 
has made the synergies between the two fields more apparent, so that the theory in both fields, 
particularly BMI, can be extended. 
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